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This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the impact of financial aid programs
on students’ enrollment decisions, student outcomes, and colleges’ financial decisions. In the
first chapter, I use discontinuities in eligibility criteria for a large merit scholarship program
to examine the impact of aid on community college students’ outcomes both during and
after college. Community colleges enroll a large share of first-time freshmen but represent
a much smaller share of financial aid research. Furthermore, researchers have focused on
the impact of aid on enrollment and outcomes during college, but none have yet considered
the impact of aid on earnings after college. The findings suggest that reducing the cost of
community college does not impact persistence, academic performance, degree completion,
expected earnings, or short-term earnings after college for marginally eligible students. In
the second chapter, I examine whether colleges are sensitive to state-sponsored merit aid
programs. Previous research has emphasized demand-side effects such as how merit aid
impacts enrollment and post-matriculation outcomes. Yet much less is known about how
merit aid programs affect the supply side of higher education. Using differences-in-differences
identification, I collectively analyze multiple programs and explore numerous college-level
outcomes. Results suggest that colleges do not capture state-funded merit scholarships
through significant increases in published tuition, and colleges increase expenditures on
students in response to merit aid programs. Lastly, in the third essay, we use discontinuities
in Pell grant eligibility to examine the effect of the Pell grant on college enrollment and
college choice. Consistent with prior work, we find no evidence that marginal Pell eligibility
increases college-going. We go on to show that just meeting the Pell cut-off has little bearing
on where students choose to enroll, in terms of sector or quality dimensions. Below the
v
threshold, where applicants are needier and the grant is more generous, students sort into
colleges with modestly higher published tuition, but no other measure of college quality or
college selectivity significantly diverges from the counterfactual. We conclude that students
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Introduction
Traditionally, financial aid programs in the U.S. have intended to provide access to college
to financially constrained capable students. A prime example is the Pell grant program,
which originated from the Higher Education Act of 1965 and continues to be the largest
source of federal need-based aid for undergraduate students. Although, there has also been
substantial growth over the last two decades in state-sponsored merit aid programs, such
as the Tennessee HOPE scholarship and the Georgia HOPE scholarship. A large body of
literature has examined the impact of financial aid, including both need-based programs
such as the Pell grant and state-sponsored merit aid programs, and studies have found that
financial aid in general increases access to college. Although previous work has also found
that program design, the application process, and renewal requirements can greatly affect
the effectiveness of specific programs (Deming and Dynarski (2010) provide a recent review
of this literature and findings). However, there still remain many unknowns as to how these
programs affect students and colleges. This dissertation consists of three chapters that aim to
contribute to this literature by examining the impact of financial aid on students’ enrollment
decisions, student outcomes, and colleges’ financial decisions.
The first chapter examines the impact of the Tennessee HOPE, a broad merit-based
scholarship, on community college students’ outcomes both during and after college.
Community colleges enroll greater than forty percent (National Center for Education
Statistics)1 of first-time freshmen but represent a much smaller share of financial aid research.
Furthermore, researchers have focused on the impact of aid on enrollment and outcomes
1This percentage is calculated by the author from total enrollment including enrollment at public, private
non-profit, and private for-profit Title IV institutions using table 1 on page 7 of the following source:
Knapp, L.G., Kelly-Reid, J.E., and Ginder, S.A. (2012). [Enrollment in Postsecondary Institutions, Fall
2010: Financial Statistics, Fiscal Year 2010; and Graduation Rates, Selected Cohorts, 2002-2007] (NCES
1
during college, but none have yet considered the impact of aid on earnings after college. I
use a regression discontinuity estimator which essentially compares students who are barely
eligible for the HOPE scholarship to students who just fall short of eligibility, and I find
there is no local impact of HOPE eligibility on persistence, academic performance, degree
completion, transfer rates to four-year universities, or earnings after college for marginally
eligible students. These results are important since merit aid packages are premised on the
idea that broad-based aid will increase access to college, improve success in college, and
ultimately support employment.
In addition to examining student responses, I also examine whether colleges are sensitive
to state-sponsored merit aid programs in chapter two. Previous research has emphasized
demand-side effects such as how merit aid programs impact enrollment, student choices, and
post-matriculation outcomes. Yet much less is known about how state-implemented merit aid
programs affect the supply side of higher education such as colleges’ financial decisions. Using
college financial data from the Delta Cost Project database and differences-in-differences
identification, I collectively analyze how colleges respond to merit aid programs in terms of
multiple outcomes including tuition and fees, expenditures on students, institutional grants,
and Pell grants disbursed in addition to other revenue sources. Results suggest that colleges
do not capture state-funded merit scholarships through significant increases in published
tuition prices. Instead, private and public colleges seem to respond to merit aid programs
with increases in expenditures on students.
In a third essay, which is co-authored with Celeste K. Carruthers, we examine how the Pell
grant, the largest source for federal need-based aid, impacts college enrollment and college
choice. Using enrollment decisions of four cohorts of Tennessee high school graduates and
discontinuities in Pell eligibility, we find no evidence that marginal Pell eligibility increases
college-going which is consistent with previous work. We also go on to show that just meeting
the Pell eligibility threshold has little bearing on where students choose to enroll, in terms
of sector and quality dimensions. Below the threshold, where applicants are needier and the
grant is more generous, students sort into colleges with modestly higher published tuition,
2012-280). U.S. Department of Education. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics.
Retrieved on 10/31/2012 from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012280.pdf
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but other measures of college quality or college selectivity do not significantly diverge from
the counterfactual. We conclude that students do not use the Pell grant as a tool to shop
among college options in ways that systemically improve enrollment outcomes.
Both federal and state governments expend a substantial amount of limited budgets on
financial aid programs such as the HOPE scholarship and the Pell grant. Given program
expenditures and the extensiveness of these programs, it is certainly important to understand
both the intended and unintended consequences of these programs. In addition, my research
aims to assess whether financial aid programs lead students to not only enroll but to enroll
in higher quality institutions, succeed academically, and reap some of the benefits from
postsecondary education such as increased earnings after college.
3
Chapter 1
HOPE for Community College
Students: The Impact of Merit Aid on
Persistence, Graduation, and Earnings
4
A version of this chapter was originally published by Jilleah G. Welch:
Welch, Jilleah G. (2014). HOPE for Community College Students: The Impact of Merit Aid
on Persistence, Graduation, and Earnings. Economics of Education Review, 43, 1-20.
Abstract
Community colleges play a major role in postsecondary education, yet previous research
has emphasized the impact of merit aid on four-year students rather than two-year students.
Furthermore, researchers have focused on the impact of merit aid on enrollment and outcomes
during college, but to my knowledge, none have yet considered the impact of aid on earnings
after college. This paper utilizes discontinuities in eligibility criteria for a large merit
scholarship to examine the local impact of aid on student outcomes both during college
and after college. The findings suggest that reducing the cost of community college does not
impact persistence, academic performance, degree completion, expected earnings, or short-
term earnings after college for marginally eligible students.
JEL: I22, I23, H75, J08
Keywords: Education Policy, Higher Education, Financial Aid, Community College
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1.1 Introduction
Many imagine the typical college student as one attending a four-year public university, but
two in five college enrollees attend two-year institutions rather than four-year institutions
(National Center for Education Statistics).1 This emphasizes how community colleges play
a major role in postsecondary education, yet the majority of the previous literature that
examines the impact of merit aid on student outcomes emphasizes the effect on four-year
students rather than two-year students. Furthermore, researchers have focused on the impact
of merit aid on enrollment and outcomes during college, but to my knowledge, none have
yet considered the impact of aid on earnings after college. States have limited budgets for
scholarships and funding for higher education, and knowing how the cost of community
college impacts students is influential for policymakers. Reducing the cost of attending a
community college may lead students to make better decisions while enrolled which in turn
could result in higher earnings after college. This paper directly examines this point in
question by analyzing the impact of eligibility for a large merit-based scholarship program,
the Tennessee HOPE Scholarship, on post-matriculation outcomes, earnings while enrolled,
expected earnings based on major choice, and short-term earnings after college specifically
for community college students.2
Previous studies have found that there are gains from both community college attendance
and completion relative to no college attendance,3 but this is the first study to examine
whether community college students who receive aid have higher earnings immediately after
college compared to those students who do not receive aid. Receiving the HOPE scholarship
may impact earnings after college through several channels. For example, receiving a
1This fraction is calculated by the author from total enrollment including enrollment at public, private
non-profit, and private for-profit Title IV institutions using table 1 on page 7 of the following source:
Knapp, L.G., Kelly-Reid, J.E., and Ginder, S.A. (2012). [Enrollment in Postsecondary Institutions, Fall
2010: Financial Statistics, Fiscal Year 2010; and Graduation Rates, Selected Cohorts, 2002-2007] (NCES
2012-280). U.S. Department of Education. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics.
Retrieved on 10/31/2012 from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012280.pdf
2Tennessee’s thirteen state community colleges offer certificate programs and two-year associate’s degrees.
3Following the canonical study by Kane and Rouse (1995), a considerable amount of research has examined
the labor-market returns to postsecondary education. Belfield and Bailey (2011) provide a review of this
literature that specifically focuses on community college students, and in a recent study, Jepsen et al. (2014)
likewise find gains from community college attendance and earning an associate’s degree, diploma, and
certificate. Jepsen et al. (2014) find that associate’s degrees have quarterly returns of about $1,500 for men
and $2,400 for women, and for both women and men, certificates have a quarterly return of about $300.
6
scholarship may reduce the need for students to work while enrolled, and this along with the
opportunity of receiving the scholarship could increase persistence, performance in school,
transfer rates to four-year colleges, and degree completion. Also, the HOPE scholarship has
renewal requirements such that students must meet a minimum grade point average (GPA) in
order to maintain their scholarship throughout their studies which could incentivize students
to more diligently study and raise their GPA. The accumulation of these outcomes could
positively affect earnings after college.
On the contrary, the HOPE scholarship might yield lower earnings after college if students
choose less financially beneficial degrees or professions since they will face less debt from the
cost of college. Also, if students do work less during enrollment, then students may not
make as many professional connections which could lead to lower short-term earnings after
college. This is a particularly relevant mechanism in community colleges, where part-time
work may complement vocational study. Higher earnings not only imply private benefits
such as increasing the standard of living for individuals, but higher earnings also have public
benefits such as increasing government revenues.
Community colleges serve many different kinds of students, including high school
graduates who are marginally interested in and/or marginally capable of succeeding in
college. Also, community college students compared to four-year university students are
more likely to come from economically disadvantaged families and be first generation college
students (Horn and Neville, 2006; Berkner and Choy, 2008). Given these typical student
characteristics in addition to community colleges being touted as cost-effective routes to
obtaining job skills and earning a bachelor’s degree (through transferring credits), community
college freshmen may be particularly sensitive to the cost of college. Merit aid alleviates the
cost of college for a targeted group of students with college-ready ACT scores,4 and this
study examines whether a generous merit aid program makes a difference in terms of those
students’ postsecondary success. In addition, these results will serve as context for emerging
4ACT’s college-ready benchmarks in each of its four subject-area tests average to 21 points overall. See
the following source: ACT, Inc. Retrieved on 7/31/2014 from http://www.act.org/solutions/college-career-
readiness/college-readiness-benchmarks/.
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community college aid programs such as the Tennessee Promise which will broaden the focus
to all high school graduates going to a community college.5
Furthermore, while it is important to examine the effect of merit aid programs on student
outcomes during college, it is equally as important to assess whether these programs impact
students after college. Individuals and governments often invest in education because of the
outcomes after college such as higher earnings, professional growth, increasing the stock of
educated workforce, and creating a more productive and competitive economy. Yet to date,
the research on the impact of large financial aid programs on student outcomes after college
is limited. Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by exclusively focusing on the
impact of merit aid on community college students and including outcomes such as earnings
after college in addition to outcomes during college.
The analytic sample consists of entering freshman in academic years 2005-2009 at any
of Tennessee’s thirteen state community colleges. Students who receive either a minimum
weighted final high school GPA of 3.0 or a minimum ACT score of 21 are eligible for the
HOPE scholarship. Receiving the HOPE scholarship is likely correlated with unobserved
characteristics such as ability that also affect student outcomes and earnings. Therefore, I
exploit a regression discontinuity design using ACT scores as the forcing variable to overcome
such biases. Given that students very close to the 21 ACT cutoff are comparable both
in terms of observables and unobservables, I find the local impact of HOPE eligibility by
comparing the outcomes of interest for the students who marginally surpass the 21 ACT
threshold to those that marginally fall short of the 21 ACT threshold. I find that students
re-take the ACT multiple times in order to push themselves past the required 21 ACT points
which implies that students marginally above 21 ACT points are no longer comparable to
students marginally below 21 ACT points. Therefore, I utilize students’ first ACT score
rather than maximum ACT score as first ACT scores exhibit no signs of heaping at the
threshold.
Results indicate that HOPE eligibility does not significantly impact number of semesters
students enroll, cumulative hours after one year, last observed GPA, transfer rates, or
5The Tennessee Promise will be a last-dollar scholarship available to all Tennessee high school graduates
who directly enroll in a community college or college of applied technology in Tennessee beginning with the
graduating class of 2015, and the program will entail both a community service and mentoring component.
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whether students obtain an associate’s or a bachelor’s degree. However, surpassing the
21 ACT requirement does have a weakly significant local impact on cumulative hours after
two years for students whose ACT score determines HOPE eligibility. HOPE eligibility is
also found to have no local impact on earnings while enrolled, expected earnings, or earnings
after college.
Overall, results for the marginally HOPE-eligible student near the ACT threshold are
informative for policymakers. Generous merit aid packages are premised on the idea that
broad-based aid will increase access to college, improve success in college, and ultimately
support employment. Moreover, individuals without college credentials require more public
assistance (Vernez et al., 1999). While understanding the mechanism through which financial
aid affects students’ choices and outcomes are beyond the scope of this paper, students losing
their HOPE scholarship after enrollment may be a contributing factor to HOPE having an
insignificant local impact on students. Additionally, the HOPE scholarship considerably
reduces the cost of attending a community college in terms of tuition and fees, but the value
of the HOPE scholarship is relatively small compared to students’ future life-time earnings
which may also be a contributing factor.
To ensure robustness of the overall zero local effect of HOPE, I show that the results are
consistent across various specifications and bandwidths in Section 1.6. I also show that the
overall zero local effect of HOPE is homogeneous across students’ income status in Section
1.7.1. Furthermore, Bruce and Carruthers (2014) find that the Tennessee HOPE scholarship
induced a small but significant substitution away from two-year schools and toward four-year
schools. In Section 1.7.2, I show that the overall zero effect of the HOPE scholarship for the
marginally eligible student is not due to this substitution effect, and that the effect of HOPE
eligibility is homogeneous across the likelihood of attending a community college versus a
four-year university.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section discusses
related literature, and Section 1.3 provides an overview of the HOPE scholarship program.
Section 1.4 provides a description of the data and delves into the details of the empirical
method used. Section 1.5 discusses the impact of HOPE eligibility on post-matriculation
outcomes, earnings while enrolled, expected earnings, and earnings after college. Section
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1.6 demonstrates that the results are robust across different specifications and bandwidths
while Section 1.7 discusses the heterogeneity of the results across income and the potential
for selection bias. The paper concludes with a discussion and a conclusion in Section 1.8.
1.2 Related Literature
In terms of economic theory, researchers often turn to a classical life cycle model to predict
the impact of aid on student outcomes. According to a classical life cycle model, when
the cost of college decreases, people are more likely to invest in their education both
in terms of attendance and completion (Becker, 1993). This theory implies that the
HOPE scholarship should positively affect student outcomes such as persistence and degree
completion. However, the value of the HOPE scholarship is relatively small compared to
the discounted present value of a student’s lifetime earnings which implies that the HOPE
scholarship may have no meaningful impacts if students can borrow against their future
earnings. Thus, many researchers have turned to empirical analyses to examine the impact
of aid on student choices.
There is a large body of empirical literature that analyzes the impact of both merit-based
and need-based scholarships on student outcomes. Several studies have found that merit-
based aid programs overall increase access to higher education (Dynarski, 2000; Nyshadham,
2013; Upton, 2013), but the gain in attendance is centered around four-year colleges
(Dynarski, 2004; Cornwell et al., 2006b; Bruce and Carruthers, 2014; Cohodes and Goodman,
2014). The research on post-enrollment outcomes is mixed and does not directly focus on
the community college sector. Some studies have utilized census data to assess the impact
of merit aid (Dynarski, 2008; Sjoquist and Winters, 2014b; Fitzpatrick and Jones, 2012).
Dynarski (2008) finds that Arkansas and Georgia’s merit-based scholarships increased degree
receipts. On the contrary, Sjoquist and Winters (2014b) and Fitzpatrick and Jones (2012)
find that merit aid programs have no effect on degree completion. A limitation of using census
data is the lack of availability of other student outcomes measuring persistence and academic
achievement; therefore, several studies have opted to use administrative data to assess specific
scholarship programs (Cornwell et al., 2005, 2006a; Lee, 2014; Sjoquist and Winters, 2014b,a;
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Scott-Clayton, 2011; Castleman and Long, 2013).6 For example, Scott-Clayton (2011) and
Castleman and Long (2013) find that aid increases cumulative credits earned and bachelor
graduation rates by examining the West Virginia Promise and the Florida Student Access
Grant (FSAG), respectively. On the other hand, Castleman and Long (2013) and Sjoquist
and Winters (2014b) find that aid had no impact on students earning an associate’s degree
by studying FSAG eligibility and the Georgia HOPE scholarship, respectively. Other studies
have also considered whether merit aid programs affect major choice and have found that
students are less likely to pursue majors in science, technology, engineering, and math
(STEM) fields due to the introduction of merit aid programs (Cornwell et al., 2006a; Sjoquist
and Winters, 2014a). While some of these studies do include community college students
and four-year students in their sample, none have yet focused exclusively on community
college students or examined post-college earnings. This paper extends the literature on
the impact of aid on student outcomes by specifically focusing on students who start at
a community college and examining additional outcomes such as GPA, transfer rates to
four-year universities, earnings while enrolled, expected earnings based on major, and short-
term earnings after college. Students at community colleges are very different from students
at four-year universities in terms of academic preparedness, professional goals, and typical
financial position, and aid may impact community college students differently than four-year
university students.
This paper also complements a small but growing literature on the impact of debt on
student decisions and outcomes after college. Rothstein and Rouse (2011) utilize a natural
experiment where a highly selective anonymous university replaced loans with grants, and
they find that debt causes graduates to choose jobs in substantially higher-salary industries.
Their findings also suggest that the effect of debt on employment outcomes is more due to
students’ preferences as they found that debt had no significant or large impact on students’
academic performance or employability (e.g. choice of major, GPA, and graduating with
6There is also a small but growing literature that examines how colleges respond to the introduction
of state merit aid programs (Long, 2004a; Calcagno and Alfonso, 2007; Topal, 2014). Long (2004a) finds
that private four-year colleges in Georgia increase tuition and decrease institutional aid in response to the
Georgia HOPE scholarship. On the contrary, Topal (2014) finds no evidence that four-year colleges capture
scholarship funds by examining the Tennessee HOPE scholarship, and Calcagno and Alfonso (2007) find
that public community colleges actually supplement the Florida Bright Futures Program (FBFP) with an
increase in institutional aid.
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honors). Zhang (2013) uses the Baccalaureate and Beyond 93/97 survey data and finds that
debt does not impact salary one year after receiving a bachelor’s degree or the probability of
working in the public or non-profit sector. This paper deviates from this literature in that it
focuses on the impact of merit aid rather than debt on future salaries, does not rely on survey
data for student outcomes, and examines whether receiving aid impacts post-college earnings
five years after initial enrollment rather than directly after graduation as in Zhang (2013).
Furthermore, the results will be more relevant to community college students compared to
Rothstein and Rouse (2011) who focus on one highly selective university and Zhang (2013)
who focus on students receiving a bachelor’s degree.
Lastly, Bruce and Carruthers (2014) examine how the Tennessee HOPE scholarship
affects enrollment on both the intensive and extensive margin, and they find that the HOPE
scholarship induces a significant but small substitution away from two-year colleges and
toward four-year colleges. Given that recent studies have found that attending a two-year
rather than a four-year college negatively impacts earning a bachelor’s degree (Long and
Kurlaender, 2009; Doyle, 2009; Reynolds, 2012), the HOPE may positively impact students
who choose to attend a four-year university rather than a community college because of
the HOPE. On the other hand, community colleges increase access to higher education and
positively impact students who otherwise would not have attended college (Rouse, 1995;
Leigh and Gill, 2003; Gonzalez and Hilmer, 2006). While there is an extensive amount of
aforementioned research on enrollment and four-year, post-matriculation outcomes, this is
the first paper to my knowledge to solely focus on how merit aid impacts community college
student outcomes including earnings after college. As states, including Tennessee, continue
to emphasize and create educational policies for the community college sector, it is essential
to understand how financial aid, including merit aid, impacts these students.
1.3 Background
The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program was enacted in 2004 and
utilizes state lottery revenue to provide scholarships and grants to eligible students. The
HOPE scholarship is the largest portion of the TELS program both in terms of number
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of recipients and expenditures, and the HOPE scholarship can be applied toward tuition
at eligible four-year and two-year colleges.7 To be considered for the HOPE, a student
must have been a Tennessee resident for at least one year, enroll in an eligible public or
private college within 16 months of high school graduation, and apply by completing the
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). A 3.0 final weighted high school GPA
or a minimum score of 21 on the ACT has been the initial HOPE requirement since 2005.8
For the entering class of fall 2004, the requirement was a 3.0 final weighted high school GPA
or a 19 (instead of a 21) minimum ACT score.
When the program began in the 2004-2005 academic year, the base HOPE scholarship
award was $3,000 per year at a four-year institution and $1,500 per year at a community
college. The award amounts have increased over time and currently are $6,000 per year at a
four-year institution and $3,000 per year at a community college.9 To maintain the HOPE
scholarship, recipients must maintain a minimum cumulative GPA of 2.75 after 24 and 48
attempted hours and a 3.0 minimum cumulative GPA after 72 and 96 attempted hours.10
The HOPE scholarship is terminated if a recipient earns a baccalaureate degree or five years
passes from the date of the student’s initial enrollment. A HOPE recipient who meets the
renewal requirements can transfer between eligible institutions as long as there is no break
7In the 2011-2012 academic year, 11,011 students at community colleges in Tennessee received the
HOPE scholarship, and 3,894 of these students received supplements in addition to the HOPE scholarship.
The TELS total expenditure for these students was $23.5 million. These values were calculated by the
author and are the sum of actual recipients and dollars for the traditional HOPE scholarship, HOPE
scholarship with GAM supplement, and HOPE scholarship with Aspire supplement from the following source:
Tennessee Lottery Scholarship Program, 2011-2012 TELS Year End Report, Retrieved on 7/17/2013 from
http://www.tn.gov/collegepays/mon college/lottery scholars.htm.
8Students can also qualify for the HOPE scholarship by obtaining a minimum SAT score of 980 rather
than a 21 on the ACT. However, less than two percent of the analytic sample have a record of taking the
SAT, and less than one percent of the analytic sample qualified for the HOPE award by their SAT score
alone. Since the administrative data contains students’ maximum rather than first SAT score, I do not
convert these SAT scores to ACT scores. Rather, I include these students in the sample and empirically
treat them the same as the other students in the analytic sample. Moreover, this demonstrates how a fuzzy
rather than sharp regression discontinuity design should be used since other factors than ACT score alone
affect HOPE eligibility.
9The base annual HOPE scholarship awards increased from $3,000 at four-year schools and $1,500 at
two-year schools in 2004 to $3,300 ($1,650) in 2005, $3,800 ($1,900) in 2006, $4,000 ($2,000) in 2007, and
$6,000 ($3,000) in 2011. Prior to 2011, the annual awards were divided equally between fall and spring
semester. Starting in fall 2011, HOPE recipients of fall 2009 and after could use the award for summer
semesters, and the annual award was divided equally between fall, spring, and summer semesters.
10Prior to the 2008-2009 academic year, the HOPE renewal requirement was a 2.75 minimum cumulative
GPA after 24 attempted hours and a 3.0 minimum cumulative GPA after 48, 72, and 96 attempted hours
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in enrollment. For example, a community college HOPE recipient can transfer to a four-
year eligible institution and still receive the HOPE scholarship as long as the student meets
the HOPE renewal criteria and maintains continuous enrollment in eligible higher education
institutions.
1.4 Data and Methods
The goal of this paper is to analyze the causal impact of HOPE eligibility on post-
matriculation and post-college outcomes for community college students. This causal effect
can be measured by the difference in the outcomes of interest in which a student receives the
HOPE scholarship and in which the same student does not receive the HOPE scholarship.
Obviously, both potential outcomes are not observed for a single student. Additionally, those
students that receive the merit-based scholarship are likely of higher unobserved ability than
students who do not receive the scholarship, and this positive selection bias means the
observed difference in average outcomes could exaggerate any benefits of the scholarship.
Ideally, the optimal approach to solve this selection bias problem is to randomly assign the
HOPE scholarship to community college students in order to equate HOPE recipients and
non-HOPE recipients in terms of both observables and non-observables. Rarely though, is
there an opportunity for such a study, and HOPE eligibility is far from being randomly
assigned. Students are eligible for the HOPE scholarship by obtaining either a 3.0 final
weighted high school GPA or a minimum ACT score of 20.5.11 This structure of assignment
of the HOPE scholarship to students lends itself to using a regression discontinuity (RD)
design. Specifically, a fuzzy RD design is exploited rather than a sharp RD design because
the probability of being eligible for the HOPE increases significantly but by much less than
one at the 20.5 ACT threshold since GPA along with other requirements (e.g. Tennessee
residency, enrolling in an eligible college within 16 months of high school graduation, and
completing the FAFSA) also affect HOPE eligibility.
11The actual ACT requirement for HOPE eligibility is 20.5 ACT points instead of 21 because composite
test scores are computed to two decimal places.
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1.4.1 Data
For the RD analysis, the data encompasses entering freshman in academic years 2005-2009
at any of Tennessee’s thirteen state community colleges. Administrative data maintained
by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission that spans from spring 2002 to spring 2012
are used to construct post-matriculation outcomes for these five cohorts of students such
as persistence, last observed GPA, transfer rates, last observed major, and degree receipts.
Since students must enroll in college within 16 months of high school graduation to be
eligible for the HOPE scholarship, the analytic sample is restricted to students with an
estimated age between 17 and 21 at initial enrollment.12 These data are then merged with
ACT records, FAFSA data, and unemployment insurance records. The ACT data provides
students’ ACT scores for each attempt. Students must complete a FAFSA to apply for the
HOPE scholarship, and HOPE eligibility is available in the administrative FAFSA records
for Tennessee resident applicants. The unemployment records from the state’s Department
of Labor and Workforce Development contain quarterly earnings for all workers with wages
in Tennessee covered by unemployment insurance from the first quarter of 2002 to the second
quarter in 2012.13
In addition, these data are also merged with expected annual wage data to assess whether
HOPE leads students to sort into more or less lucrative fields. Students’ last observed major
is mapped to occupations or Standard Occupational Classifications (SOCs) using a crosswalk
provided by the National Center for Education Statistics.14 Wage estimates by occupations
are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey.15
Each major is mapped to multiple occupations or SOCs; therefore, expected annual wage
for a major is the average of the annual wages for all SOC codes mapped to that major.
12Age as of enrollment is estimated by taking the difference between the year of initial enrollment and the
year of birth.
13The earnings data does not include self-employment earnings, investment income, or earnings from other
states.
14The Classification of Instruction Program (CIP) codes to SOC codes crosswalk was obtained from
the following source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for
Education Statistics. Retrieved on 10/24/2013 from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/cip2000/index.asp.
15The wage estimates exclude self employed persons, owners and partners in unincorporated
firms, and household workers. Annual wage estimates were obtained from the following source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics. Rerieved on 10/24/2013 from
http://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm.
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Furthermore, I assume students begin forming their expectations regarding wages for their
chosen field of study when they enter school, so estimated wages are based on year of entry
into college. The majority of the majors are accurately mapped to SOC codes with the
exception of the liberal arts and sciences/liberal studies major which is only mapped to one
occupation, postsecondary teachers. Since forty-five percent of the analytic sample has this
general liberal arts major as their last observed major,16 expected earnings based on level of
highest degree (e.g. some college but no degree, associate’s degree, or bachelor’s degree) from
the Current Population Survey is used for these students.17 All earnings including earnings
while enrolled, expected earnings, and earnings after college were converted to 2005 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index.
1.4.2 Test for Manipulation of the Running Variable
Final high school GPA data are not included in the administrative data, so ACT scores are
used as the forcing variable in the RD analysis. Even if final high school GPA was available,
ACT scores would be a more suitable forcing variable. High school GPA may be more easily
manipulated by students and schools at the 3.0 GPA threshold for the HOPE scholarship
compared to the 20.5 ACT threshold. Yet there is still concern that ACT scores might shows
signs of manipulation around the 20.5 cutoff. Pallais (2009) finds that students increased
their last observed ACT scores in response to the introduction of the TELS program in 2004.
Therefore, it is likely that students may improve their preparation or re-take the ACT exam
in order to increase their chance of becoming HOPE eligible.
To test for manipulation of ACT scores, the discontinuity in the density function of ACT
scores is estimated following McCrary (2008). As can been seen in Figure A.1, the density
of students is not smooth around the ACT cutoff for the HOPE scholarship when students’
maximum or best ACT score is used. The spike in the density function just above 20.5
16This major does not appear to be a pipeline major for transferring to four-year colleges as only 3% of
students with this major transferred to a four-year school. Moreover, most students (roughly 91%) with the
liberal arts major did not complete college. Eight percent of students in this major obtained an associate’s
degree as their highest obtained degree while less than one percent earned a bachelor’s degree.
17Estimated wages based on education level for each cohort was obtained from the following
source: United States Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. Retrieved on 10/24/2013 from
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/education/educational attainment.html
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implies that students are re-taking the exam until they surpass the necessary score of 20.5
for the HOPE scholarship. This behavioral response implies that students who marginally
surpass the 20.5 cutoff are not comparable to students who marginally fail to surpass the
20.5 cutoff. For example, the students who re-take the ACT exam and push themselves
above the 20.5 cutoff may be more highly motivated compared to those below the cutoff,
and the RD analysis may overstate any benefits of the HOPE scholarship when best ACT
scores are used as the forcing variable. When the ACT score from students’ first attempt is
used, there is no statistically significant discontinuity in ACT scores around the cutoff (see
Figure A.1). Therefore, all the empirical analysis will utilize students’ ACT score from their
first attempt of taking the exam.
1.4.3 Empirical Strategy
In fuzzy RD design, the local average treatment effect of HOPE eligibility is found by dividing
the discontinuity in the outcome variable of interest at the 20.5 threshold by the discontinuity
in the probability of treatment at the 20.5 threshold. Hahn et al. (2001) show that this local
average treatment effect is numerically equivalent to a local instrumental variables estimator
where passing the 20.5 threshold is used as an instrument for HOPE eligibility. Therefore, one
can find the effect of passing the 20.5 ACT threshold on HOPE eligibility by first estimating
the following first stage equation of two stage least squares:
Hi = α0 + α1Higheri + f [(ACTgapi) ∗ Loweri]α2 + g[(ACTgapi) ∗Higheri]α3 + νi (1.1)
The dependent variable in Equation 1.1 is a binary indicator for HOPE eligibility for student
i. Higheri is a binary indicator equal to one for students who score greater than or equal
to 20.5 points on the ACT while Loweri is a binary indicator equal to one for students who
score less than 20.5 points. f(·) and g(·) are functions of the gap between i’s ACT score and
the threshold, 20.5 ACT points. Specifying separate functions, f(·) and g(·), on either side
of the cutoff, allows for the slope and intercept to differ for the regression line above and
below the cutoff.
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Although final high school GPA is not available in the administrative data, students are
asked to report their grades for several classes in the high school curriculum (e.g. English,
algebra, calculus, biology, U.S. history, etc.) in a survey each time they take the ACT exam.
The ACT calculates a GPA based on these survey responses, and this calculated GPA from
students’ last ACT attempt is used as a proxy for final high school GPA. Using a similar
methodology as Bruce and Carruthers (2014), the sample is divided between students with a
proxy high school GPA that meets the required HOPE high school GPA of 3.0 and students
with either a missing proxy GPA or a proxy GPA that is less than 3.0. Figure A.2 graphically
demonstrates the discontinuity in HOPE eligibility as indicated in the FAFSA data for these
two groups of students. The discontinuity in HOPE eligibility is much larger and significant
for students with either a missing GPA or a proxy GPA less than 3.0. Specifically, the
discontinuity in HOPE eligibility is estimated using Equation 1.1 for the lower high school
GPA group, and the discontinuity is 27.3 percentage points and significant at the one percent
significance level. The discontinuity for students with at least a 3.0 proxy high school GPA
is insignificant and only 1.6 percentage points. A significant discontinuity in the probability
of receiving treatment is necessary for identification of treatment effects in a RD framework
(Hahn et al., 2001). Since there is a significant and much larger discontinuity in HOPE
eligibility at the 20.5 threshold for students whose high school GPA is missing or is less
than the required 3.0 for the HOPE scholarship, the main analysis and baseline results are
centered around the lower high school GPA students. Students with at least a 3.0 high school
GPA are used as a falsification test of the identification strategy, and the outcomes for these
students should not be affected by HOPE eligibility at the 20.5 ACT threshold as there is
not a significant discontinuity in HOPE eligibility at the 20.5 cutoff.
The local average treatment effect of HOPE eligibility is determined by estimating the
following second stage equation of two stage least squares:
Yi = π0 + τFRDĤi + f [(ACTgapi) ∗ Loweri]π1 + g[(ACTgapi) ∗Higheri]π2 + ηi (1.2)
The dependent variables in Equation 1.2 are the outcomes of interest including measurements
of persistence through community college, last observed GPA, transfer rate to a four-year
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college, degree receipts, earnings while enrolled, expected earnings, and earnings after college.
Ĥi are the fitted values forHi obtained from Equation 1.1, and the other variables in Equation
1.2 are defined as in Equation 1.1. The coefficient of interest, τFRD, represents the local
average treatment effect of HOPE eligibility on the student outcomes.
I estimate Equation 1.2 for each post-matriculation outcome of interest for lower GPA
students whose ACT score is within five points of the 20.5 cutoff, and f(·) and g(·) are
linear functions of the gap between i’s ACT score and the 20.5 ACT threshold. Bandwidth
selection is an integral component in RD design as there is a tradeoff between bias and
precision. Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) adapt alternative methods specifically for the
RD setting and provide a data dependent algorithm for optimal bandwidth selection that
minimizes the mean squared error (τ̂SRD − τSRD)2. Using this data dependent algorithm, I
calculate the optimal bandwidth separately for each outcome, and a five-point bandwidth
is utilized in the baseline analysis as the mean and median of the optimal bandwidths, is
generally close to five points.18 Also, linear functions for the gap between i’s ACT score and
the 20.5 ACT threshold are used rather than a quadratic or cubic in an effort to prevent
students with ACT scores further away from the 20.5 cutoff from carrying too much weight in
the specification (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Yet in Section 1.6, I test whether the results are
stable across alternative specifications including a quadratic and a cubic function for both
f(·) and g(·) and additional bandwidths including the calculated optimal bandwidth for each
outcome. Additionally, robust standard errors, clustered by first ACT score increment, are
used in all regressions.
1.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1 lists the descriptive statistics for HOPE eligibility, post-matriculation outcomes,
and control variables. Column I lists the summary statistics for all students who were
entering freshman in 2005-2009 at any of Tennessee’s thirteen public community colleges and
whose ACT score is within five points of the 20.5 cutoff. Of these students, 50.3 percent are
eligible for the HOPE scholarship according to FAFSA records. Several post-matriculation
18For further discussion on optimal bandwidth selection in a regression discontinuity framework see Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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outcomes are examined including: total number of semesters enrolled including summer
semesters, cumulative hours after one calendar year from initial enrollment, cumulative hours
after two calendar years from initial enrollment, last observed GPA, and a binary indicator for
transferring to a four-year college.19 On average, students enroll in college for 6 semesters
and accumulate about 19 and 37 hours after one and two years, respectively. The mean
last observed GPA is 2.53, and about 38% of all students transfer to a four-year college.
Degree receipt is examined by including outcome variables for earning an associate’s degree
within three years for cohorts 2005-2008 and earning a bachelor’s degree within five years for
cohorts 2005-2006.20 Roughly 9% earn an associate’s degree within three years and 15% earn
a bachelor’s degree within five years. Lastly, earnings while enrolled, expected earnings, and
earnings after college are considered. The majority of the sample has at least some earnings
while enrolled, and the average quarterly earnings while enrolled is $1,352. The average
expected annual wage based on major or level of highest degree is about $50,000. For the
2005-2006 cohorts, approximately 73% of students who exit school prior to the fifth year
after initial enrollment with or without a degree have post-college earnings, and the average
quarterly earnings in the fifth year is $2,645.21
Columns II and III of Table A.1 split the sample into the analytic sample, those students
with a missing or sub-3.0 proxy high school GPA, and students with a proxy high school
GPA greater than 3.0. As expected, HOPE eligibility is lower for the lower GPA students.
Also, lower high school GPA students complete slightly fewer number of semesters, are less
likely to transfer to a four-year college, and have a lower first and maximum ACT score
than the higher GPA students. In addition, expected annual wage based on major or level
of highest degree for those with a general liberal arts major is less for lower high school
19Cumulative hours after one and two calendar years from initial enrollment includes enrolled students,
dropouts, and transfer students. For students who transfer, cumulative hours includes both hours before
and after transferring.
20The administrative data only has degree attainment through spring 2012 which does not provide ample
time for the 2009 cohort to earn an associate degree within three years, so the 2009 cohort is excluded for
the analysis of this outcome variable. Also, the analytic sample is restricted to cohorts 2005-2006 for earning
a bachelor’s degree within five years given that degree attainment is only available through spring 2012.
21The sample is restricted for any earnings and average quarterly earnings in the fifth year to students who
exit college prior to the fifth year with or without a degree and to cohorts 2005-2006 for which earnings data
is available in the fifth year after initial enrollment. Earnings data is available through the second quarter
of 2012.
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GPA students. Both GPA groups are almost equally likely to have earnings while enrolled
and earnings in the fifth year after initial enrollment, but there are small differences in their
average quarterly earnings.
Table A.1 also includes descriptive statistics for control variables including gender, race,
cohort indicators, and an indicator for lower-income. A student is specified as being lower-
income if parental adjusted gross income from the FAFSA data is less than $52,000 which
is the median parental adjusted gross income. If parental adjusted gross income is missing,
then a student is considered lower-income if their estimated total combined income of their
parents before taxes is less than $60,000 according to a categorical survey response from the
ACT exam. Students with proxy GPAs that are less than 3.0 have a higher percentage of
males, black, and lower-income students.
1.4.5 Test for Discontinuity in Predetermined Characteristics
RD is thought of as a local randomized quasi-experiment where students on the right and left
of the cutoff are comparable, but in order for this to be true, predetermined characteristics
should exhibit the same distribution above and below the HOPE threshold. To test whether
this is the case, I estimate the discontinuity in the control variables at the 20.5 cutoff by
replacing the dependent variable with each control variable in Equation 1.2. The results are
reported in Table A.2 for students with and without HOPE qualifying proxy high school
GPAs. Any significant discontinuity in a covariate would imply that changes in a post-
matriculation outcome might be from a different mechanism than the HOPE scholarship.
The majority of the estimates are small and insignificant for both the lower and higher GPA
groups of students. Surprisingly, the percentage of black students increases at the HOPE
threshold for sub-3.0 GPA students. In the Appendix, I provide a graphical analysis for
the percentage of black students at the threshold. The percentage of black students does
not appear to have a significant discontinuity at the 20.5 threshold, and it appears that the
relationship is quadratic rather than linear for the gap between i’s ACT score and the 20.5
threshold. I estimate Equation 1.2 using both a quadratic and a cubic rather than a linear
specification, and the percentage of black students no longer registers as significant in either
case. Therefore, it is unlikely that the discontinuity in the percentage of black students
21
in Table A.2 is due to omitted variables that may threaten internal validity of the results.
Additionally, baseline findings are robust to including controls as shown in Section 1.6.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Regression Discontinuity Empirical Analysis
I first estimate Equation 1.1 to assess the effect of passing the 20.5 ACT threshold on HOPE
eligibility, and then I estimate Equation 1.2 to find the local average treatment effect for each
post-matriculation outcome. The estimations include students whose ACT score is within
five points of the 20.5 cutoff, and f(·) and g(·) in Equation 1.2 are linear functions of the gap
between i’s ACT score and the 20.5 ACT threshold. Identification relies on the assumption
that in absence of treatment, the outcome of interest would be continuous over the 20.5
threshold and HOPE treatment is causing the discontinuity in the outcome variable. The
results are shown in Table A.3, and robust standard errors, clustered by first ACT score
increment, are in parentheses. Column I lists the mean values for each variable for the
typical student in this ACT range, and Columns II and III list the treatment on the treated
estimates for low and high GPA students, respectively.
As discussed in Section 1.4.3, the first stage discontinuity is 27.3 percentage points and
significant at the one percent significance level for students with a missing or sub-3.0 GPA
while the discontinuity is 1.6 percentage points and insignificant for students with a GPA
that exceeds 3.0. Since a significant discontinuity in HOPE eligibility at the 20.5 ACT
threshold is needed for identification and this discontinuity is only significant for the lower
GPA students, the main analysis focuses on students with lower high school GPAs.
Focusing on the outcomes of interest, one might expect that HOPE recipients would not
be as financially constrained and thus would not need to work as much while enrolled which
may enable students to more easily persist through school by attending full-time and taking
more credit hours per semester. Surprisingly, I find that HOPE eligibility has no impact on
persistence measures such as the number of semesters enrolled or cumulative hours after one
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year.22 However, HOPE receipt does have a small but significant impact on cumulative hours
after two calendar years from initial enrollment. Specifically, students who are above the
20.5 cutoff attempt 3.367 more hours over the course of two years than students below the
20.5 cutoff. This finding is significant at the ten percent level and represents a 9.1 percent
increase above 37 hours, the mean cumulative hours after two years for typical students in
this ACT range.
As mentioned in Section 1.3, students must obtain at least a cumulative GPA of 2.75
after 24 and 48 attempted hours and a 3.0 after 72 and 96 attempted hours to keep their
HOPE scholarship. One would expect that students who are HOPE eligible would diligently
study and increase their GPA to ensure the renewal of their HOPE scholarship. Nevertheless,
the RD findings imply that HOPE does not impact students’ last observed GPA at the 20.5
threshold. Furthermore, marginally achieving 20.5 ACT points has no impact on transferring
to a four-year college, attaining an associate’s degree within three years, or attaining a
bachelor’s degree within five years.23
Lastly, earnings while enrolled, expected earnings, and earnings post-college are exam-
ined. It is easy to hypothesize that receiving financial aid such as the HOPE scholarship
would reduce the need for students to work during school and thereby decrease earnings
during enrollment. Contrary to this hypothesis, students that are marginally HOPE eligible
are no more likely or unlikely to receive earnings while enrolled, and HOPE eligibility has
no impact on the average quarterly earnings while enrolled. Also, the HOPE scholarship
might adversely affect earnings after college because students may choose a less financially
beneficial major or degree since they will face less debt from the cost of college. However,
HOPE eligibility has no impact on expected earnings based on major choice or level of highest
degree for those with a general liberal arts major. Therefore, HOPE does not appear to
22While not included in the main results, I also examined additional measures of persistence such as
maximum cumulative hours and full-time status (i.e. greater than 12 hours per semester) in the first year,
and both of these measures were also insignificant even though full-time status is needed for a student to be
awarded the full value of the HOPE scholarship.
23HOPE eligibility also did not impact whether students received a less than one year certificate, a 1-2
year certificate, an associate’s degree within two years, or a bachelor’s degree within four years. For brevity,
these findings are not included in the main results.
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impact major choice or expected earnings based on major choice.24 Also, meeting the HOPE
ACT requirement has no significant local impact on receiving any post-college earnings in
the fifth year after initial enrollment nor on the average quarterly earnings during that fifth
year for students who exit school prior to the fifth year either with or without a degree.25
The findings regarding earnings after college are consistent with the other RD results in this
paper in that it would be questionable if HOPE eligibility did not have a local impact on
persistence, GPA, transfer rates, or degree receipts but did have an impact on post-college
earnings. In addition, these findings suggest that students are not choosing different majors
or occupations with different salaries because the HOPE scholarship possibly decreased their
debt level.
To synthesize these findings, there is no local impact of surpassing the 20.5 ACT threshold
for the HOPE scholarship on the majority of post-matriculation outcomes examined with
the exception of a significant local impact on cumulative hours after two years. While this
local average treatment effect is significant, the impact is modest as the point estimate is
only an increase of about three hours over the course of two years. Therefore, the results
indicate that HOPE eligibility does not impact student persistence or earnings for marginally
HOPE eligible students, and these findings are robust to several specifications and various
bandwidths as discussed and demonstrated in Section 1.6.
Column III of Table A.3 lists the local average treatment effect of surpassing the 20.5
threshold on the outcomes of interest for the high GPA students which are estimated using
Equation 1.2. Since high GPA students do not have a significant discontinuity in HOPE
eligibility at 20.5 ACT points, these students should not have a discontinuity in the outcomes
variables at 20.5 ACT points. This is the case as all of the discontinuities in the post-
matriculation outcomes are small and insignificant for the high GPA students.
24HOPE eligibility also did not impact whether students chose a STEM major or a major in humanities,
social sciences/education, business/economics, or other majors for their first declared major, last declared
major, associate major, or bachelor major. For conciseness, these results are excluded from the main results.
25There is also no significant impact on average, quarterly, post-college earnings during the third and sixth
year after initial enrollment although these findings are excluded in effort to streamline the main results.
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1.5.2 Regression Discontinuity Graphical Analysis
Graphical analyses are an integral component of RD and provide an informative illustration
of the RD empirical strategy. Figure A.3 consists of a graphical analysis for each post-
matriculation outcome with the forcing variable on the horizontal axis. The mean value of
the outcome for students with the same ACT score is plotted for all ACT scores within five
points of the 20.5 threshold. The size of the circles in the scatter plots increase proportionate
to the number of students who received a specific ACT score. The plotted fitted lines on
either side of the threshold are the predicted outcome values from estimating the reduced
form equation,26 and the discontinuity or reduced form intent-to-treat effect is listed for
each outcome. It is clear from each graph that the number of low GPA students decreases
as ACT score increases since the size of the markers decrease in ACT score. Number of
semesters, GPA, transferring to a four-year college, and expected annual wage all increase
as ACT score rises, but all of these outcomes vary smoothly across the 20.5 threshold.
There visually looks like there might be a small discontinuity for cumulative hours after one
year, associate’s degree within three years, and bachelor’s degree within five years, but after
considering the scales on the vertical axis, these outcomes also seem to not have a significant
discontinuity at the 20.5 threshold. It appears that the percentage of students with any
earnings while enrolled or any post-college earnings in the fifth year is relatively constant
across ACT scores. Also, there does not appear to be a significant large discontinuity in
average quarterly earnings while enrolled or average, post-college, quarterly earnings in the
fifth year. The only variable that depicts a possible significant discontinuity is cumulative
hours after two years, and this same outcome is the only one that registered a significant
discontinuity in Equation 1.2. Yet the local impact is extremely small both visually and in
terms of economic magnitude.
26The reduced form equation is found by substituting Equation 1.1 into Equation 1.2 which yields the
intent-to-treat effect of HOPE eligibility. The intent-to-treat effect is the numerator of the fuzzy regression
discontinuity average treatment effect, and the intent-to-treat effect is equivalent in significance yet smaller
in magnitude compared to the local average treatment effects presented in the baseline findings.
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1.6 Robustness and Falsification Checks
I test the robustness of the baseline results to various specifications and bandwidths. The
results of the robustness and falsification checks are in Table A.4. All reported estimates
reflect the local average treatment effect of HOPE eligibility on student outcomes, and
robust standard errors, clustered by first ACT score, are in parentheses. Column I lists the
baseline results for low GPA students which are the same results as reported in Table A.3
and estimated using Equation 1.2. Columns II through IX also estimate the impact of HOPE
on low GPA students whose HOPE receipt likely depended on the running variable, but each
column differs from the baseline specification in one respect. First, controls for gender, race,
lower-income, and cohort indicators are added in Column II. Secondly, optimal bandwidths
are calculated separately for each outcome using the data dependent algorithm from Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) which minimizes the mean squared error (τ̂SRD− τSRD)2.27 Then,
local linear estimates from a triangle kernel are found for the calculated optimal bandwidths
in Column III (Nichols, 2011).28 Columns IV and V use a quadratic and a cubic, respectively,
rather than a linear function of the gap between i’s ACT score and the 20.5 threshold for
f(·) and g(·) in Equation 1.2. In Column VI, the bandwidth is expanded to include students
whose first ACT score is within seven points of the 20.5 threshold, and in Column VII, the
bandwidth is contracted to students whose first ACT score is within two points of the 20.5
threshold. Columns VIII and IX test for discontinuities in the outcomes at 18.5 and 22.5 ACT
points, respectively, which are not associated with the HOPE scholarship. Lastly, Column
X contains the baseline results for high GPA students which are the same discontinuities
presented in the main analysis in Table A.3.
Overall, the baseline findings indicate that there is no local impact of HOPE eligibility
on persistence, academic performance as measured by GPA, degree receipt, earnings during
college, expected earnings, or actual earnings after college. Columns II-VII in Table A.4
show that the nearly zero local impact of HOPE eligibility on the student outcomes is
27I estimate the optimal bandwidth for the numerator or the outcome variable as if it was a sharp regression
discontinuity design. As noted in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), this basic optimal bandwidth is very
similar to the optimal bandwidth for a fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
28Specifically, the stata -rd- command from Nichols (2011) is utilized with plugged in optimal bandwidths
that are calculated according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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robust across different specifications and bandwidths as almost all of the estimates remain
insignificant across these columns. Moreover, the significant, albeit modest, impact of HOPE
on cumulative hours over the course of two years also remains significant across these columns
with the exception of when the bandwidth is expanded to seven points in Column VII.
Cumulative hours after one year exhibits some inconsistent significant discontinuities, but the
coefficients for this outcome remain insignificant for many of the different specifications. Also,
number of semesters is significant when a two-point bandwidth is used, but this coefficient
is only significant at the ten percent level and remains insignificant for all of the other
specifications.29
Columns VIII and IX test whether surpassing the threshold of 18.5 and 22.5 ACT points,
respectively, impact the outcomes of interest. There may be other scholarship programs or
admission criteria that require a minimum ACT score that is not associated with the HOPE
scholarship, and any discontinuities at an alternative threshold would imply that a portion
of the magnitude of the HOPE impact on the outcomes of interest could be attributed to
these other ACT thresholds. Yet cumulative hours after two years is insignificant at both of
these alternative thresholds which further confirms the robustness of the baseline findings.
The other significant coefficients in Columns VIII and IX, representing 1.7% of the table,
may be significant by chance.
Lastly, Column X serves as a falsification test using high GPA students. There could be
other scholarships or admission criteria that also require a 20.5 ACT score. As can be seen
in Column X of Table A.4 and similarly in Column III of Table A.3, none of the outcomes
exhibit a significant discontinuity at 20.5 ACT points for the high GPA students. Therefore,
it is unlikely that a different scholarship program that also has a minimum 21 ACT score
requirement is driving the significant result for cumulative hours after two years. It should
be noted though that this does not mean that HOPE eligibility does not impact higher
GPA students. Higher GPA students show no local impact of surpassing the 20.5 cutoff on
the outcomes of interest, but HOPE eligibility may still impact higher ability students with
higher ACT scores that are not examined in the RD analysis.
29I also demonstrate in the Appendix that the overall zero local impact of HOPE eligibility is robust to
using a one-point, three-point, four-point, and six-point bandwidth.
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1.7 Extensions
1.7.1 Heterogeneity by Income
While the baseline results indicate an overall zero effect of HOPE on student persistence and
earnings, the HOPE scholarship may impact students differently depending on their income
status. Therefore, I examine whether the baseline findings are heterogeneous across lower-
income status in Table A.5. Column I lists the baseline results for low GPA students which
are estimated using Equation 1.2 and are the same as those reported in Table A.3. Columns
II and III are also estimated for low GPA students using Equation 1.2, but estimations are
limited to a subsample of students based on their income status. Cumulative hours after
two years remains significant for lower-income students, but the point estimate remains
modest for these students. HOPE eligibility increases the likelihood of having any earnings
in the fifth year after enrollment for lower-income students while HOPE eligibility decreases
the likelihood of having any earnings in the fifth year for higher-income students. Yet the
average quarterly earnings in the fifth year remains insignificant for both lower and higher-
income students. Also, average quarterly earnings while enrolled decreases for higher-income
students, but all of the other student outcomes of interest remain insignificant, similar to
the baseline findings, regardless of income status.30
1.7.2 Discussion of Potential Selection Bias
I also examine whether negative selection bias could be driving the overall zero effect
of HOPE eligibility on the majority of the student outcomes of interest. Bruce and
Carruthers (2014) examine how Tennessee’s HOPE scholarship affects students’ choice of
college state and sector, and they find that the HOPE scholarship induces a significant but
small substitution away from two-year colleges and towards four-year colleges. This finding
suggests that there could be the possibility that students above the 20.5 ACT cutoff in the
30I also examine whether the baseline results are heterogeneous across gender and race in addition to
income status in the Appendix. There is suggestive evidence of persistence and degree effects on non-white
students, but the results are not strong enough to ascribe the discontinuities to a causal effect of HOPE rather
than noise. Moreover, the results for non-white students are not robust to small changes in specification or
bandwidth.
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analytic sample in this paper could be negatively selected in that these students did not
substitute away from two-year schools into four-year schools. Is the overall zero effect of
HOPE eligibility on the majority of the student outcomes and earnings due to a sorting-
induced negative selection bias at the threshold? To examine this possibility, I test whether
the discontinuity in the outcomes of interest for community college students vary by the
ex-ante likelihood of going to a two-year college rather than a four-year college.
The administrative data for first time freshman at two-year and four-year colleges are
used to find the predicted probability of attending a two-year community college. The
predicted probability of attending a two-year college rather than a four-year college is found
from a linear least squares regression with control variables including gender, race, lower-
income status, cohort indicators, parent adjusted gross income (AGI),31 an indicator for
parents’ highest level of college attainment32, indicators for students’ ex-ante preference for
attending a two versus four-year college33 and indicators for which Tennessee high school the
student attended last according to ACT records.34
To examine whether there are heterogeneous effects of HOPE eligibility across the
probability of attending a community college, the baseline specification, Equation 1.2, is
estimated for low GPA students, and students with lower predicted probabilities of attending
a community college are omitted. The results for this estimation are in Table A.6. Column I
repeats the baseline results which are the same as those reported in Table A.3, and students
in the lower percentiles for the predicted probability of attending a community college are
omitted in ascending order starting with omitting the 5th percentile in Column II through the
50th percentile in Column XI. There is some suggestive but weak evidence of the possibility
of negative selection bias as average quarterly earnings in the fifth year after enrollment
becomes positive and significant when the 20th through the 35th percentiles are omitted in
31An auxiliary regression is used to impute parent AGI when parent AGI is missing.
32An auxiliary probit regression is used to predict the probability that at least one parent completed
college when parent education is missing
33Students’ ex-ante preference for attending a two versus four-year college are from categorical survey
responses from the ACT exam.
34Model fit statistics indicate that the linear least squares model with these control variables is the optimal
model for predicting the probability of attending a two-year versus four-year college. Less than 1 percent
of the analytic sample had a predicted probability less than zero, and 5.8% of the analytic sample had a
predicted probability greater than one. Indicators for missing FAFSA data, missing college preferences, and
missing a student’s high school code were also included as controls.
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Columns V through VIII, but the coefficients become insignificant after the 40th percentile
and beyond are omitted. All of the other outcome variables that are insignificant in the
baseline results remain consistently insignificant across the probability of attending a two-
year school even after a substantial number of students in the lower percentiles are excluded
from the estimation. Also, cumulative hours after two years becomes insignificant after the
5th percentile is omitted. Table A.6 suggests that HOPE eligibility does not have a local
impact on student persistence, academic performance, degree receipt, or earnings, and this
finding is homogeneous across the likelihood of attending a community college.35 Therefore,
the overall finding of a zero effect of HOPE on students’ post-matriculation outcomes and
earnings is not due to a negative selection bias that stems from negative selection out of
two-year schools at the HOPE eligibility threshold.
1.8 Conclusion and Implications
There is an abundant amount of research on the impact of aid on student outcomes, but
to date no study has focused exclusively on the impact of merit aid on community college
students. Community colleges are a large component of higher education in the U.S., and
aid may impact community college students differently than four-year university students
especially as these two groups of students tend to differ in terms of academic preparedness,
professional goals, and financial position. Also, to my knowledge, this is the first study to
examine how financial aid impacts earnings after college. Higher earnings not only imply
private benefits such as increasing the standard of living for individuals, but higher earnings
also have public benefits such as increasing government revenues. Therefore, to extend the
literature, I analyze the impact of eligibility for Tennessee’s HOPE scholarship on post-
matriculation and post-college earnings for community college students. To overcome biases
associated with unobservables such as ability being correlated with both receiving the HOPE
scholarship and the outcomes of interest, I exploit a regression discontinuity design and focus
35The estimates from interacting the predicted probability of attending a community college with Higheri,
the binary variable equal to one for students who surpass 20.5 ACT points, in the reduced form of Equation
1.2 also provides some suggestive but weak evidence that discontinuities in the outcomes vary by the likelihood
of attending a community college.
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on ACT scores in determining HOPE eligibility. The local impact of HOPE eligibility is found
by comparing outcomes for the students who marginally surpass the required 21 ACT score
for the HOPE scholarship to those that marginally fall short of 21 ACT points.
I find that HOPE eligibility does not significantly impact marginally eligible students
who lack a HOPE-qualifying GPA in terms of persistence through community college,
performance in school measured by GPA, obtaining an associate’s or bachelor’s degree, or
the likelihood of transferring to a four-year college. However, I do find a signicant but small
effect on cumulative hours after two years. HOPE eligibility is also found to have no effect
on earnings while enrolled, expected earnings, or actual earnings after college.
How do these results for community college students compare to the results for four-
year university students? Findings surrounding four-year university students are mixed.
Castleman and Long (2013) consider the impact of the Florida Student Access Grant
(FSAG) which is a need-based grant while Scott-Clayton (2011) examines the impact of
the West Virginia Promise scholarship, a large merit-based scholarship that is similar to
the Tennessee HOPE scholarship. Both Castleman and Long (2013) and Scott-Clayton
(2011) find that aid positively affects some student outcomes including cumulative credits
and earning a bachelor’s degree. These findings may conflict with the results from this paper
in part because aid affects community college students differently than four-year university
students. Secondly, need-based aid, such as the FSAG, targets low-income students, and aid
may induce different behavioral responses among these students. Lastly, the findings may
be divergent because the requirements for receiving aid are heterogeneous. For example,
the West Virginia Promise requires a 3.0 high school GPA and a 21 ACT score while
the Tennessee HOPE requires a 3.0 high school GPA or a 21 ACT score. This literature
as a whole suggests that the impact of aid on post-matriculation outcomes for students
may largely depend on the details in the structure of assignment and renewal criteria for
such programs which should be considered when designing scholarship and grant programs.
Sjoquist and Winters (2014b) and Fitzpatrick and Jones (2012) collectively analyze the
impact of large merit-based aid programs for nine and fifteen states, respectively, and they
find that merit-aid programs have no effect on degree completion. While they focus almost
entirely on degree completion to measure academic persistence and achievement, my results
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do align with these results as eligibility for the HOPE scholarship had no highly significant
effects on student persistence or earnings.
In addition to program design details, what other factors may contribute to the HOPE
having an insignificant local impact on community college students in Tennessee? Over the
2005 to 2009 academic years, the average HOPE award at a two-year college was about
$1800 per year while the average tuition and fees at Tennessee’s community colleges over the
same time period was $2,511 (in 2005 dollars). Therefore, the HOPE scholarship notably
reduces the cost of attending a community college as the scholarship accounts for about 72%
of tuition and fees at a community college and around 14% of the cost of attendance (COA)
including tuition and fees, books and supplies, and off campus room and board (not living
with family).36 However, some students may be receiving other scholarships in addition to
the HOPE that already cover a significant portion of tuition and fees. For example, roughly
two in five of the students who received the HOPE in the analytic sample also received the
Pell grant which had an average annual award of $2,704 (in 2005 dollars) over the time period
studied.37 Students who are eligible for both the Pell and the HOPE scholarship receive the
full amount of the HOPE scholarship as the Pell and HOPE scholarship together do not
exceed students’ allowable aid or COA.38 For example, receiving the HOPE and the average
Pell award is only a little over a third of the COA at a community college in Tennessee, and
the HOPE’s limited impact might be due to its small share of the COA. Also, the average
value of the HOPE scholarship equates to about $35 per week or around five hours of work
per week earning the federal minimum wage rate (assuming 52 weeks per year). Thus, the
HOPE may not necessarily provide a substantial exchange for labor hours over the course of a
year which may also explain the program’s minimal impacts on community college students.
36Averages and percentages are calculated by the author using tuition and fees and total cost of attendance
estimates from IPEDS for Tennessee’s thirteen state community colleges for the 2005-2006 through 2009-2010
academic year.
37Average Pell grant award was calculated by the author using average Pell grants for 2005-2006 through
2009-2010 academic years which are provided in the following source: U.S. Department of Education, Office
of Postsecondary Education, 2011-2012 Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report. Retrieved on
5/13/2014 from http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2011-12/pell-eoy-2011-12.pdf
38For details and rules regarding HOPE scholarship award amounts and eligibility, see the following
source: Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship Program,
Rules of Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation Chapter 1640-01-19. Retrieved on 7/31/2014 from
http://www.tennessee.gov/sos/rules/1640/1640-01-19.20100531.pdf.
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The HOPE scholarship also may not positively impact students after matriculation
because students lose their HOPE scholarship by failing to meet renewal requirements.
Carruthers and Özek (2014) find that over a third of Tennessee HOPE recipients at two-year
and four-year colleges lost their scholarship within three years by failing to meet renewal
criteria for cumulative GPA, and that losing the HOPE has a small but negative impact
on credits and decreases the likelihood of continuous enrollment. In the analytic sample in
this paper, less than two percent of HOPE recipients in the 2005 cohort lost their HOPE
scholarship within one year, but around 30% of HOPE recipients lost their scholarship within
two years.39 These percentages likely understate the percentage of students who lost their
HOPE scholarship because losing HOPE records are missing for students who drop out of
college immediately after losing the HOPE. While understanding the mechanisms through
which financial aid affects students’ choices and outcomes are beyond the scope of this paper,
losing the HOPE scholarship may help explain why the HOPE scholarship does not have
lasting local impacts on community college students in Tennessee.
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge that the findings of this paper come with a
caveat. Regression discontinuity is known for having strong internal validity, but regression
discontinuity lacks external validity in that the estimated effects of HOPE eligibility are local
around the discontinuity. HOPE eligibility does not significantly impact marginal students
near the 21 ACT threshold with non-qualifying HOPE GPAs, but HOPE eligibility may
impact students who have substantially higher ACT scores. Further research is needed to
determine if HOPE eligibility significantly impacts students of higher ability in contrast to
marginally eligible students, and future research in addition to the existing research will
continue to be influential for policymakers in designing and implementing aid programs for
both four-year university students and community college students.
39Data on students losing the HOPE scholarship are not available after 2008, so losing HOPE statistics
are only calculated for the 2005 cohort.
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Chapter 2
The Incidence of Financial Aid: How




I examine how colleges respond to the introduction of broad merit aid programs. Previous
research has emphasized the impact of merit aid on enrollment, student choices, and post-
matriculation outcomes. Yet much less is known about how state-implemented merit aid
programs, especially those funded through lottery revenues or other semi-external revenue
sources, affect colleges’ financial decisions. I use college financial data from the Delta Cost
Project database to assess how colleges respond to merit aid programs in terms of tuition
and fees, expenditures on students, institutional grants, and Pell grants disbursed in addition
to other revenue sources. Results suggest that colleges do not capture state-funded merit
scholarships through significant increases in published tuition prices. Instead, public and
private colleges react to state-funded merit scholarships with increases in expenditures on
students.
JEL: I22, I28, H75
Keywords: Education Policy, Higher Education, Financial Aid
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2.1 Introduction
Merit aid programs have grown substantially over the last two decades. For example, non-
need-based aid has increased from 11% of total undergraduate state grant aid in 1990-1991
to 26% in 2011-2012 (The College Board, 2013). Over a dozen states have implemented
broad merit aid programs, led by the Georgia HOPE scholarship, and many researchers
have examined the impact of merit aid programs on student outcomes such as college
enrollment, choice of college sector, persistence, degree completion, and migration (Dynarski,
2000, 2004; Cornwell et al., 2005, 2006b; Dynarski, 2008; Scott-Clayton, 2011; Nyshadham,
2013; Cohodes and Goodman, 2014; Bruce and Carruthers, 2014; Sjoquist and Winters,
2014b,a; Fitzpatrick and Jones, 2012). However, much less is known about how colleges
respond to state-implemented merit aid programs. In order to fully assess the incidence
of broad merit aid programs, it is necessary to know whether the supply side of higher
education is sensitive to these programs. Do colleges raise tuition after merit aid programs
are introduced? If colleges do capture a portion of scholarship funds, are colleges using
captured funds for initiatives or activities that still benefit students? Do colleges supplement
merit aid programs with increases in expenditures on students? This paper aims to shed light
on some of these unintended consequences of merit scholarship programs which in turn could
impact the net reduction in cost or benefits for scholarship recipients. More specifically, this
paper collectively analyzes how broad merit aid programs affect colleges’ tuition and fees,
expenditures on students, institutional grants, and Pell grants disbursed in addition to other
revenue sources.
The idea that colleges increase tuition in response to increases in financial aid is referred
to as the Bennett Hypothesis, named after former Secretary of Education, William Bennett,
who suggested this notion in a 1987 New York Times opinion article (Bennett, 1987). The
majority of the literature that has examined the Bennett Hypothesis or how aid impacts the
supply side of higher education revolves around federal programs. Some studies have found
support for the Bennett Hypothesis as increases in federal aid result in increases in colleges’
tuition prices (Cellini and Goldin, 2014; Frederick et al., 2012). However, conclusions have
been mixed regarding the Pell grant, a federal need-based grant for low-income students
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(McPherson and Schapiro, 1991; Li, 1999; Rizzo and Ehrenberg, 2004). Although recent
studies reveal that private four-year colleges increase tuition in response to Pell generosity
(Singell and Stone, 2007), and colleges capture 12 percent of all Pell Grant aid by reducing
institutional aid (Turner, 2014). Studies that specifically examine federal aid programs in
the form of tax credits, such as the HOPE Tax Credit (HTC) and the Lifetime Learning
Tax Credit (LLTC), find limited evidence of effects on tuition, but find that tax-based aid
almost completely crowds out institutional aid at public and private colleges (Long, 2004c;
Turner, 2012).
Broad merit aid programs include a large portion of undergraduate students as eligibility
requires a moderately high standardized test score and/or high school GPA. In addition,
merit scholarships often cover a significant portion of tuition at public four-year or two-year
colleges, and states usually allow students to use scholarships at either public or private
colleges within the state. Given the breadth and transparency of these highly publicized
programs, colleges may have larger reactions to them compared to more complex federal
programs.
A few studies have previously examined the supply-side effects of broad merit aid
programs (Calcagno and Alfonso, 2007; Long, 2004a; Jensen, 2011). Calcagno and Alfonso
(2007) focus on community colleges and find that public community colleges in Florida do
not alter tuition and actually supplement the Florida Bright Futures Program (FBFP) with
increases in institutional aid. Long (2004a) finds that some private colleges in Georgia
capture as much as 30 percent of the Georgia HOPE scholarship by increasing tuition
and decreasing institutional aid. Lastly, Jensen (2011) separately analyzes large merit aid
programs in five states and finds that public colleges raise tuition and fees after merit aid
programs are introduced. This paper extends this literature in a few ways. First, I collectively
analyze ten broad merit-aid programs, and findings will help to evaluate whether previous
results from specific states are generalizable. With the exception of Long (2004a), the
relevant literature has primarily focused on tuition prices and institutional aid. This paper
also examines tuition and institutional aid, but I also extend the literature by considering
numerous other outcomes such as instructional expenditures, student services expenditures,
Pell grants disbursed, and other revenue sources.
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Additionally, some studies do not directly focus on the introduction of broad merit
aid programs but are certainly related to this literature. Curs and Dar (2010a) examine
how states’ expenditures on need and merit-based aid affect tuition prices and average
institutional aid (and thus net price). Using data from 2002-2007 and instrumental variables,
Curs and Dar (2010a) find that colleges decrease published tuition prices due to increases in
state merit aid.1 I depart from this work in a few ways. First, I expand the years studied
to include 1986-2009 which covers the time period for which states introduced broad merit
aid programs.2 Secondly, I use differences-in-differences identification, and several non-price
college outcomes are explored. While some aforementioned studies suggest that colleges
may capture some portion of financial aid through either increases in tuition or decreases
in institutional aid, it is unknown whether colleges alter expenditures on students which in
turn may affect education quality.3
Lastly, Jones (2015) examines the impact of lotteries earmarked for education, either K-
12 or higher education, on state governments’ finances and charitable contributions and finds
that education lotteries crowd out education contributions. The majority of the broad merit
aid programs are funded through states’ lotteries, and one outcome of interest explored here
is colleges’ revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts. However, this paper is more so
focused on colleges’ responses to merit aid rather than donors’ responses, but the literature
will benefit from comparing results when college-level versus donor-level data as in Jones
(2015) is used.
The analytic sample consists of a 1986-2009 panel of public and private not-for-profit
four-year colleges in the U.S. This data spans the time period for which multiple states
implemented broad merit aid programs. For example, Georgia was one of the first states
to introduce a merit aid program in 1993, and now, over one fourth of the states in the
U.S. have implemented merit aid programs. While some states have implemented small
1In a closely related paper, Curs and Dar (2010b) use a similar data set and methodology to examine
supply-side effects of total state-sponsored financial aid (including both merit and need-based aid) and find
that increases in state financial aid lead public colleges to decrease published tuition prices.
2For example, Georgia implemented the Georgia HOPE scholarship in 1993, and Florida implemented the
Florida Bright Futures Scholarship in 1997. Out of the ten broad merit aid programs examined, Tennessee
was one of the last states to implement a program in 2004.
3Griffith (2011) also examines merit aid but analyzes how private four-year colleges fund or react to their
own aid programs rather than how colleges interact and respond to large state aid programs.
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and very selective programs which only include, for example, top ranked students from each
high school within a state, the focus of this paper is on broad merit aid programs. States
and colleges are more likely to respond to these programs since there are a large number
of recipients. Also, almost all broad merit aid programs are funded through semi-external
revenue sources such as lottery revenues or tobacco settlement funds which also may induce
larger responses especially regarding states’ financial decisions.
Merit aid programs in general aim to increase academic preparedness among high school
students, increase access to college, incentivize high ability students to attend college in-
state, and promote academic success and completion. Yet unintended consequences including
colleges’ responses to these programs may in turn affect the net benefit of merit scholarships
for recipients. However, results indicate that public and private colleges do not seem to be
capturing HOPE-like scholarships through significant increases in tuition, and public and
private colleges rather supplement merit aid programs with some increases in expenditures
on students. Findings are informative for policymakers since students seem to be receiving
the full value of their merit scholarships as intended by policymakers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section provides an
overview of broad merit aid programs. Section 2.3 describes the details of the data and
empirical method used, and Section 2.4 discusses the impact of broad merit aid programs
on colleges’ revenues and expenditures. An extension is provided in Section 2.5 that uses an
alternative method for measuring the broadness of merit aid programs. Lastly, the paper
concludes with a discussion and conclusion in Section 2.6, and in the Appendix, I examine
whether results are sensitive to omitting college-specific time trends and check for differences
in pre-treatment trends across merit and non-merit states.
2.2 Background
Table B.1 lists the characteristics of the merit aid programs which are funded through either
lottery revenues or tobacco settlement funds. Generally, to apply for a merit scholarship,
students must be a resident of the specified state and complete the Free Application for
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) or a separate financial aid application for the state. Eligibility
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requirements vary depending on the program, but as shown in Column IV of Table B.1,
initial eligibility often requires a particular ACT/SAT score (e.g. ACT composite score of
21) and/or a moderate final weighted high school GPA (e.g. 3.0). Most programs enable
students to use their merit aid scholarship at a two-year or four-year, public or private not-
for-profit, college. The award amounts differ by state but often cover a significant portion
of tuition and fees.4 Typically, students can renew their scholarship by meeting specified
minimum college GPA requirements, and after meeting these renewal requirements, students
can maintain their scholarship until they receive a baccalaureate degree or for four to seven
years, depending on the program, after the student’s initial enrollment.
2.3 Data and Methods
Institutional financial data is available from the 1986-1987 to the 2009-2010 academic year
which covers the time period for which states implemented broad merit aid programs.
Therefore, a panel data model which mimics differences-in-differences identification is used
to assess how colleges respond to the introduction of merit aid programs with all non-merit
states in the U.S. serving as the control group. All analyses examine the impact of merit
aid on public and private colleges separately given that responses between the two different
types of schools are likely to differ.
2.3.1 Data
The data encompasses colleges that are consistently undergraduate degree granting, Title IV,
four-year public or private not-for-profit colleges within the U.S.5 Institutional characteristics
stem from the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS). These data are then merged with institutional financial
data from the Delta Cost Project IPEDS database.6 The Delta Cost Project database
4Several states also have supplemental awards to the base award amount for either high ability students
with exceptional ACT scores or low-income students.
5The sample excludes colleges in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
6The Delta Cost Project Database was originally created in 2007 by The Delta Cost Project, an
independent, non-profit organization, and NCES began administering the database in 2012.
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originates from IPEDS, but in the Delta Cost Project database, adjustments have been
made to institutional financial data to account for various accounting and reporting changes
over time.7 The outcomes of interest come from this consistent longitudinal data set of
institutional revenue and expenditure data. This results in a total sample of 1,508 four-year
colleges of which 477 are public and 1,031 are private not-for-profit.8
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The impact of broad merit aid programs on colleges’ financial decisions is found by estimating
the following fixed effect model.
log(Yist) = π0 + π1Meritst +Wst +Xit + δt + δi + f(t)δi + εist (2.1)
The dependent variable in Equation 2.1 is the log of the outcomes of interest such as
tuition and fees, expenditures on students, institutional grants, state appropriations, and
revenues from private donors for college i in state s in year t. Meritst is a binary indicator
equal to one for the treatment states or states that introduced broad merit aid programs
after implementation and zero otherwise.9 Wst contains controls for variation in economic
conditions across states including annual unemployment rates10, annual personal income
per capita11, and annual real GDP per capita.12 To account for college demand, state
controls also include the percent of the state population age 18 to 24 who have a high school
7One example of a modification made in the Delta Cost Project Database that is pertinent to this paper is
adjustments made to instructional expenditures. For example, to create consistent data over time, operations
and maintenance and interest amounts attributed to instruction are deducted from instructional expenditures
in years in which institutions reported according to the standards set by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB). Please see the Delta Cost Project Database documentation files for more information which
can be obtained from the following source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics, Retrieved on 3/5/2014 from http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/deltacostproject/
8Private for-profit colleges are excluded from the sample since data is more often missing for these
institutions, and each states’ merit aid program typically only allow students to use their scholarship at
public or private not-for-profit colleges.
9In Section 2.5, I use a more continuous rather than binary measure of merit aid by using using actual
program expenditures per FTE enrollment for Meritst.
10Unemployment rates were obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
11Personal income per capita were acquired from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
12Real GDP per capita is missing for all states in 1986. Linear interpolation is used to fill in this missing
data. Real GDP per capita was collected from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
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degree which stem from a combination of the American Community Survey (ACS), decennial
Census, and Current Population Survey (CPS).13,14 Xit contain institutional control variables
including the percent of undergraduates who are women15 and the percent undergraduates
who are non-white.16 Institutional controls also include the log of the full-time equivalent
(FTE) enrollment at an institution.17 Lastly, f(t)δi accounts for linear, college-specific time
trends, and δi and δt are institutional fixed effects and time fixed effects, respectively. All
of the financial outcomes of interest and controls were converted to 2010 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index. Robust standard errors are clustered by institution.
The coefficient of interest, π1, describes the average treatment effect of merit aid programs
on states’ and colleges’ financial decisions. The main identification threat is unobserved
heterogenous trends. More specifically, a potential concern is there might be broad changes
in education policy or states’ sentiment toward higher education that are coincident with
the introduction of merit aid programs. Or in other words, there may be broad education
initiatives such that merit aid states implement merit aid programs in tandem with adjusting
state educational expenditures such as state appropriations. Furthermore, such an education
initiative may be in response to a decrease in higher education funding in merit aid states
pre-treatment. I address this policy endogeneity concern in a few ways. First, a policy
endogeneity concern is greatest at the point of program implementation rather than years
13The 2005-2009 estimates stem from the ACS. The 1990 and 2000 Census estimates are from the IPUMS-
USA database, and estimates from the IPUMS-CPS data set are used for years 1992-1999 and 2001-2004.
Linear interpolation is used to fill in missing data for years 1986-1989 and 1991. ACS educational attainment
data is from the U.S. Department of Commerce, United States Census Bureau, and the American Fact Finder.
Census and CPS data were obtain from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (King et al.,
2010; Ruggles et al., 2010).
14Since previous economic conditions likely influence colleges’ current financial decisions, the lagged value
of state controls are mapped to the current academic year. For example, the unemployment rates for 2009
are mapped to the academic year 2009-2010.
15Undergraduate enrollment by gender is missing for all institutions for the academic year 1990-1991 in
addition to less than one percent of missing observations. Linear interpolation is used to fill in this missing
data; however, five colleges are omitted from the analytic sample as they are either missing enrollment data
by gender for either all years or for several years such that linear interpolation can either not be used or
does not produce reasonable extrapolations.
16Enrollment by race is missing for academic years 1987-1988, 1989-1990, 1990-1991, 1995-1996, and 1996-
1997 for all colleges and for an additional less than one percent of observations. Linear interpolation is
used to fill in these gaps in the data, but five institutions are omitted from the analytic sample as linear
interpolations do not perform well since several years of enrollment data are missing.
17FTE enrollment is missing for less than one percent of the sample, and linear interpolation is used to
fill in missing data.
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following implementation, and the concern is presumably for outcomes that are determined
by state governments who also administer state-funded merit aid programs. Therefore, I
focus more so on college level decisions that are made independently at the college level,
but I include state level outcomes such as state appropriations and tuition at public colleges
(which is sometimes made through oversight or negotiation with state legislatures) in order
to compare results to the previous literature that has examined these variables (Long, 2004a;
Calcagno and Alfonso, 2007; Jensen, 2011; Curs and Dar, 2010a). Also, the long panel allows
me to control for college-specific time trends. In the Appendix, I demonstrate that results
are sensitive to including these college-specific time trends and for some outcomes, there does
appear to be non-parallel pre-treatment trends for treatment and control states. Therefore,
college-specific time trends are included to account for linear trends at the institution level
or higher, and time fixed effects control for general time trends.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics are presented separately for merit and non-merit states in Tables B.2
through B.5. Table B.2 and Table B.3 demonstrate that merit and non-merit states are
comparable in terms of state and institutional control variables, respectively. For the last
year in the panel data set, non-merit states have slightly higher average personal income
per capita and real GDP per capita than states with merit aid programs, but the average
unemployment rate and percent of the population with a high school degree are similar across
the states. Also, average student composition and FTE enrollment are comparable across
treatment and control states.
Table B.4 and B.5 present summary statistics for the outcomes of interest per FTE
enrollment for public and private not-for-profit colleges, respectively. Several revenue
outcomes are examined for public colleges including: in-state tuition, out-of-state tuition,
revenue from private donors,18 state grants and contracts,19 and state appropriations. Over
the time period studied, the mean in-state and out-of-state tuition and fees (or sticker price)
18Includes gifts, grants, and contracts that are directly related to instruction, research, public service, or
other institutional purposes.
19Includes both operating and non-operating grants and contracts.
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at public colleges is roughly $4,000 and $10,000, respectively, for both merit and non-merit
states. The average revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts per FTE is about
$1,000, and state appropriations per FTE are about $9,000 for all states. It should be
noted that state grants and contracts include revenues from states for specific programs,
and institutions should report merit scholarship funds such as the HOPE scholarship when
reporting state grants and contracts. Including this outcome helps confirm that colleges
in merit aid states are consistently reporting revenues for merit aid programs. Several
college outcomes related to students are also examined including: instructional expenditures,
student services expenditures,20 the gross amount of Pell grants disbursed by an institution,
institutional grants, and the number of full-time faculty per 100 FTE students.21 For all
states, the mean instructional expenditures and student services expenditures per FTE are
approximately $8,000 and $1,000 respectively. The mean gross amount of Pell grants per
FTE is about $900, and the average institutional grant per FTE is roughly $700. Lastly, the
average number of full-time faculty per 100 FTE students is approximately six.
Similar outcomes are also examined for private colleges including: tuition, revenue from
private donors, instructional expenditures, student services expenditures, the gross amount
of Pell grants disbursed by an institution, institutional grants, and the number of full-time
faculty per 100 FTE students. The mean tuition or sticker price at private colleges is higher
in non-merit versus merit states. The average revenue from private donors per FTE is
roughly $5,000 and significantly higher for private versus public colleges. Likewise, the mean
institutional grant per FTE is about $4,000 and significantly higher for private versus public
colleges, and the average student services expenditures per FTE is approximately $2,500 and
higher for private versus public colleges.
2.4 Results
I estimate Equation 2.1 for all outcomes of interest separately for public and private colleges
where the control group consists of colleges in non-merit states and colleges in merit states
20Includes expenses for activities such as admissions, registrar activities, student activities, cultural events,
intramural athletics, student organizations, student newspapers, etc.
21Faculty includes faculty for instruction, research, and public service.
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pre-treatment. To prevent data composition from driving results, only institutions with less
than or equal to two years of missing data for the dependent variable are included in each
estimation.22 The results for public colleges are shown in Table B.6, and robust standard
errors, clustered by institution, are in parentheses. Column I lists the mean value of each
outcome for public colleges in merit states the year before program implementation, and
values are in millions except for the outcomes tuition and faculty per 100 FTE enrollment.
Column II lists the estimates of the effect of merit aid programs on colleges’ revenues and
expenditures.
State merit aid programs arguably provide funds for a lot of students from middle and
upper income families. One might expect for colleges to raise tuition in response to state-
funded merit scholarships since receiving financial aid raises these families’ ability to pay.
However, the implementation of merit aid programs does not significantly affect in-state
tuition, and merit aid programs induce only slightly significant and a modest increase in
out-of-state tuition. Specifically, public colleges in merit states have a 3.4% increase in out-
of-state tuition post-merit relative to what prices would have been in absence of merit aid
programs. However, this minimal impact on tuition may not be altogether surprising since
tuition at public colleges are often set through oversight or negotiation with state legislatures.
State legislatures may prohibit significant tuition hikes at public colleges to ensure that the
full value of HOPE-like scholarships are passed on to students as intended by policymakers.
However, it should be noted that published tuition prices or sticker prices are often not the
price that students pay, and it remains to be seen whether merit aid programs affect the net
price that students actually pay.
One may also expect an increase in state-funded scholarships to crowd out other revenue
sources such as private contributions to colleges especially since broad merit aid programs
are generally very transparent, simple, and highly publicized programs. Yet the introduction
of merit aid programs does not significantly affect revenue from private gifts, grants, and
contracts. Colleges in merit aid states do, nonetheless, experience significant increases in
state appropriations and state grants and contracts. Merit state colleges experience a
22Included observations vary depending on the outcome of interest, but on average, roughly 90% of the
sample is included in estimations for both public and private not-for-profit colleges.
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relative 4.8% increase in state appropriations and a 90.6% increase in state grants and
contracts. The enormous increase in state grants and contracts is expected and reassuring
since colleges in merit aid states should report merit aid dollars in this category on annual
IPEDS surveys. However, finding that merit aid programs actually crowd in rather than
crowd out state appropriations is surprising. Many might expect states to instead decrease
state appropriations to public colleges in the years after merit aid programs are introduced
especially since most of these programs are funded through semi-private sources such as
lottery revenues or tobacco settlement funds instead of general revenues. Yet states create
merit aid programs in order to improve educational outcomes in their state, and states’
commitment to these goals may explain increases in state appropriations.23
Expenditures on students are also examined. While merit aid programs appear to
not affect instructional expenditures, colleges in merit aid states increase student services
expenditures by 3.9% and increase the number of full-time faculty per 100 FTE enrollment by
3.9%. Many merit aid programs aim to incentivize high ability students to attend college in-
state, and colleges may be supplementing these merit aid programs with increases in spending
on various student-oriented activities and initiatives in order to further attract students to
their university especially given the increasing competition among both colleges within and
outside of a state. Previous work has found that students do value amenities such as student
activities, cultural events, intramural athletics, residence halls, food services, college unions,
etc., and colleges respond to market demand for such non-price amenities (Jacob et al.,
2013).
Lastly, for public colleges, I examine whether increases in merit aid crowd out institutional
grants or affect the gross amount of Pell grants at an institution. Colleges could adjust
institutional grants in several ways in response to merit aid programs. Colleges may view
state merit scholarships as a substitute for institutional grants and reduce institutional
grants. On the other hand, colleges may not change the overall spending level of institutional
grants, but redirect institutional grants from typical merit scholarship recipients to more
needy students, for example. Unfortunately, this kind of substitution can not be examined
23This finding is consistent with that of Long (2004a) who finds that public colleges in Georgia with a
greater percentage of HOPE recipients experience an increase in state appropriations.
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here since only the aggregate level of institutional grants is available, but results indicate that
colleges do not make any significant changes to institutional grants, at least at the aggregate
level, in response to merit aid programs. Yet the gross amount of Pell grants disbursed by
an institution increases by 5.1% for merit state colleges after program implementation. This
increase in the gross amount of Pell grants may arise through a couple different channels. The
introduction of merit aid programs may increase the enrollment of Pell eligible students or
it may increase the number of current students (who would have enrolled regardless of merit
aid programs) who are Pell eligible. While the analysis here can not distinguish between
these two mechanisms, several programs require students to apply for merit scholarships by
completing the FAFSA which may result in more students being Pell eligible post program
implementation.
Turning to private colleges, results for private colleges are presented in Table B.7. Similar
to Table B.6, Column I lists the mean value of each outcome for private colleges in merit
states the year before program implementation, and Column II lists the estimates of the effect
of merit aid programs on private colleges’ financial decisions. Given that private colleges set
tuition prices independently, private colleges may be more likely than public colleges to
increase tuition in response to merit aid programs. Results, however, indicate that private
colleges do not significantly alter tuition prices. Furthermore, similar to public colleges,
private contributions to private colleges are not affected by the implementation of merit
aid programs, and private colleges in merit aid states increase expenditures on students.
However, private colleges increase instructional expenditures rather than student services
expenditures contrary to findings for public colleges. Private colleges increase instructional
expenditures by 3.9%, but this finding is only significant at the ten percent level. Also,
similar to public colleges, private colleges experience an increase in the gross amount of Pell
grants disbursed to students. Private colleges in merit states experience a 4.5% increase in
the gross amount of Pell grants compared to the level that would have transpired in absence
of merit aid programs. The underlying reasons for this increase are unknown, but several
programs requiring students to file a FAFSA for eligibility likely plays a role.
Overall, public and private colleges do not seem to be capturing HOPE-like scholarship
funds through significant increases in tuition prices. Instead, after merit aid programs
47
are introduced, public and private colleges slightly increase expenditures on students and
experience increases in the gross amount of Pell grants.
2.5 Extensions
In this section, I extend the baseline analysis by considering other possible ways to measure
merit aid programs. The baseline specification, Equation 2.1, uses a binary indicator,
Meritst, that is equal to one for states that introduced broad merit aid programs after
implementation and zero otherwise. This is precisely how previous studies that examine
both demand and supply-side effects have specified the introduction of merit aid programs
in similar panel data models (Dynarski, 2004; Fitzpatrick and Jones, 2012; Sjoquist and
Winters, 2014b,a). Yet, in this extension, I use actual program expenditures per FTE
enrollment rather than an indicator for Meritst.
24 Using expenditures per FTE allows for
the specification to account for not only switching a merit aid program from off to on,
but it accounts for the overall broadness and size of the program. Additionally, results
can be interpreted in terms of dollar values. Unfortunately, program expenditures are only
available going back to the 2002-2003 academic year; therefore, eventual size of each merit
aid program is used. Specifically, each states’ expenditures on their merit aid program in
the 2006-2007 year is divided by state undergraduate FTE enrollment in the same year. The
FTE enrollment includes students typically eligible for HOPE-like scholarships and includes
undergraduate students at four-year and two-year, public and private not-for-profit colleges
within a state. For scaling purposes, expenditures per FTE for each state are divided by 100
to align better with the dependent variables which are the log of expenditure and revenue
outcomes.
Equation 2.1 is estimated with Meritst now equaling the 2006-2007 expenditures per
FTE for states that introduced merit aid programs after implementation and zero otherwise,
24Expenditures for state, merit aid programs were collected from The National Association of
State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) Program Quick Finder. Expenditure and
recipient data for specific scholarship programs including states’ merit aid programs is only recently
available, and expenditure and recipient details can be obtained going back to the 2002-2003
academic year. The NASSGAP Program Quick Finder can be found at the following website:
http://www.nassgap.org/survey/program finder/program finder.asp.
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and results for public colleges are presented in Table B.8. Column I lists the baseline results
which are the same as those found in Column II of Table B.6, and Column II lists estimates
of the effect of merit aid on colleges’ financial decisions using eventual program size or
expenditures per undergraduate FTE (divided by 100). Out-of-state tuition which was only
weakly significant in the baseline specification no longer registers as significant when using
expenditures per FTE. Merit aid now appears to crowd out some revenue from private donors,
but the estimate is only significant at the ten percent level. Merit aid continues to increase
expenditures on students including both instructional and student services expenditures.
While these estimates increase in terms of significance as they are now significant at the one
percent level, point estimates continue to be relatively modest. For every $100 dollar increase
in merit aid per FTE, instructional expenditures and student services expenditures increase
by 0.4% and 0.7%, respectively. Also, the gross amount of Pell grants disbursed by merit
state colleges continues to significantly increase post-treatment as does state appropriations
and state grants and contracts.
Focusing on private colleges, Table B.9 presents results for private colleges using
expenditures per FTE to indicate merit aid programs. Results from the baseline specification
and using expenditure data are very similar. Merit aid does not significantly affect tuition,
revenues from donors, or institutional grants, but private colleges in merit states do slightly
increase instructional expenditures. Also, the introduction of merit aid programs increases
the gross amount of Pell grants disbursed at private colleges.
Overall, results from both the baseline specification and from using actual expenditure
data suggest that neither public nor private colleges in merit states capture merit scholarship
funds. Instead colleges increase expenditures on students and experience significant, albeit
modest, increases in the gross amount of Pell grants disbursed.
2.6 Conclusion and Implications
Merit aid programs have grown substantially over the last two decades, and an extensive
amount of research examines the demand-side effects of these programs. Yet much less
is known about how colleges respond to state-implemented merit aid programs. This
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paper examines whether merit aid programs affect the supply side of higher education
and contributes to the literature by analyzing multiple programs and exploring numerous
college-level outcomes. Additionally, an extension is provided that utilizes actual program
expenditures as a measure of the size of merit aid programs. Using a 1986-2009 panel
of colleges, I find that public and private colleges do not seem to be capturing HOPE-
like scholarships through significant increases in tuition prices or decreases in institutional
aid, at least at the aggregate level. Instead, public and private colleges supplement merit
aid programs with increases in expenditures on students such as instructional and student
services expenditures. Also, colleges in merit states experience an increase in the gross
amount of Pell grants disbursed after program implementation. Overall, colleges do not
seem to be extremely responsive to the introduction of merit aid programs, and findings are
informative for policymakers. Results suggest that students are receiving the full value of
their merit scholarships as intended by policymakers, and if anything, might even receive
additional financial aid through Pell eligibility.
How do results compare to those in the existing literature? Long (2004a) examines
supply-side effects specifically for the Georgia HOPE scholarship. Using the data set from
this paper, I conduct a very similar analysis using the traditional differences-in-differences
identification, with Southeast states as the control group for Georgia over the academic
years 1989-1990 to 1996-1997.25 Long (2004a) finds that HOPE leads to modest decreases in
tuition at Georgia’s public colleges and modest increases in tuition at private colleges, which
contradicts the findings discussed above. I am able to replicate the results from Long (2004a),
particularly regarding public tuition, instructional expenditures per FTE, and institutional
grants, and this exercise suggests that some of the responses from colleges in Georgia are
not generalizable to colleges in other states with merit aid programs.
25Long (2004a) examines whether public and private four-year colleges respond to the introduction of
the Georgia HOPE in terms of state appropriations, tuition, room and board fees, institutional aid, and
instructional expenditures per student and uses two different specifications. One is a traditional differences-
in-differences identification while the other is also a differences-in-differences identification but incorporates
the proportion of the student body that are HOPE recipients. Additionally, the analysis uses data from
IPEDS rather than the Delta Cost Project database, and competitor colleges where more than five percent
of the student population are from Georgia are omitted since these colleges may respond to the HOPE. Thus,
there are differences between the number of observations and the data set as well as slight variations in the
control variables used in the replication compared to those in Long (2004a).
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In conclusion, previous research that examines how colleges respond to merit aid programs
has produced mixed results, and comparisons are difficult given variations in programs
studied, data sets used, and empirical strategies. This paper aims to broaden the time period
studied in order to collectively analyze how merit aid programs affect colleges in terms of
multiple outcomes. Altogether, this study along with previous work suggest that colleges
are not extremely sensitive to merit scholarship programs as colleges are not drastically
altering tuition prices. In fact, findings here suggest that colleges may even slightly increase
expenditures on students. However, an open question still remains. How do merit aid
programs affect the actual net price that students pay for college? Although I detect little to
no change in published tuition prices and institutional aid at the aggregate level in the wake
of merit aid, future analyses using student-level data may reveal that state-funded merit
scholarships affect students’ financial aid packages and thus net price. Additionally, do
colleges in merit aid states that increase expenditures on students realize positive demand-
side effects? Connecting both demand-side and supply-side analyses will provide insight
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Abstract
Pell grants are the largest financial aid vehicle in the United States, and yet, their role
in shaping students’ college choices is not clear. We identify the effect of initial Pell grant
eligibility on college enrollment and college choice, drawing on the enrollment decisions of
four cohorts of Tennessee high school graduates and discontinuities in Pell eligibility as a
function of federal formulas. Consistent with prior work, we find no evidence that marginal
Pell eligibility increases college-going. We go on to show that just meeting the Pell cut-off has
little bearing on where students choose to enroll, in terms of college sector or college quality.
Below the threshold, where applicants are needier and the grant is more generous, students
sort into colleges with modestly higher published tuition, on the order of 12 - 14 cents
per dollar of Pell aid. And yet, no other measure of college quality or college selectively
significantly diverges from the counterfactual. We conclude that Tennessee’s traditional-
aged students do not use the Pell grant as a tool to shop among college options in ways that
systematically improve enrollment outcomes.
JEL: I22, I23, H75
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3.1 Introduction
Over 9.4 million students received Pell grants, the largest source of federal grant aid in higher
education, in the 2011-2012 academic year, amounting to $33.6 billion in expenditures (U.S.
Department of Education, 2012). This extensive grant program intends to increase access to
college for financially constrained students, but research shows that initial Pell eligibility has
little to no positive impact on college enrollment (Hansen, 1983; Kane, 1995; Bettinger, 2004;
Rubin, 2011), with notable exceptions provided by older, non-traditional students (Seftor
and Turner, 2002).1 The idea that traditional student demand for college is insensitive
to Pell eligibility is not altogether surprising, for three reasons. Foremost, the application
process for federal financial aid is complex and can stretch well into a student’s senior year
of high school, which weakens and delays the communication of aid eligibility to students
on the margin of going to college (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2006, 2008; Dynarski and
Wiederspan, 2012; Dynarski et al., 2013). Easing this process meaningfully increases college
enrollment (Bettinger et al., 2012). Second, applicants observe Pell eligibility at the same
time as institutions, who may capture a portion of federal funds by reducing institutional aid
(Turner, 2014). And third, marginal Pell eligibility is associated with a fairly small grant, so
local treatment effects could understate the impact of Pell grants more broadly. With these
ideas in mind, two of the remaining questions about Pell eligibility and college-going center
around students’ choice of college, conditional on enrollment, and treatment effects for Pell
grants larger than the modest scholarship available at the beginning of the phase-in range.
Using data on four cohorts of Tennessee high school graduates from the classes of 2006-
2009, we utilize discontinuities in Pell eligibility along continuous values of “expected family
contribution,” a relatively opaque construct of federal aid processing, to estimate the impact
of Pell grants on the extensive margin of college enrollment, and we go on to examine whether
Pell eligibility affects where a student chooses to enroll, in terms of college sector and college
quality.2 Are Pell recipients more inclined to enroll out-of-state? Are students receiving
the Pell more likely to attend four-year universities rather than two-year colleges? Do Pell
1Limited or null effects on the college entry margin do not rule out a response from enrolled students to
the threat of losing Pell (Scott-Clayton and Schuddee, 2015).
2Throughout the study we use “college quality” interchangeably with “college selectivity,” although we
acknowledge that selectivity measures do not equate with institutional value added.
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recipients attend higher quality institutions? To date, researchers have exploited the Pell
eligibility threshold to examine on-time college enrollment (Rubin, 2011) and institutional
aid (Turner, 2014), but it is not yet known whether Pell grants affect student choices along
the spectrum of college quality. The same Pell award can be used at almost any institution,
so Pell has the potential to help the neediest students enroll in better colleges. One reason
for this gap in the literature is the rare confluence of data on complete cohorts of high school
graduates, linked to both college enrollment outcomes and detailed data from financial aid
applications. We draw from linked administrative data on Tennessee’s public high school
graduates that makes all of the necessary connections for a regression discontinuity analysis
of college enrollment behavior and Pell eligibility.
Other aid programs have been shown to affect college choice, sometimes with unintended
consequences. Bruce and Carruthers (2014) find that the Tennessee HOPE scholarship, a
broad-based merit scholarship, induces a small substitution effect towards four-year colleges
and away from two-year colleges for marginally eligible students, and Goodman (2008) and
Cohodes and Goodman (2014) find that students favor in-state public colleges rather than
higher quality private or out-of-state colleges in response to merit-based tuition waivers
in Massachusetts. There is a fundamental difference between Pell grants and merit aid,
however, that may dampen the effect of Pell on college choice. Eligibility criteria for merit aid
programs are widely publicized and tied to standardized test scores or grade point averages.
Students are well-informed as to their merit aid eligibility, sometimes long before they start
applying to college. Eligibility for the Pell grant, by contrast, is much less transparent and
students are notified late in twelfth grade.
In addition to characterizing the effect of Pell aid on college choices, we extend the
literature in a second way by assessing whether the local impact of the Pell grant generalizes
away from the eligibility threshold, where students are needier and where the grant is
more generous. We extrapolate treatment effects below the eligibility cut-off based on the
relationship between college enrollment and students’ observable characteristics just above
the cut-off (Angrist and Rokkanen, 2015).
Consistent with previous work, our findings indicate that Pell eligibility does not
significantly impact college enrollment per se for traditional-aged students. Moreover, we find
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little evidence that applicants use Pell eligibility to shop among college options. With three
exceptions, passing the Pell eligibility threshold has no impact on college sector or college
quality. The exceptions are thus: we find that (1) marginally Pell-eligible males enroll in
more selective colleges relative to marginally ineligible males, (2) females substitute into out-
of-state four-year public colleges upon gaining Pell eligibility, and (3) Pell-eligible students
enroll in institutions where tuition and fees are modestly higher than the counterfactual.
But these findings are economically small, statistically imprecise, or sensitive to specification
changes. We conclude that Pell grants – the largest need-based aid vehicle in the United
States – have no discernible impact on whether traditional-aged students go to college and
at best modest effects on where students go to college.
3.2 Conceptual and Policy Framework
The federal Pell Grant program initially began under Title IV of the Higher Education Act
of 1965. The specific timeline of Pell grant determination illustrates how students might
leverage the grant to shop among college options as well as the difficulties of doing so in
reality. Students seeking to be eligible for the Pell as well as other federal grants, subsidized
loans, or work-study programs must complete a Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(FAFSA). Students begin to file FAFSAs in January for fall enrollment the same year, and
colleges often require that high school seniors submit their FAFSA between February and
March in order to be given priority for need-based institutional aid.
The FAFSA collects demographic information, federal income tax information, family
size, the number of family members in college (excluding parents), and other financial data
such as assets and untaxed income. Students indicate at least one college to receive the
output of FAFSA processing. The 2006-2009 cohorts in our study could submit the FAFSA
electronically or by mail. Up to four colleges could be listed on paper FAFSAs while online
applications allowed for six, increasing to ten with 2009 applicants (U.S. Department of
Education, 2007).
Once a student submits her FAFSA, the Central Processing System calculates her
Expected Family Contribution (EFC). EFC is the amount that the student or her family
56
are expected to provide for college expenses, based on ability to pay. To begin calculating
EFC, allowances for taxes and basic living expenses are subtracted from the family’s income
to yield “available” income. The family’s available income along with a percentage of net
assets is divided by the number of dependents in college (including the applicant) to generate
EFC.3 Within three days to three weeks after a student submits her FAFSA, the Central
Processing System sends the student a Student Aid Report, and all schools listed on the
student’s FAFSA receive an Institutional Student Information Record. The Student Aid
Report lists the student’s FAFSA information as well as her EFC and potential Pell grant
eligibility.
At this point a student is notified that she may be eligible for a Pell grant but she is
not made aware of the amount. Pell grants are a simple function of EFC, and Pell-to-
EFC schedules are published each year after federal appropriations have been determined
(typically in January). In principle, students can easily find out what their Pell grant should
be upon learning their EFC. But the Student Aid Report – the primary communication
between the federal aid process and students – did not include this information for the
cohorts we study. One reason for this omission is that each component of the EFC formula
is subject to audit and verification by institutions, who are responsible for compiling aid
packages for each admitted applicant.4
Financial aid offices at each college where a student is admitted use the relayed
Institutional Student Information Record to determine how much need-based aid she can
receive based on the reported EFC. Students’ need-based and merit-based aid is collectively
bound by the relevant cost of attendance. The cost of attendance for a particular college
includes tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, miscellaneous expenses, and
child care or dependent care allowances. There is a maximum and a minimum Pell grant for
eligible students and a maximum EFC for Pell eligibility. These criteria vary from year to
3There are actually six different EFC formulas according to the student’s dependency status and whether
the student qualifies for a simplified formula. The dependency-based formulas are very similar and mainly
differ by the percentages and allowances used. The simplified formula uses a reduced set of financial indicators
and is available to families who are eligible to file a 1040A or 1040EZ tax form instead of the longer 1040
form, or who participate in means-tested federal benefits programs and have an adjusted gross income less
than a specific amount ($49,999 for 2012-2013).
4Current applicants are presented with an estimate of their Pell grant upon completing the online FAFSA,
although EFC components are still frequently subject to verification.
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year according to federal appropriations. Each year, Pell grant eligibility is a sharp function
of a particular value of EFC. For instance, year 2006 applicants with EFC equal to $3,851
were ineligible for Pell while applicants with EFC between $3,650 and $3,850 were eligible
for a $400 grant. Then for EFC values below $3,650, the Pell grant increased one-for-one
until the maximum Pell grant of $4,050 was reached for applicants with zero EFC.5
Typically, admitted students receive letters in March or April from college financial aid
offices specifying the amount of Pell grants and institutional scholarships they are eligible to
receive if they enroll. A student’s EFC and potential Pell grant is constant across her choice
set of colleges, but financial aid packages will differ across institutions according to cost of
attendance, college resources, and available state aid. The idea that Pell grants could help
students choose between different colleges rests on the non-trivial assumption that students
can jointly consider admissions and aid information from multiple schools when deciding
where to enroll. The federal aid application timeline offers two ways to do this. When
submitting the initial FAFSA, as noted, students can request that their financial details be
sent to up to ten schools. After the initial application, students can add or delete schools
from this list online, by mail, over the phone, or via the financial aid office of a prospective
college. In practice, however, a majority of students list just one school on their FAFSA
applications (Turner, 2014).
Could Pell grants lead students to choose more selective institutions? Theoretical
expectations are unclear. Pell-eligible students can apply the same grant to any Title IV
institution: two-year, four-year, public, private, in-state, or out-of-state.6 In that sense,
Pell grants are conditional transfers that relax households’ income constraint for college
expenditures and other goods. Ignoring for a moment the institutional response to Pell aid,
the grant may affect students’ relative preferences for different colleges if demand for college
quality is responsive to net price. If the returns to college are greater for those educated at
5Minimum Pell awards were $400, $890, and $976 for 2007, 2008, and 2009 applicants, respectively, and
maximum Pell awards were $4,310, $4,731, and $5,350.
6There are rare cases where Pell awards are reduced for exceeding a school’s cost of attendance.
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more selective institutions,7 then basic human capital theory holds that a rational applicant
will leverage Pell aid into a more costly, more selective institution.8
This simple prediction rests on students having complete information, but in reality they
may be uninformed about colleges that make up their choice set, uncertain about their chance
of success at a more selective institution, or otherwise unsure about the future benefits of
a college education. Moreover, the visage of a rational applicant is more nuanced than one
who considers only net price and lifecycle income. Students sort into colleges based on a
number of other factors: debt aversion, distance from home (Long, 2004b), college amenities
(Jacob et al., 2013), and so forth. And the price elasticity of demand for college quality is not
readily understood - since the value of the Pell grant is de jure equivalent across institutions,
Pell eligibility changes the relative price of institutions and could actually lead students to
favor less costly, less selective institutions. Consider the Alchian and Allen (1967) theorem,
usually applied to a consumer’s decision to buy either a high quality or low quality version
of the same good. When a fixed cost, typically a transportation cost, is added to both
goods, the relative price of a high quality good decreases, leading consumers to purchase
the higher quality good in spite of the overall price increase. By contrast, uniform Pell
grants increase the relative price of more costly colleges, perhaps leading some students to
favor less selective, less costly institutions. The “free ride” that a $5,000 Pell grant affords
at a community college, for instance, may have more salience than a $5,000 discount at a
four-year university.
Empirical evidence related to our question is less ambiguous than theory. Recent work
has shown that gains in families’ ability to pay for college – actual or perceived – lead
students to select higher quality colleges. Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013) find that rising
7See Kane and Rouse (1995) and Reynolds (2012) for evidence that labor market returns to four-year
institutions dominate those for two-year community colleges, Goodman et al. (2015) for evidence that just
meeting the academic threshold for four-year college admission increases the likelihood of bachelor’s degree
completion, and Hoekstra (2009) for evidence that just gaining admission to an anonymous and selective
flagship university significantly increases earnings as a young adult. The question of returns to college quality
is not settled, however: Dale and Krueger (2011) find that ability bias explains all of the wage returns to
college selectivity for white students and students with more educated parents.
8See Avery and Hoxby (2004) for an overview of the human capital model specifically in the context of
college choice. Rational agents calculate present discounted values for each potential college in their choice
set and include the cost of college, grants, scholarships, loans, future earnings, consumption, etc. Then, a
rational student chooses the school that maximizes the difference between the present discounted value of
benefits and the present discounted value of costs.
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home equity increases the probability a student attends a high quality institution, and this
was especially true for students from low-income families. Hoxby and Turner (2014) report
on a randomized controlled trial that provided ACT and SAT test-takers with application
fee waivers and information on net price at several different colleges, under the hypothesis
that high-achieving, low-income applicants are not fully aware of the aid available to them
at more selective institutions. The treatment effectively increased families’ perceived ability
to pay and led students to enroll in substantially better colleges at a cost of $6 - 15 per
student. But for administrative reasons outlined above, the effect of a Pell grant on families’
budget constraint may be much less apparent than new housing wealth or an informative
mailer.
Expectations from theoretical and empirical frameworks are further clouded when
institutional responses are taken in consideration. Colleges publicize the rate of Pell-
eligible students they enroll, a signal of economic diversity that may have intrinsic value
to institutions and alumni. Nevertheless, colleges allocate institutional grants with an
approximation of students’ ability to pay as well as full knowledge of applicants’ Pell
eligibility. The grant may crowd out other sources of aid (Turner, 2014), yielding little
difference in net price across a student’s choice set.
The opaque and sharp nature of Pell eligibility as a function of EFC motivates a quasi-
experimental analysis of the effect of Pell on college choices. But the timing and delivery of
official Pell grant amounts, alongside uncertainty surrounding students’ price sensitivity and
demand for college quality, leads to ambiguous a priori expectations at and below the Pell
grant threshold. In the reduced form, then, the empirical questions surrounding Pell grants
and college choices necessitate a large set of students making college decisions. With this in
mind, we examine college enrollment choices for the universe of 2006-2009 Tennessee high
school graduates filing FAFSA applications.
3.3 Data and Methods
Data on 2006-2009 Tennessee high school graduates and their FAFSA records are provided
by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, who match students to college enrollment
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outcomes using the National Student Clearinghouse. We merge information on college
selectivity (the ACT scores of incoming classes, instructional expenditures per student,
Carnegie class, and published tuition and fees) from the federal Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS). National Student Clearinghouse data on these four cohorts
cover observed postsecondary enrollment up to and including the 2009-2010 academic year.9
For each 2006-2009 graduate, we identify the first instance of a successful FAFSA (excluding
dual enrollment) and link that application to college enrollment outcomes the following
academic year.10,11
From the starting-point sample of 2006 - 2009 Tennessee high school graduates, we omit
22 percent who do not file a FAFSA before 2011. This sample selection is regrettable but
necessary to evaluate the Pell grant’s impact on matriculation decisions. Pell eligibility
is determined via FAFSA processing, so students who neglect to file an application are
automatically ineligible. Moreover, the forcing variable used in regression discontinuity
analyses – each student’s expected family contribution – is unavailable for students without
an application on record. Although results will not necessarily generalize to students who do
not file for federal aid, findings allow for causal inference regarding financial aid eligibility
and college choices among low-income students who are considering college.
Table C.1 lists descriptive statistics for the FAFSA-filing sample as a whole, by subsequent
college enrollment (Columns 1-2), as well as for the subset of students whose EFC falls within
$3,000 of Pell eligibility (Columns 3-4). Note that 80.5 percent of the bandwidth-restricted
sample enrolled in college during the window of time between graduation and 2009-2010. This
is considerably higher than the rate of college enrollment for Tennessee high school graduates
9The National Student Clearinghouse is a non-profit entity whose enrollment data cover, as of this writing,
in excess of 98 percent of United States college students. Coverage tends to be narrower, but still over 90
percent, among Tennessee college students due to a preponderance of small religiously-affiliated colleges that
do not participate in the Clearinghouse. We have no reason to expect that non-participation rates will affect
results and/or vary discontinuously over the Pell eligibility threshold.
10This necessarily leads to imbalance across cohorts, in that we allow the 2006 cohort to wait up to four
academic years after graduation to file a FAFSA and enroll in college, whereas we observe just one year after
high school for 2009 graduates. As we show in the appendix, results are robust to conditioning on student
covariates and cohort fixed effects. Additionally, in an unreported analysis, we find that results are robust
to the omission of students whose first FAFSA application is more than one year after high school.
11The market for higher education is somewhat concentrated among Tennessee high school graduates,
but not so much as to motivate a discrete choice model rather than regression discontinuity identification
across a spectrum of college quality. The top five destinations for students in this sample draw 30 percent
of college-going seniors, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for all college destinations is 366.
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a whole (63.5 percent among these four cohorts), which is a consequence of inherently higher
rates of college-going among successful FAFSA filers. Table C.2 lists summary statistics for
college outcomes of interest, conditional on enrolling in college at all. We examine a mutually
exclusive and exhaustive set of six college sector options, demarcated by control (public or
private), state (in Tennessee or not), and level (two-year or four-year). We additionally
examine nine measures of college quality and college selectivity, listed and summarized in
the bottom portion of Table C.2.
The specification for baseline regression discontinuity analysis takes the following form:
Yic = α + β1PELLic + β2PELLic ∗ (EFCic − Ēc) + β3(EFCic − Ēc) + εic, (3.1)
where Yic is a matriculation or institutional outcome for student i in cohort c, PELLic is an
indicator equal to one for students whose EFC is at or below the Pell eligibility threshold, and
Ēc is the relevant Pell eligbility threshold for cohort c. We limit the analysis to students whose
nominal EFC falls within $3,000 of the relevant Pell eligibility threshold, and we round EFC
values to the nearest hundred. Robust standard errors are clustered by $100 EFC bin. The
appendix discusses results under wider EFC aggregations, alternative bandwidths (narrower,
optimal), the inclusion of controls, and the use of a quadratic rather than a linear function
for the gap between i’s EFC and the Pell eligibility threshold for i’s cohort (EFCic − Ēc).
Ours is a sharp regression discontinuity analysis, since Pell eligibility rates rise from zero
to very nearly one hundred percent at the EFCic = Ēc threshold.
12 Figure C.1 depicts Pell
eligibility relative to the EFC cut-off alongside grantees’ potential scholarship.13 The local
average treatment effect estimate of Pell eligibility on Yic is given by β1 in Equation 3.1. The
standard regression discontinuity identification assumption applies: in the absence of Pell
grants, the propensity to enroll in different colleges would have varied smoothly around the
EFC threshold.
12Estimates of Equation 3.1 for reported Pell eligibility point to a first-stage discontinuity of between 99
and 100 percent.
13We observe official Pell eligibility in the FAFSA data on hand, but not the amount of the grant students
were ultimately awarded. Panel I of Figure C.1 represents students’ actual, reported eligibility, whereas
Panel II depicts the grant that students would have been eligible for according to their EFC. Pell grants,
worth no more than $5,350 for these cohorts, are rarely scaled back for exceeding the cost of attendance
constraint, which generally measures in the tens of thousands of dollars.
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We indirectly test the identification assumption in three ways. First, we follow McCrary
(2008) and test for discontinuities in the density of EFC values around the threshold, finding
that students do not appear to cluster on one side of the threshold.14 This implies that
applicants are not strategically responding to the publicly available (albeit, complex) EFC
formula to gain Pell eligibility. Second, we estimate discontinuities in pre-college student
characteristics like gender, race, ethnicity, and parental education. Results are listed in
the top portion of Table C.3. Other than a significant 1.6 percentage point decline in the
likelihood of one’s father having a college education, we see no indication that students below
the Pell threshold were very different from students just above the threshold. Another way
to test the fundamental identification assumption is to estimate college enrollment outcomes
as a function of students’ observable characteristics (listed in Table C.1) and then examine
whether predicted outcomes shift at the threshold. The bottom portion of Table C.3 lists
findings from that exercise, where we show that expected enrollment outcomes vary smoothly
over the Pell eligibility threshold.
As noted in Section 3.2, marginal Pell eligibility yields a modest grant, which may limit
the extent to which the students who drive local treatment effects realistically use the Pell to
shop for different colleges. A variety of methods are available to estimate treatment effects
away from an eligibility threshold based on extrapolations of Yic = f(EFCic− Ēc) functional
forms or based on changes in the f(·) slope at the threshold. These hinge on assumptions
about counterfactual f(·) in the absence of treatment. Rather than make assumptions about
the relationship between counterfactual college choices and the running variable, we pursue
a method proposed by Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) that first explains that relationship
using exogenous characteristics of subjects, and then predicts counterfactual outcomes as
functions of those characteristics. Our identifying assumption is thus: in the absence of
Pell, outcomes would be mean-independent of EFCic− Ēc when conditioned on a set of Xic
student variables.
This conditional independence assumption is tested using the following specification,
with the sample limited to Pell-ineligible students with EFC values up to $3,000 above the




Yic = α + π(EFCic − Ēc) +Xicγ + ε (3.2)
A parsimonious set of Xic observables describing student i are used to model college
enrollment choices. If the running variable EFCic − Ēc is an insignificant determinant of
enrollment outcomes, conditional on Xic, we can more confidently argue that Ŷic predictions
below the eligibility threshold based on parameter estimates from students above the
threshold are adequate counterfactual outcomes. Our task, then, is to explain enough of
the variation in Pell-ineligible students’ college choices to render the conditional correlation
with distance from the cut-off null. To do so we include in Xic measures of demographics
(gender, Caucasian race), families’ ability to pay (real adjusted gross income and the ratio
of EFC to adjusted gross income), parental education (binary indicators for mothers’ college
education and fathers’ college education), and student ability and commitment to college
(first ACT composite score, the number of ACT attempts, indicators for missing ACT data).
We find that π estimates from Equation 3.2 for the set of college sector and college quality
outcomes are generally small and insignificant (see Table C.10 in the appendix). Predictions
from Equation 3.2 are extrapolated as counterfactual outcomes below the Pell eligibility
threshold using linear re-weighting estimators (Kline, 2011).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Impact of Pell Eligibility on College Enrollment and the
Choice of College Sector
Figure C.2 summarizes findings for the effect of Pell eligibility on any college enrollment.
Point estimates and standard errors for β1 in Equation 3.1 are listed above each figure.
Echoing earlier work that utilizes a similarly sharp identification strategy, but in a survey
15We limit the conditional independence test to ineligible students above the Pell threshold since the Pell
grant treatment grows as EFC falls. Note that this is a weaker test than that articulated by Angrist and
Rokkanen (2015), who apply this method to a setting where outcomes are assumed to be mean-independent
of the running variable on both sides of the threshold. We use a $3,000 bandwidth for the sake of consistency
with the regression discontinuity sample, although inframarginal results are largely unchanged under wider
bandwidths.
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setting with less statistical power (Rubin, 2011), we find no discernible increase in college-
going below the Pell eligibility threshold. On the contrary, we observe a marginally significant
decline in college-going among white FAFSA-filers, although as we show in the Appendix,
this counter-intuitive result is sensitive to modifications of the Equation 3.1 specification.
One reason that Pell eligibility might be ineffective at pushing marginal college students
to enroll is that eligibility is communicated to students fairly late in their senior year of high
school, after students have committed to enrolling (or not enrolling) in college. This would
also tend to work against Pell as a tool for students choosing between different colleges, but
in principle applicants have leeway to consider aid packages from multiple schools, and to
date, the idea that Pell eligibility helps students shop among their choice set is untested.
With this in mind, we limit the sample to college-going students and estimate Equation 3.1
for a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of six college sectors. Results – for the entire
sample of college enrollees and subsamples divided by gender and race – are listed in Table
C.4.
Column (1) lists point estimates and robust standard errors for β1 from Equation 3.1,
applied to the college sector choices of all college enrollees in the four-cohort sample of
Tennessee high school graduates. Column (1) results are also depicted in Figure C.3. We
find no significant discontinuities in students’ enrollment behavior broadly, although there
are three marginally significant results for subsamples that are worthy of note. First, males
are 0.4 percentage points more likely to enroll in a private two-year college below the Pell
eligibility threshold. These are typically for-profit sub-baccalaureate colleges. Though the
point estimate is small and weakly significant, it represents 80 percent of the share of students
enrolling in this sector. Second, females are somewhat less likely to enroll in an in-state four-
year college and somewhat more likely to enroll in an out-of-state four-year college just below
the Pell threshold, relative to students who are marginally ineligible for Pell. As we show in
the Appendix, these findings are sensitive to wider bandwidths but otherwise robust across
alternative specifications.
Among the thirty estimates presented in Table C.4, we might expect three to fall within
the 10 percent level of statistical significance. Even if we consider them to be genuine
consequences of Pell eligibility, they do not amount to strong evidence that Pell eligibility
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helps students shop across college options or enroll in better colleges than they would have
otherwise.
We note an important observation from Figure C.3 before moving on to results for student
decisions in terms of college quality. The slope of some outcomes with respect to the running
variable changes noticeably at the threshold in ways that suggest that the elasticity of student
responses with respect to the grant value, rather than grant eligibility, favors more selective
colleges. In particular, enrollment in Tennessee two-year community colleges appears to
become less likely for needier students who qualify for larger Pell grants, and enrollment in
out-of-state four-year public universities becomes more likely. Since the grant rises dollar-
for-dollar in this range of EFC, one way to quantify changes in slope is to interpret β2 in
Equation 3.1 as a regression kink estimate of student responses to aid.16 We do not pursue
a regression kink design here because a number of predetermined covariates listed in Table
C.3 also exhibit a small but significant change in slope proximate to the eligibility threshold,
as do regression-adjusted enrollment outcomes predicated on those covariates.17 Rather, in
Section 3.4.3 we present results based on supra-threshold extrapolations that condition on
student observables.
3.4.2 Pell and the Quality of College
Next, we examine the potential effect of Pell eligibility on the quality of college chosen,
as proxied by nine institutional characteristics drawn from IPEDS: the 25th and 75th
percentiles of enrollee ACT scores, per-student instructional expenditures,18 student-faculty
ratios, graduation rates, Carnegie class, tuition and fees for in-state residents, tuition and
fees for out-of-state residents, and lastly, tuition and fees conditional on students’ actual
residency (i.e., students attending Tennessee institutions are assigned in-state tuition and
students attending out-of-state institutions are assigned out-of-state tuition). Results are
16Regression kink methods are described in detail by Card et al. (2012).
17Nevertheless, conclusions from regression kink analyses are in accord with those discussed in Section
3.4.3.
18Instructional expenditures per student are also available in the Delta Cost Project Database. The Delta
Cost Project database consists of IPEDS financial data for colleges, but the data have been adjusted to
account for changes in reporting and accounting standards over time. Results and robustness checks when
using instructional expenditures per FTE from Delta Cost are consistent with those when using instructional
expenditures directly from IPEDS.
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listed in Table C.5. We see little evidence in Column (1) to suggest that the broad population
of Tennessee college-goers systematically sorts across college quality domains in response to
Pell eligibility. All of the point estimates in Column (1) of Table C.5 are consistent with
the idea that students move to higher-quality institutions because of Pell, but none of these
estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Columns (2) through (5) of Table C.5 lists results by gender and race. The standout
result from this stratification is that male college choices may be somewhat sensitive to
Pell eligibility. Marginally Pell-eligible males attend institutions with a slightly higher
interquartile range of student body ACT scores, by 0.22 composite points at the 25th
percentile and 0.31 points at the 75th percentile. These discontinuities reflect 1.2 percent
and 1.3 percent, respectively, of bandwidth-restricted samples means for these selectivity
measures (8.1 and 10.0 of their respective standard deviations). We also detect weakly
significant discontinuities in student-faculty ratios for males, but not for other subsamples.
Of the fifteen college outcomes we examine in this study, results for the interquartile ACT
range of males’ college choices are thus far the strongest evidence for quality upgrading at
the Pell eligibility threshold. The magnitude of ACT improvements at males’ chosen colleges
may yield significant returns that outweigh the direct cost of Pell support.19 Note, however,
that discontinuities in interquartile ACT are not only local to the male subgroup, but more
specifically to males at the Pell eligibility margin (see Appendix Table C.11).
3.4.3 Treatment Effects Away from the Eligibility Threshold
With the notable exception of gender-specific findings for certain college measures, regression
discontinuity results imply that Pell eligibility and Pell awards have little bearing on students’
demand for college overall, nor on their relative demand across the spectrum of college quality
19Hoekstra (2009) finds that marginally successful applicants to a selective flagship university earn 18
- 28 percent more, annually, as 28 - 33 year-olds than marginally ineligible applicants. The anonymous
flagship drew freshmen scoring 65 points higher on the SAT than the next most selective in-state university,
a difference equivalent to 6.4 percent of the mean among the relevant cohort per The College Board (1996,
Table 4-2). Here, we find that white Pell-eligible males sort into colleges with higher ACT scores by 1.2 - 1.3
percent of the mean. If, in agreement with Hoekstra (2009), this results in 3.4 - 5.3 percent gains in annual
earnings for affected students, the value of additional earnings could amount to $37,000 - $57,000 over a
30-year career, under a 3 percent discount rate and baseline weekly earnings of $1,101 (the average weekly
earnings for full-time and salary workers with a bachelor’s degree over age 25, per the Current Population
Survey).
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and selectivity. This may be because the marginal Pell grant is somewhat modest, $400 for
the first two cohorts in our sample, and $890 and $976 for subsequent cohorts.20 It may be
the case that null local treatment effects do not generalize, and that needier students who
qualify for larger Pell grants well below the threshold are more affected.
Therefore, we follow a method proposed by Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) and examine
treatment effects below the eligibility threshold. As outlined in Section 3.3, we first focus on
Pell-ineligible students whose EFC falls within $3,000 of the Pell cut-off and estimate college
outcomes as a function of exogenous student characteristics listed in Section 3.3. We then
map parameter estimates to Pell-eligible students with EFC values up to $3,000 below the
threshold. Treatment-on-the-treated effects are taken to be the average difference between
observed and predicted outcomes, with standard errors calculated following Kline (2011).
Key results are depicted in Figure C.4 for any college enrollment, Figure C.5 for college
sector outcomes, and Figure C.6 for college quality outcomes (including the only four with
statistically significant treatment effects). Circles represent observed student outcomes and
“X” markers represent counterfactual estimates, summarized by $100 EFC bin. Treatment
effects and standard errors are listed under each figure heading. We find no significant
treatment effect on college-going below the Pell cut-off (Figure C.4), and no meaningful
effect on students’ chosen college sector (Figure C.5). A possible exception is found in
the sub-figure for private four-year enrollment, where we see a weakly significant 1.1-point
positive treatment effect below the threshold.
Regarding the quality of colleges chosen (Figure C.6), we do not see a significant gap
between observed and counterfactual outcomes for any measure of selectivity or quality
except for published tuition and fees and colleges’ graduation rate. Sub-threshold treatment
effects indicate that Pell-eligible students attend institutions with higher tuition and fees
than they would have otherwise, by $261 on in-state schedules and $299 on out-of-state
schedules. Within this range of Pell-eligible students, grants were $2,120 on average. This
means that each dollar of Pell aid was potentially offset by 12.3 - 14.1 cents of higher tuition,
20A modal finding in the early financial aid literature is that each $1,000 yields a 4-percentage-point
increase in college-going (see Deming and Dynarski (2010) for a review), so despite the small initial value of
the grant, our null results run counter to expectations of 2 - 4 percentage-point gains in college-going as a
result of marginal eligibility.
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without considering reductions in out-of-pocket costs from institutional grants. But when
we look at published tuition and fees at each students’ institution and condition on their
residency, it is harder to make the case that Pell grants give students more buying power.
Residency-based tuition is higher than the counterfactual, but by a weakly significant $214.
Pell-eligible students also attend institutions with a higher graduation rate, but estimated
treatment effects are small and weakly significant (0.54 percentage points is 2.8 percent of a
standard deviation among college-going students in this bandwidth).
3.5 Discussion
The effect of Pell grants on traditional students’ college-going has been found to be small
or null (Hansen, 1983; Kane, 1995; Bettinger, 2004; Rubin, 2011), but to date, it is unclear
whether Pell eligibility affects where students enroll. We extend the need-based financial
aid literature in this direction, utilizing unique administrative data that links high school
graduates to detailed financial aid data as well as college enrollment outcomes. Based on
discontinuous changes in Pell eligibility along the schedule of expected family contribution,
we find little evidence to suggest that students use the Pell as a tool to expand or shop
among their choice set of colleges. Scattered results in favor of quality upgrading among
marginally Pell-eligible students include females’ substitution out of state and males’ choice
of more selective colleges at the threshold, but these results are economically small, sensitive
to specification, or statistically imprecise.
Perhaps our most intriguing finding regards the tuition and fees of Pell-eligible students’
selected institutions. By examining treatment effects below the threshold, we find support
for the idea that students sort into more costly colleges as a consequence of successively
more generous Pell aid. It is worth noting, however, that we cannot discern whether this
arises from student-led demand for more expensive colleges, or from institution-led demand
for Pell-eligible students. Moreover, higher tuition does not necessarily equate with higher
quality, and several other dimensions of college selectivity and quality change very little (e.g.,
graduation rates) or not at all (instructional expenditures, Carnegie research status) at and
below the eligibility threshold.
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One likely explanation for our null results lies with the way in which Pell eligibility and
Pell amounts are announced to students. The same opaque and formulaic eligibility criterion
that motivates sharp regression discontinuity analysis may hinder applicants’ awareness of
the program. Moreover, results from financial aid applications are delivered late in the senior
year of high school, when many college plans are already in place. More salient changes in
families’ perceived ability to pay have been shown to lead to quality upgrading (Lovenheim
and Reynolds, 2013; Hoxby and Turner, 2014), although the theoretical implications of a
uniform change in net price throughout the college quality spectrum remain unclear. And
of course, the Pell-induced price differential is blunted to the extent that Pell grants crowd
out institutional aid. Though we cannot deconstruct the relative contributions of these four
candidate mechanisms, we can conclude that their collective effect is to rule out Pell grant
eligibility as a systematic factor in college choice.
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Conclusion
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the impact of financial aid programs
on students’ enrollment decisions, student outcomes, and colleges’ financial decisions. The
first chapter examines the impact of the Tennessee HOPE, a broad merit-based scholarship,
on community college students’ outcomes both during and after college. Community colleges
are a large component of higher education in the U.S., but to date no study has focused
exclusively on the impact of merit aid on community college students. Also, to my knowledge,
this is the first study to examine how financial aid impacts earnings after college. Focusing
on ACT scores in determining HOPE eligibility, I use a regression discontinuity estimator
which essentially compares students who are barely eligible for the HOPE scholarship to
students who just fall short of eligibility. Findings suggest that there is no local impact of
HOPE eligibility on persistence, academic performance, degree completion, transfer rates
to four-year universities, or earnings after college for marginally eligible students. While
understanding the mechanisms through which financial aid affects students’ choices and
outcomes are beyond the scope of this paper, possible contributing factors may include
program design details, students losing their HOPE scholarship after enrollment, and the
relatively small value of the HOPE scholarship compared to students’ future life-time
earnings.
In the second chapter, I examine whether colleges are sensitive to the introduction of
state-sponsored merit aid programs. Previous research has emphasized demand-side effects
such as how merit aid impacts enrollment and post-matriculation outcomes. Yet much less is
known about how merit aid programs affect the supply side of higher education. Additionally,
this paper extends the literature by analyzing multiple programs and exploring numerous
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college-level outcomes. Using differences-in-differences identification, I find that public and
private colleges do not seem to be capturing HOPE-like scholarships through significant
increases in tuition prices or decreases in institution aid, at least at the aggregate level.
Instead, public and private colleges seem to supplement merit aid programs with increases
in expenditures on students. Results suggest that colleges are not extremely sensitive to
merit scholarship programs and that students are receiving the full value of their merit
scholarships as intended by policymakers. Although, the literature and policymakers will
benefit from additional work in this area. Specifically, future analyses that use student-level
data to assess how merit aid affects students’ financial aid packages and thus net price will
continue to be informative. Also, connecting both demand-side and supply-side analyses will
provide further insight into the incidence of broad merit aid programs which can help shape
future financial aid programs.
In the third chapter, we use discontinuities in Pell grant eligibility to examine the effect
of Pell grant eligibility on college enrollment and college choice. Similar to previous work,
we find no evidence that Pell grant eligibility increases college-going. We go on to find
that students do not seem to use the Pell grant as a tool to expand or shop among their
choice set of colleges in terms of sector or quality dimensions. Below the threshold, where
applicants are needier and the grant is more generous, students sort into colleges with
modestly higher published tuition. However, we cannot discern whether this arises from
student-led demand for more expensive colleges, or from institution-led demand for Pell-
eligible students. Furthermore, higher tuition does not necessarily equate with higher quality,
and other measures of college quality or college selectivity do not significantly diverge from
the counterfactual below the eligibility threshold. Some possible explanations for our nearly
null result may include applicants not receiving financial aid packages until well into their
senior year. Additionally, other factors beyond financial aid have been found to influence
college choice, and Pell grants crowding out institutional aid may also play a role. While we
cannot deconstruct such contributing factors, we can conclude that their collective effect is
to rule out Pell grant eligibility as a systematic factor in college choice.
While the goals of specific financial aid programs vary, expansive programs such as the
HOPE scholarship and the Pell grant are generally established in order to increase access
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to college, promote academic success and completion, and ultimately support employment.
The papers in this dissertation examine such intended outcomes as well as some potential
unintended outcomes, and together, this research aims to be informative for those designing
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Figure A.1: McCrary (2008) density test for ACT scores, entering freshman in academic
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Figure A.2: HOPE eligibility by first ACT score for low GPA students 0.273 (0.012) and
high GPA students 0.016 (0.010)
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics: entering freshman in academic years 2005-2009 at
Tennessee public community colleges within five points of the 20.5 ACT threshold
(I) (II) (III)
All Low GPA High GPA
Students Students Students
HOPE Eligible 0.503 0.303 0.663
Number of Semesters 6.116 5.217 6.833
(3.573) (3.559) (3.419)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 18.865 20.777 17.340
(9.806) (8.600) (10.422)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 37.097 35.188 38.620
(17.013) (17.565) (16.400)
Last Observed GPA 2.529 2.217 2.753
(0.987) (0.970) (0.937)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.381 0.218 0.512
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years 0.094 0.066 0.117
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years 0.147 0.072 0.215
Any Earnings While Enrolled 0.884 0.883 0.886
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled 1,351.873 1,525.773 1,213.116
(1,323.719) (1,415.132) (1,228.469)
Expected Annual Wage 49,504.838 45,128.210 52,975.728
(19,612.702) (18,582.191) (19,714.168)
Any Earnings in 5th Year After Enrollment 0.728 0.716 0.742
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year 2,645.878 2,516.007 2,815.929
(2,792.820) (2,660.090) (2,949.319)
Male 0.424 0.499 0.363
Black 0.092 0.131 0.060
Hispanic 0.017 0.020 0.015
Other nonwhite 0.054 0.052 0.055
Lower-income 0.421 0.450 0.398
2006 Cohort 0.199 0.205 0.194
2007 Cohort 0.198 0.195 0.201
2008 Cohort 0.220 0.207 0.230
2009 Cohort 0.224 0.214 0.233
First ACT Score 19.585 18.671 20.314
(2.651) (2.373) (2.635)
Maximum ACT Score 20.417 19.185 21.400
(2.977) (2.500) (2.962)
Observations 53,301 23,655 29,646
Notes: Column I lists the mean for all entering freshman in academic years 2005-2009 at Tennesee
public community colleges scoring within five points of the 20.5 ACT threshold. Column II and
III split the sample into students with a missing or proxy high school GPA that is less than
3.0 and students with a proxy high school GPA greater than 3.0. Standard deviations are in
parentheses for continuous variables.
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Table A.2: Estimates of discontinuities in control
variables
(I) (II)












2006 Cohort 0.023 -0.448
(0.038) (0.603)
2007 Cohort 0.058 0.318
(0.041) (0.539)
2008 Cohort -0.033 0.772
(0.042) (0.614)
2009 Cohort -0.036 -0.058
(0.022) (0.409)
Observations 23,655 29,646
Notes: The table lists the the estimated discontinuity at
20.5 ACT points for control variables. Discontinuities are
estimated using Equation 1.2. Estimations are limited to
students whose first ACT score is within five points of the
20.5 threshold. Column I lists results for students with
missing high school GPA proxies or high school GPA proxies
below 3.0. Column II lists results for students with high
school GPA proxies above 3.0. Robust standard errors,
clustered by first ACT score, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.3: The impact of HOPE eligibility on post-matriculation outcomes
(I) (II) (III)
Low GPA High GPA
Mean Students Students
First Stage: HOPE Eligibility
HOPE Eligibility 0.503 0.273*** 0.016
(0.012) (0.010)
R-squared 0.189 0.021
Two Stage Least Squares:
Effect of HOPE on Outcomes
Number of Semesters 6.116 0.362 2.919
(0.285) (3.000)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 18.865 1.197 -11.886
(1.211) (14.388)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 37.097 3.367* -11.486
(1.749) (31.237)
Last Observed GPA 2.529 0.007 -1.565
(0.079) (1.974)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.381 0.012 0.570
(0.049) (0.552)
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years1 0.094 0.015 -0.852
(0.026) (0.989)
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years2 0.147 -0.044 1.357
(0.044) (1.887)
Any Earnings While Enrolled 0.884 -0.021 0.341
(0.030) (0.514)
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled 1,351.873 -128.399 -377.972
(134.476) (1,322.390)
Expected Annual Wage 49,504.838 542.046 25,007.112
(2,487.106) (18,836.656)
Any Earnings in 5th Year After Enrollment3 0.728 -0.010 0.507
(0.062) (1.430)
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year3 2,645.878 112.896 893.101
(363.400) (8,772.576)
Observations 53,301 23,655 29,646
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the effect of passing the 20.5 ACT threshold on HOPE eligibility
(first stage, Equation 1.1) and the local average treatment effect of HOPE on student outcomes (two stage
least squares, Equation 1.2). 1 Estimations for an associate’s degree within 3 years are limited to cohorts
2005-2008. 2 Estimations for a bachelor’s degree within five years are limited to cohorts 2005-2006. 3 Any
earnings and average quarterly earnings in 5th year after initial enrollment are limited to students who
exit school prior to the 5th year with or without a degree and cohorts 2005-2006. Robust standard errors,
clustered by first ACT score, are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure A.3: Intent-to-treat impact of HOPE on student outcomes for low GPA students,
reduced form discontinuities
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Figure A.3 (continued): Intent-to-treat impact of HOPE on student outcomes for low
GPA students, reduced form discontinuities
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Table A.4: Robustness checks for outcomes
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Baseline With Optimal Seven-Point Two-Point Discontinuity Discontinuity Baseline
Low GPA Controls Bandwidth Quadratic Cubic Bandwidth Bandwidth At 18.5 Points At 22.5 Points High GPA
Number of Semesters 0.362 0.296 0.319 0.192 0.750 0.211 0.605* 0.553 0.137 2.919
(0.285) (0.276) (0.397) (0.405) (0.487) (0.232) (0.368) (0.927) (0.917) (3.000)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 1.197 1.234 2.777** 3.722** 3.032 0.015 2.945* -6.286 2.078 -11.886
(1.211) (1.204) (1.241) (1.759) (2.220) (0.973) (1.782) (4.643) (2.484) (14.388)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 3.367* 3.505** 3.643* 3.848* 5.442*** 1.609 5.112*** -1.721 2.992 -11.486
(1.749) (1.729) (2.037) (2.091) (2.029) (1.361) (1.915) (6.819) (4.527) (31.237)
Last Observed GPA 0.007 0.059 0.015 0.054 -0.071 -0.052 -0.000 -0.211 0.368 -1.565
(0.079) (0.077) (0.117) (0.138) (0.175) (0.064) (0.113) (0.377) (0.251) (1.974)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.012 0.001 0.014 -0.066 0.046 0.029 -0.021 0.280 -0.104 0.570
(0.049) (0.049) (0.041) (0.108) (0.141) (0.035) (0.109) (0.210) (0.166) (0.552)
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years 0.015 0.020 0.027 0.052 0.061 0.011 0.063 -0.112 -0.281* -0.852
(0.026) (0.025) (0.035) (0.050) (0.068) (0.020) (0.051) (0.091) (0.168) (0.989)
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years -0.044 -0.040 -0.038 -0.030 -0.037 -0.007 -0.059 -0.022 -0.197 1.357
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.085) (0.118) (0.033) (0.094) (0.129) (0.209) (1.887)
Any Earnings While Enrolled -0.021 -0.024 -0.003 0.041 0.056 -0.024 0.040 -0.059 0.015 0.341
(0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.047) (0.050) (0.026) (0.040) (0.133) (0.126) (0.514)
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled -128.399 -131.366 -96.315 60.790 -148.010 -178.390 -109.582 -1,337.810* -138.941 -377.972
(134.476) (132.558) (148.105) (238.857) (257.146) (116.052) (212.214) (706.934) (516.019) (1,322.390)
Expected Annual Wage 542.046 -92.274 845.254 -193.687 -1,062.106 954.642 -992.645 -5,921.074 -3,927.795 25,007.112
(2,487.106) (2,453.841) (1,631.276) (4,738.596) (6,304.992) (1,739.876) (4,752.273) (6,254.743) (6,025.328) (18,836.656)
Any Earnings 5th Year After Enrollment -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 -0.057 -0.239 0.012 -0.084 0.050 -0.144 0.507
(0.062) (0.061) (0.073) (0.110) (0.188) (0.050) (0.111) (0.852) (0.446) (1.430)
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year 112.896 129.443 -28.232 -9.923 -471.818 -102.372 -322.262 -7,155.986 1,269.279 893.101
(363.400) (352.077) (410.127) (569.128) (770.905) (314.143) (587.394) (11,860.761) (2,707.180) (8,772.576)
Observations 23,655 23,655 35,782 23,655 23,655 31,654 9,365 30,191 15,550 29,646
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the local average treatment effect of HOPE on student outcomes. Column I contains the baseline two stage least squares findings for low
GPA students. Columns II-IX also estimate the impact of HOPE on low GPA students, but each column differs from the baseline specification in one respect. Column II adds
controls for gender, race, lower-income status, and cohort indicators. Column III uses a triangle kernel (Nichols, 2011) with a plugged in optimal bandwidth that was calculated
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column IV and V use a second order polynomial and a third order polynomial, respectively, for the function of the gap between
i’s ACT score and the 20.5 threshold. Column VI expands the bandwidth to seven ACT points, and column VII contracts the bandwidth to two ACT points. Columns VIII and
IX test for discontinuities in the outcomes at 18.5 and 22.5 ACT points, respectively, which are not associated with HOPE eligibility. Column X contains falsification estimates for
the students with high school GPA proxies above 3.0, who should not have significant discontinuities at the 20.5 threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered by first ACT score,
are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Heterogeneity by lower-income status
(I) (II) (III)
Baseline
Low GPA Lower-income Higher-income
Number of Semesters 0.362 0.371 0.294
(0.285) (0.314) (0.421)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 1.197 1.072 1.525
(1.211) (1.510) (1.389)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 3.367* 3.230* 3.603
(1.749) (1.944) (2.492)
Last Observed GPA 0.007 -0.024 0.040
(0.079) (0.116) (0.143)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.012 0.084 -0.076
(0.049) (0.066) (0.069)
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years1 0.015 -0.004 0.040
(0.026) (0.036) (0.041)
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years2 -0.044 -0.038 -0.047
(0.044) (0.042) (0.074)
Any Earnings While Enrolled -0.021 0.012 -0.065
(0.030) (0.044) (0.041)
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled -128.399 138.583 -427.015*
(134.476) (126.753) (243.374)
Expected Annual Wage 542.046 2,860.897 -2,500.799
(2,487.106) (2,807.866) (3,870.399)
Any Earnings 5th Year After Enrollment3 -0.010 0.184** -0.233**
(0.062) (0.086) (0.103)
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year3 112.896 532.627 -352.872
(363.400) (351.230) (549.352)
Observations 23,655 10,639 13,016
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the local average treatment effect of HOPE on student outcomes by
lower-income status. 1 Estimations for an associate’s degree within 3 years are limited to cohorts 2005-2008.
2 Estimations for a bachelor’s degree within five years are limited to cohorts 2005-2006. 3 Any earnings and
average quarterly earnings in 5th year after initial enrollment are limited to students who exit school prior
to the 5th year with or without a degree and cohorts 2005-2006. Robust standard errors, clustered by first
ACT score, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Omit lower percentiles for the predicted probability of attending a two-year college
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI)
5th 10th 15th 20th 25th 30th 35th 40th 45th 50th
Baseline Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
Low GPA Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted
Number of Semesters 0.362 0.348 0.369 0.238 0.341 0.229 -0.038 0.170 0.002 0.118 -0.222
(0.285) (0.298) (0.324) (0.333) (0.312) (0.332) (0.339) (0.307) (0.324) (0.404) (0.417)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 1.197 0.640 0.624 0.652 0.846 0.192 -0.280 -0.180 -0.418 0.214 -0.859
(1.211) (1.275) (1.401) (1.360) (1.337) (1.240) (1.392) (1.310) (1.462) (1.699) (1.619)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 3.367* 2.921 3.035 2.669 2.958 2.228 0.481 1.337 0.189 0.827 -0.700
(1.749) (1.793) (1.846) (1.882) (1.925) (1.983) (2.527) (2.312) (2.611) (3.263) (3.056)
Last Observed GPA 0.007 0.036 0.100 0.099 0.128 0.141 0.077 0.093 0.044 0.051 0.146
(0.079) (0.083) (0.095) (0.086) (0.091) (0.087) (0.078) (0.091) (0.099) (0.107) (0.137)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.012 0.016 0.031 0.014 0.025 0.016 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 0.017 -0.021
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.048)
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years1 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.003 -0.002 -0.013 -0.010 -0.014 -0.021 -0.037
(0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.043) (0.043)
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years2 -0.044 -0.036 -0.027 -0.022 -0.001 0.012 -0.009 0.009 0.003 0.017 -0.008
(0.044) (0.040) (0.039) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.041) (0.040) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040)
Any Earnings While Enrolled -0.021 -0.020 -0.028 -0.031 -0.029 -0.024 -0.022 -0.036 -0.036 -0.049 -0.053
(0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.049)
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled -128.399 -163.997 -192.449 -197.297 -108.183 -53.716 -24.513 -27.408 -31.241 -116.243 -117.766
(134.476) (132.842) (125.392) (135.609) (144.909) (140.264) (162.843) (146.913) (158.206) (191.638) (182.812)
Expected Annual Wage 542.046 781.830 1,814.425 1,182.744 1,418.409 1,529.155 1,374.499 2,408.629 1,754.725 995.247 -52.942
(2,487.106) (2,599.171) (2,511.649) (2,639.682) (2,716.456) (3,033.112) (3,141.193) (2,952.959) (3,275.522) (3,375.133) (3,626.607)
Any Earnings 5th Year After Enrollment3 -0.010 0.005 0.038 0.009 0.039 0.039 0.006 -0.023 -0.041 -0.093 -0.137
(0.062) (0.060) (0.068) (0.067) (0.064) (0.067) (0.071) (0.067) (0.074) (0.092) (0.104)
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year3 112.896 283.676 406.429 406.023 684.586* 767.430** 704.727** 654.139* 468.872 328.820 200.891
(363.400) (386.413) (401.055) (391.422) (360.422) (373.390) (346.033) (372.441) (404.560) (475.019) (506.729)
Observations 23,655 22,472 21,289 20,106 18,924 17,741 16,558 15,375 14,193 13,010 11,827
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the local average impact of HOPE on student outcomes. Column I contains the two stage least squares baseline findings. Columns II-XI omit
students with the lowest predicted probability of attending a two-year school in ascending order. 1 Estimations for an associate’s degree within 3 years are limited to cohorts 2005-2008.
2 Estimations for a bachelor’s degree within five years are limited to cohorts 2005-2006. 3 Any earnings and average quarterly earnings in 5th year after initial enrollment are limited to
students who exit school prior to the 5th year with or without a degree and cohorts 2005-2006. Robust standard errors, clustered by first ACT score, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Below I present a graphical analysis for the discontinuity in the percentage of black
students at the 20.5 threshold. I also show that the baseline results are robust to varying
bandwidths and discuss the heterogeneity of the results by gender and race.
A.1 Test for Discontinuity in Control Variables
Discontinuity estimates for control variables are discussed in Section 1.4.5 and presented in
Table A.2. The majority of the estimates are small and insignificant for the analytic sample
with one exception. The percentage of black students increases at the HOPE threshold. The
graphical analysis for this control variable is presented in Figure A.4. Similar to Figure A.3,
the mean value of each outcome for students with the same ACT score is plotted for all
ACT scores within five points of the 20.5 threshold. The size of the circles in the scatter
plots increase proportionate to the number of students who received a specific ACT score.
Discontinuities are estimated by replacing the dependent variable with the control variable
in the reduced form equation of Equation 1.2. The plotted fitted lines on either side of the
threshold are the predicted values from the estimation, and the discontinuity or reduced
form intent-to-treat effect is listed. The percentage of black students decreases as ACT score
increases, but there does not visually look like there is a discontinuity in the percentage of
black students at the threshold. Moreover, it appears that the relationship describing the
gap between i’s ACT score and the 20.5 threshold is more likely to be a quadratic rather
than a linear function. I estimate the discontinuity in the percentage of black students using
both a quadratic and a cubic rather than using a linear specification in Equation 1.2, and
the percentage of black students no longer registers as significant in either case. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the significant discontinuity in the percentage of black students found
in Table A.2 is due to omitted variables that may threaten internal validity of the results.
In addition, I demonstrate that the baseline findings are robust to including all controls in
Section 1.6 in the main text.
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A.2 Robustness Checks for Outcomes at Varying Band-
widths
I demonstrate the robustness of the baseline results by using various bandwidths in Table
A.7. Column I contains the baseline two stage least square findings for low GPA students
similar to those reported in Column I in Table A.4. Columns II through VIII also estimate
the local impact of HOPE on low GPA students, but a different bandwidth is used in each
column. In the main text, I include the optimal bandwidth, a seven-point bandwidth, and
a two-point bandwidth in the robustness checks in Table A.4. Here, I also report these
estimates, but I demonstrate that the baseline findings are also robust to using a one-point,
three-point, four-point, and six-point bandwidth. Cumulative hours after two years remains
significant when using a three-point and four-point bandwidth, but it is not significant
when using a one-point or six-point bandwidth. Cumulative hours after one year continues
to exhibit some inconsistent significant discontinuities, but the coefficient for this outcome
remains insignificant for many of the different bandwidths. All of the other outcome variables
that are insignificant in the baseline results remain consistently insignificant when using the
various bandwidths which demonstrates the robustness of the overall zero local impact of
HOPE eligibility on the student outcomes.1
A.3 Heterogeneity by Gender and Race
In Table A.8, I examine whether the baseline findings are heterogeneous across gender, race,
and parents’ income. Similar to Table A.5 in the main text, Column I lists the baseline
results for low GPA students and Columns II and III list the results for lower-income and
higher-income students, respectively. Column IV-VII present estimates for a subsample of
low GPA students based on gender and race. As demonstrated in Column IV, cumulative
hours after two years remains significant for males, similar to lower-income students, but
the point estimate remains modest for this subgroup. All of the other student outcomes of
1Average quarterly earnings while enrolled is significant at the ten percent level when a one-point
bandwidth is used, but this significant coefficient represents about one percent of the table and may be
significant by chance.
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interest remain insignificant, similar to the baseline findings, for males, females, and white
students. However, there is suggestive evidence of persistence and degree effects on non-white
students as can be seen in Column VII in Table A.8. It appears that HOPE eligibility might
have a larger and positive impact on non-white students in terms of transferring to a four-
year university, earning an associate’s degree within three years, and earning a bachelor’s
degree within five years.
Figure A.5 consists of a graphical analysis for each outcome variable that exhibits a
significant discontinuity for non-white students in Table A.8. Similar to Figure A.3, the
plotted fitted lines on both sides of the threshold are the predicted outcome values from
estimating the reduced form equation except the intent-to-treat estimations are limited to
the subsample of non-white students. Transferring to a four-year college and earning an
associate’s degree within three years increases in ACT score while earning a bachelor’s degree
within five years and average quarterly earnings in the fifth year after initial enrollment seem
relatively constant across ACT scores for non-white students. All four of the graphs exhibit
some noise in the data above the 20.5 ACT threshold which is likely due to a small sample
size. In addition, the suggestive evidence of persistence and degree effects on non-white
students is weakened as there visually does not appear to be a large significant discontinuity
in any of the outcome variables in the graphical analyses, especially after considering the
scales on the vertical axes.
In addition, I test the robustness of the baseline results for non-white students to various
specifications and bandwidths in Table A.9. Column I lists the baseline results for low GPA,
non-white students which are the same as reported in Column VII of Table A.8. Similar to
the baseline robustness checks in Table A.4, Columns II through X all differ from the baseline
specification in one respect (e.g. adding controls, changing the size of the bandwidth, or using
a quadratic or cubic rather than a linear function of the gap between i’s ACT score and the
20.5 threshold for f(·) and g(·) in Equation 1.2). The coefficients for transferring to a four-
year college, earning an associate’s degree within three years, earning a bachelor’s degree
within five years, and average quarterly earnings in the fifth year all remain significant when
controls are added in Column II and when a seven-point rather than five-point bandwidth
is used in Column VI. However, all of these outcomes are insignificant when a two-point
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bandwidth is used in Column VII and when a quadratic and cubic function is used for the gap
between i’s ACT score and the 20.5 threshold in Column IV and V, respectively. Therefore,
while the results in Table A.8 suggest that HOPE eligibility has positive persistence and
degree effects on non-white students, these results are not strong enough to ascribe the
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Figure A.4: Intent-to-treat impact of HOPE on controls for low GPA students, reduced
form discontinuities
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Table A.7: Robustness checks for outcomes at varying bandwidths
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Baseline Optimal One-Point Two-Point Three-Point Four-Point Six-Point Seven-Point
Low GPA Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Number of Semesters 0.362 0.319 0.215 0.605* 0.288 0.334 0.344 0.211
(0.285) (0.397) (0.429) (0.368) (0.309) (0.287) (0.249) (0.232)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 1.197 2.777** 0.621 2.945* 2.776* 1.913 0.485 0.015
(1.211) (1.241) (1.864) (1.782) (1.469) (1.301) (1.077) (0.973)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 3.367* 3.643* 3.015 5.112*** 3.827** 3.207* 2.252 1.609
(1.749) (2.037) (1.975) (1.915) (1.866) (1.761) (1.506) (1.361)
Last Observed GPA 0.007 0.015 -0.048 -0.000 0.093 0.035 -0.032 -0.052
(0.079) (0.117) (0.120) (0.113) (0.114) (0.087) (0.069) (0.064)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.012 0.014 0.088 -0.021 -0.046 -0.006 0.035 0.029
(0.049) (0.041) (0.123) (0.109) (0.077) (0.058) (0.042) (0.035)
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years1 0.015 0.027 0.037 0.063 0.030 0.020 -0.000 0.011
(0.026) (0.035) (0.069) (0.051) (0.039) (0.031) (0.023) (0.020)
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years2 -0.044 -0.038 -0.025 -0.059 -0.049 -0.028 -0.036 -0.007
(0.044) (0.045) (0.115) (0.094) (0.066) (0.052) (0.037) (0.033)
Any Earnings While Enrolled -0.021 -0.003 -0.007 0.040 0.031 -0.003 -0.009 -0.024
(0.030) (0.036) (0.052) (0.040) (0.039) (0.033) (0.026) (0.026)
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled -128.399 -96.315 -361.745* -109.582 55.940 -79.951 -125.213 -178.390
(134.476) (148.105) (197.733) (212.214) (187.467) (150.514) (119.945) (116.052)
Expected Annual Wage 542.046 845.254 -1,426.827 -992.645 145.379 1,844.997 1,158.492 954.642
(2,487.106) (1,631.276) (6,854.286) (4,752.273) (3,501.369) (2,857.228) (2,077.843) (1,739.876)
Any Earnings 5th Year After Enrollment3 -0.010 -0.013 -0.140 -0.084 -0.071 0.016 0.003 0.012
(0.062) (0.073) (0.180) (0.111) (0.088) (0.078) (0.054) (0.050)
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year3 112.896 -28.232 -398.090 -322.262 60.670 21.423 48.968 -102.372
(363.400) (410.127) (827.252) (587.394) (428.130) (390.830) (346.577) (314.143)
Observations 23,655 35,782 4,866 9,365 14,087 18,997 28,000 31,654
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the local average treatment effect of HOPE on student outcomes. Column I contains the baseline two stage least squares findings for
low GPA students. Columns II-VIII also estimate the local average treatment effect of HOPE on low GPA students, but a different bandwidth is used in each column. Column
II uses a triangle kernel (Nichols, 2011) with a plugged in optimal bandwidth that was calculated according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for each outcome of interest.
Column III through VI use a bandwidth of one point to seven points respectively. 1 Estimations for an associate’s degree within 3 years are limited to cohorts 2005-2008.
2 Estimations for a bachelor’s degree within five years are limited to cohorts 2005-2006. 3 Any earnings and average quarterly earnings in 5th year after initial enrollment
are limited to students who exit school prior to the 5th year with or without a degree and cohorts 2005-2006. Robust standard errors, clustered by first ACT score, are in
parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Heterogeneity by gender, race, and lower-income status
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Baseline
Low GPA Lower-income Higher-income Male Female White Non-white
Number of Semesters 0.362 0.371 0.294 0.483 0.222 0.286 0.919
(0.285) (0.314) (0.421) (0.363) (0.593) (0.272) (0.835)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 1.197 1.072 1.525 1.229 1.064 1.424 1.200
(1.211) (1.510) (1.389) (1.080) (2.300) (1.474) (1.495)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 3.367* 3.230* 3.603 3.727** 2.719 3.435 5.085
(1.749) (1.944) (2.492) (1.617) (3.302) (2.178) (3.895)
Last Observed GPA 0.007 -0.024 0.040 0.158 -0.157 0.041 0.076
(0.079) (0.116) (0.143) (0.102) (0.168) (0.085) (0.219)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.012 0.084 -0.076 -0.014 0.050 -0.034 0.206**
(0.049) (0.066) (0.069) (0.056) (0.076) (0.050) (0.087)
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years1 0.015 -0.004 0.040 0.011 0.024 0.008 0.104**
(0.026) (0.036) (0.041) (0.032) (0.049) (0.029) (0.052)
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years2 -0.044 -0.038 -0.047 -0.031 -0.062 -0.078 0.204**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.074) (0.037) (0.086) (0.051) (0.095)
Any Earnings While Enrolled -0.021 0.012 -0.065 0.007 -0.059 -0.020 -0.024
(0.030) (0.044) (0.041) (0.037) (0.054) (0.029) (0.082)
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled -128.399 138.583 -427.015* -113.653 -149.060 -98.232 -260.431
(134.476) (126.753) (243.374) (183.797) (252.475) (161.877) (211.974)
Expected Annual Wage 542.046 2,860.897 -2,500.799 832.206 128.372 -211.255 3,437.752
(2,487.106) (2,807.866) (3,870.399) (2,696.458) (3,315.112) (2,449.387) (3,866.150)
Any Earnings 5th Year After Enrollment3 -0.010 0.184** -0.233** -0.115 0.144 0.017 -0.207
(0.062) (0.086) (0.103) (0.089) (0.116) (0.057) (0.166)
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year3 112.896 532.627 -352.872 -50.402 354.217 444.502 -1,804.277**
(363.400) (351.230) (549.352) (471.138) (619.583) (340.017) (833.411)
Observations 23,655 10,639 13,016 11,813 11,842 18,850 4,805
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the local average treatment effect of HOPE on student outcomes by gender, race, and lower-income status. 1 Estimations for an associate’s
degree within 3 years are limited to cohorts 2005-2008. 2 Estimations for a bachelor’s degree within five years are limited to cohorts 2005-2006. 3 Any earnings and average
quarterly earnings in 5th year after initial enrollment are limited to students who exit school prior to the 5th year with or without a degree and cohorts 2005-2006. Robust
standard errors, clustered by first ACT score, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure A.5: Intent-to-treat impact of HOPE on student outcomes for non-white low GPA
students, reduced form discontinuities
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Table A.9: Robustness checks for outcomes for non-white students
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Baseline
Non-white With Optimal Seven-Point Two-Point Discontinuity Discontinuity Baseline
Low GPA Controls Bandwidth Quadratic Cubic Bandwidth Bandwidth At 18.5 Points At 22.5 Points High GPA
Number of Semesters 0.919 0.869 0.776 0.273 0.863 0.759 -0.007 2.249 2.575 10.430
(0.835) (0.793) (0.834) (1.364) (1.530) (0.686) (1.468) (3.031) (1.996) (14.017)
Cumulative Hours after 1 Year 1.200 1.176 1.580 1.105 3.455 1.239 1.928 -0.545 2.193 60.407
(1.495) (1.492) (3.172) (3.255) (4.878) (1.308) (3.579) (8.439) (6.605) (65.445)
Cumulative Hours after 2 Years 5.085 5.035 2.170 -2.565 -1.804 3.997 -2.571 0.167 10.627 86.080
(3.895) (3.735) (4.802) (7.746) (10.643) (3.168) (8.140) (17.130) (11.322) (96.094)
Last Observed GPA 0.076 0.056 0.050 -0.116 -0.599 0.180 -0.333 -0.420 -0.043 6.002
(0.219) (0.212) (0.274) (0.351) (0.460) (0.173) (0.336) (0.746) (0.770) (10.067)
Transferred to Four-Year College 0.206** 0.207** 0.147* -0.131 -0.145 0.146** -0.127 0.200 0.089 1.084
(0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.167) (0.303) (0.061) (0.194) (0.378) (0.301) (1.656)
Associate’s Degree within 3 Years 0.104** 0.100** 0.102 0.097 0.055 0.103*** 0.082 0.099 0.035 -10.642
(0.052) (0.050) (0.084) (0.112) (0.137) (0.039) (0.109) (0.194) (0.173) (82.367)
Bachelor’s Degree within 5 Years 0.204** 0.201** 0.214 0.287 0.160 0.170** 0.143 -0.335 0.288 -1.989
(0.095) (0.094) (0.133) (0.187) (0.175) (0.075) (0.155) (0.394) (1.014) (4.073)
Any Earnings While Enrolled -0.024 -0.024 -0.040 -0.068 -0.000 -0.047 -0.021 -0.072 0.156 0.446
(0.082) (0.085) (0.087) (0.153) (0.179) (0.068) (0.140) (0.363) (0.185) (1.203)
Average Quarterly Earnings While Enrolled -260.431 -287.050 -224.050 -45.974 422.995 -310.751* 275.082 -357.224 472.916 -2,271.017
(211.974) (240.887) (286.740) (285.679) (539.926) (174.798) (359.089) (1,297.157) (815.330) (3,515.245)
Expected Annual Wage 3,437.752 3,624.359 2,591.573 -4,989.138 -15,765.358 2,765.414 -10,913.492 -6,491.291 16,266.794 -176,867.248
(3,866.150) (3,738.076) (3,497.917) (6,548.839) (14,049.066) (2,891.484) (7,251.086) (14,423.408) (10,114.508) (617,103.407)
Any Earnings 5th Year After Enrollment -0.207 -0.204 -0.184 0.245 0.040 -0.271** 0.168 3.371 -4.657 -1.462
(0.166) (0.158) (0.216) (0.341) (0.432) (0.134) (0.346) (12.832) (32.695) (2.541)
Average Quarterly Earnings in 5th Year -1,804.277** -1,784.521** -1,664.228 -816.755 -2,081.342 -1,943.794*** -1,218.847 18,610.190 -19,239.314 -13,760.000
(833.411) (852.769) (1,113.193) (1,329.129) (1,570.157) (695.665) (1,560.230) (67,104.730) (129,943.797) (15,069.065)
Observations 4,805 4,805 11,061 4,805 4,805 8,485 1,327 8,351 2,323 3,845
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the local average treatment effect of HOPE on student outcomes. Column I contains the baseline two stage least squares findings for non-white
students. Columns II-X differ from the baseline specification in one respect. Column II adds controls for gender, race, lower-income status, and cohort indicators. Column III uses a
triangle kernel (Nichols, 2011) with a plugged in optimal bandwidth that was calculated according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column IV and V use a second order polynomial
and a third order polynomial, respectively, for the function of the gap between i’s ACT score and the 20.5 threshold. Column VI expands the bandwidth to 7 ACT points, and column
VII contracts the bandwidth to 2 ACT points. Columns VIII and IX test for discontinuities in the outcomes at 18.5 and 22.5 ACT points, respectively, which are not associated with
HOPE eligibility. Column X contains falsification estimates for the students with high school GPA proxies above 3.0, who should not have significant discontinuities at the 20.5 threshold.
Robust standard errors, clustered by first ACT score, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix B
The Incidence of Financial Aid: How
Colleges Respond to Merit
Scholarship Programs
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Table B.1: Merit aid program characteristics
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Year Program 2014-2015 Initial Private
State Introduced Program Name Eligibility Requirements Revenue Source Colleges
Florida 1997 Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program 3.0-3.5 GPA and 26-29 ACT Lottery Yes
Georgia 1993 Georgia HOPE Scholarship 3.0 GPA Lottery Yes
Kentucky 1999 Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship Combination of GPA (starting at
2.5) and ACT (starting at 15)1
Lottery Yes
Louisiana 1998 Louisiana TOPS Scholarship 2.5-3.0 GPA and 20-27 ACT Tobacco Settlement Funds Yes
Michigan 2000 Michigan Merit Award and Promise Scholarship Level 2 or above on Michigan Merit
Exam (MME)2
Tobacco Settlement Funds Yes
Nevada 2000 Nevada Millennium Scholarship 3.25 GPA and pass all sections of
proficiency examination
Tobacco Settlement Funds Yes
New Mexico 1997 New Mexico Lottery Success Scholarship 2.5 GPA first semester at public
college or university
Lottery No
South Carolina 1998 South Carolina LIFE (and HOPE) Scholarship Two of the following: 3.0 GPA, 24
ACT, or top 30% of class
Lottery Yes
Tennessee 2004 Tennessee HOPE Scholarship 3.0 GPA or 21 ACT Lottery Yes
West Virginia 2002 West Virginia PROMISE Scholarship 3.0 GPA and 22 ACT Lottery Yes
Notes: The table lists merit aid program characteristics for states with programs that are funded through either lottery revenues or tobacco settlement funds. Program
information was collected from state agency websites. Column VI indicates whether students can use their merit aid scholarship at in-state private institutions. 1Kentucky’s
scholarship amounts depend on students’ GPA each year in high school, and bonus awards vary by ACT score. 2The Promise scholarship, which replaced the Merit Award,
was implemented in the 2007-2008 academic year; however, the Promise scholarship was discontinued after three years. To receive the Merit Award, students had to meet or
exceed standards on all four sections of the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) which was replaced with the MME.
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Unemployment rate 9.87 8.11
(2.23) (1.73)
Personal income per capita 34,745.73 40,950.72
(2,152.62) (7,188.60)
Real GDP per capita 38,640.35 49,599.28
(5,035.11) (20,427.86)
Percent of population 18-24 with high school degree 81.34 84.92
(2.77) (2.88)
Observations 10 41
Notes: Column I and II list the mean of state control variables in 2009 for merit and
non-merit states, respectively. All financial variables are in 2010 dollars. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
Table B.3: Summary statistics for institutional control




Percent of undergraduates women 56.16 55.51
(14.00) (16.68)
Percent of undergraduates non-white 38.80 36.43
(27.22) (24.49)
Log of FTE 7.89 7.83
(1.36) (1.38)
Observations 270 1,238
Notes: Column I and II list the mean of institutional control
variables in the 2009-2010 academic year for colleges in merit
and non-merit states, respectively. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
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Table B.4: Summary statistics for outcomes of interest per FTE for public colleges




In-state tuition 3,832.08 4,258.91
(1,765.64) (2,005.61)
Out-of-state tuition 10,357.01 10,792.64
(4,416.13) (4,593.85)
Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts per FTE 1,111.83 1,137.02
(3,054.44) (3,497.81)
Instructional expenditures per FTE 8,278.29 8,783.06
(11,098.37) (10,606.75)
Student services expenditures per FTE 1,116.78 1,361.35
(510.46) (1,601.40)
Gross Pell per FTE 919.92 827.22
(813.72) (495.07)
Institutional grants per FTE 723.76 730.04
(756.07) (802.51)
Full-time faculty per 100 FTE students 5.97 6.12
(5.51) (5.70)
State grants and contracts per FTE 1,017.04 729.39
(4,391.97) (2,313.18)
State appropriations per FTE 9,373.99 9,904.03
(10,240.96) (11,778.21)
Observations 2,400 9,048
Notes: Column I and II list the mean of the outcomes of interest per FTE for public colleges in
academic years 1986-1987 to 2009-2010 for colleges in merit and non-merit states, respectively.
All financial variables are in 2010 dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table B.5: Summary statistics for outcomes of interest per FTE for private






Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts per FTE 4,733.75 5,177.01
(22,933.83) (8,848.93)
Instructional expenditures per FTE 6,807.49 8,545.55
(20,182.16) (8,841.60)
Student services expenditures per FTE 2,481.35 2,600.27
(6,836.94) (1,958.60)
Gross Pell per FTE 1,063.61 801.41
(944.72) (946.05)
Institutional grants per FTE 3,833.13 4,680.87
(3,633.68) (3,633.79)
Full-time faculty per 100 FTE students 5.63 6.11
(3.53) (5.67)
Observations 4,080 20,664
Notes: Column I and II list the mean of the outcomes of interest per FTE for private not-for-
profit colleges in academic years 1986-1987 to 2009-2010 for colleges in merit and non-merit
states, respectively. All financial variables are in 2010 dollars. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
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Table B.6: The impact of merit aid programs on outcomes for public
colleges
(I) (II)
Mean for Effect of
Merit States Merit Aid
In-state tuition 3551.72 -0.006
(0.012)
Out-of-state tuition 9433.81 0.034*
(0.019)
Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts 17.58 -0.147
(0.092)
Instructional expenditures 82.52 0.020
(0.013)
Student services expenditures 10.80 0.039**
(0.020)
Gross Pell 6.88 0.051*
(0.026)
Institutional grants 8.30 0.066
(0.089)
Full-time faculty per 100 FTE students 6.04 0.039***
(0.014)
State grants and contracts 6.31 0.906***
(0.155)
State appropriations 97.46 0.048***
(0.012)
Observations 11,129
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the effect of merit aid programs on outcomes
for public colleges which are estimated using Equation 2.1. Column I lists the
mean of outcomes for merit states one year before program implementation, and all
dollar values are in millions except for tuition and faculty outcomes. Observations
for each outcome vary as only institutions with no more than two years of missing a
dependent variable are included in each estimation, and as an example, observations
for in-state tuition are listed. Robust standard errors, clustered by institution, are
in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.7: The impact of merit aid programs on outcomes for private
not-for-profit colleges
(I) (II)
Mean for Effect of
Merit States Merit Aid
Tuition 13,487.75 0.014
(0.013)
Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts 7.77 0.033
(0.041)
Instructional expenditures 16.90 0.039*
(0.021)
Student services expenditures 3.80 0.039
(0.034)
Gross Pell 1.38 0.045*
(0.026)
Institutional grants 7.85 0.064
(0.041)
Full-time faculty per 100 FTE students 5.23 0.023
(0.027)
Observations 22,279
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the effect of merit aid programs on outcomes
for private not-for-profit colleges which are estimated using Equation 2.1. Column I
lists the mean of outcomes for merit states one year before program implementation,
and all dollar values are in millions except for tuition and faculty outcomes.
Observations for each outcome vary as only institutions with no more than two
years of a missing dependent variable are included in each estimation, and as an
example, observations for tuition are listed. Robust standard errors, clustered by
institution, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.8: The impact of merit aid programs on outcomes for public




In-state tuition -0.006 -3.2E-04
(0.012) (0.002)
Out-of-state tuition 0.034* 0.002
(0.019) (0.003)
Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts -0.147 -0.022*
(0.092) (0.012)
Instructional expenditures 0.020 0.004**
(0.013) (0.002)
Student services expenditures 0.039** 0.007***
(0.020) (0.002)
Gross Pell 0.051* 0.010***
(0.026) (0.004)
Institutional grants 0.066 0.014
(0.089) (0.013)
Full-time faculty per 100 FTE students 0.039*** 0.005***
(0.014) (0.002)
State grants and contracts 0.906*** 0.153***
(0.155) (0.020)
State appropriations 0.048*** 0.008***
(0.012) (0.001)
Observations 11,129 11,129
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the effect of merit aid programs on outcomes
for public colleges which are estimated using Equation 2.1. Column I lists the
baseline estimates. Column II lists the estimates using state expenditures on merit
aid programs in 2006-2007 as a measure of merit aid rather than a binary indicator
which is used in baseline estimations. Observations for each outcome vary as only
institutions with no more than two years of a missing dependent variable are included
in each estimation, and as an example, observations for in-state tuition are listed.
Robust standard errors, clustered by institution, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.9: The impact of merit aid programs on outcomes for private






Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts 0.033 0.004
(0.041) (0.005)
Instructional Expenditures 0.039* 0.005**
(0.021) (0.003)
Student Services Expenditures 0.039 0.007
(0.034) (0.004)
Gross Pell 0.045* 0.006*
(0.026) (0.004)
Institutional Grants 0.064 0.006
(0.041) (0.005)
Full-time Faculty per 100 FTE students 0.023 0.001
(0.027) (0.004)
Observations 22,279 22,279
Notes: The table lists the estimates of the effect of merit aid programs on outcomes
for private not-for-profit colleges which are estimated using Equation 2.1. Column
I lists the baseline estimates. Column II lists the estimates using state expenditures
on merit aid programs in 2006-2007 as a measure of merit aid rather than a binary
indicator which is used in baseline estimations. Observations for each outcome vary
as only institutions with no more than two years of a missing dependent variable
are included in each estimation, and as an example, observations for tuition are
listed. Robust standard errors, clustered by institution, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
113
B.1 Sensitivity of Results and Differences in Pre-
treatment Trends
In this Appendix, I examine whether results are sensitive to omitting college-specific time
trends, and I examine whether there are differences in pre-treatment trends across treatment
and control states. Table B.10 presents the estimates for public colleges. Column I contains
the baseline results from estimating Equation 2.1 and are the same estimates as those
presented in Column II in Table B.6. Column II also contains results from estimating
Equation 2.1 except college-specific time trends, f(t)δi, are omitted. Column III contains
results from the following estimation:
∆log(Yist) = β1EverMerits + ∆Wst + ∆Xit + δt + εist (B.1)
In Equation B.1, the outcomes of interest, Wst, and Xit are defined as in Equation 2.1
except the first differences of these variables are used in estimations. Also, EverMerits is
a binary indicator equal to one for all states that implemented merit aid programs. Lastly,
post-merit observations for all merit states are omitted from regressions. The coefficient of
interest, β1 describes any pre-existing trends in the outcomes of interest and is presented in
Column III.
Overall, the results indicate that estimates are sensitive to including college-specific time
trends, and there does appear to be non-parallel pre-treatment trends for merit and non-
merit states. Without accounting for school-specific trends, merit aid programs appear
to negatively affect in-state tuition and positively affect instructional expenditures and
institutional grants, but these impacts do not register as significant when I condition on
college-specific time trends. Also, all of these outcomes exhibit different pre-treatment trends
for colleges in merit versus non-merit states. For example, institutional grants increases
by 20.6% for merit states when college-specific time trends are omitted, but institutional
grants for colleges in merit states were on a 2.2% per year higher trend pre-treatment.
If the pre-treatment trend continued for these variables, this pre-treatment difference could
accumulate and largely explain the significant results found in Column II. Moreover, Column
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I demonstrates that merit aid programs no longer significantly impact institutional grants,
in-state tuition, or instructional expenditures when college-specific time trends are included.
Overall, Table B.10 demonstrates the sensitivity of results to accounting for linear trends at
the institution level or higher.
The estimates for private colleges are presented in Table B.11. Overall outcomes do not
seem to have differences in pre-treatment trends as much for private versus public colleges.
However, the gross amount of Pell grants for colleges in merit states are on a 1% per year
lower trend pre-treatment. This lower pre-treatment trend could be putting a downward bias
on the estimate that excludes school-specific trends especially as it registers as significant
when they are included in Column I. Altogether, both Table B.10 and B.11 demonstrate
the importance and need to account for linear trends at the institution level or higher in
addition to general time trends.
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In-state tuition -0.006 -0.070*** -0.007**
(0.012) (0.017) (0.003)
Out-of-state tuition 0.034* 0.044** -0.007**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.003)
Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts -0.147 -0.162 -0.010
(0.092) (0.100) (0.012)
Instructional expenditures 0.020 0.025** 0.004**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.002)
Student services expenditures 0.039** -0.020 -0.008**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.004)
Gross Pell 0.051* 0.016 0.006
(0.026) (0.033) (0.004)
Institutional grants 0.066 0.206*** 0.022**
(0.089) (0.076) (0.010)
Full-time faculty per 100 FTE students 0.039*** 0.015 0.005
(0.014) (0.019) (0.003)
State grants and contracts 0.906*** 0.478*** -0.022
(0.155) (0.120) (0.013)
State appropriations 0.048*** 0.036** 0.001
(0.012) (0.016) (0.002)
Observations 11,129 11,129 9,232
Notes: Column I lists the baseline estimates of the effect of merit aid programs on outcomes for public
colleges which are estimated using Equation 2.1. Column II is also estimated using Equation 2.1
except estimations exclude college-specific time trends. Column III lists estimates for pre-treatment
trends in outcomes using Equation B.1. Observations for each outcome vary as only institutions with
no more than two years of a missing dependent variable are included in each estimation, and as an
example, observations for in-state tuition are listed. Robust standard errors, clustered by institution,
are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Tuition 0.014 0.038* 0.003
(0.013) (0.021) (0.002)
Revenue from private gifts, grants, and contracts 0.033 -0.080 -0.010
(0.041) (0.050) (0.006)
Instructional Expenditures 0.039* -0.014 -0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.003)
Student Services Expenditures 0.039 -0.026 -0.001
(0.034) (0.033) (0.005)
Gross Pell 0.045* 0.000 -0.010*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.005)
Institutional Grants 0.064 0.076* 0.001
(0.041) (0.046) (0.007)
Full-time Faculty per 100 FTE students 0.023 0.004 0.001
(0.027) (0.021) (0.006)
Observations 22,279 22,279 18,893
Notes: Column I lists the baseline estimates of the effect of merit aid programs on outcomes for
private not-for-profit colleges which are estimated using Equation 2.1. Column II is also estimated
using Equation 2.1 except estimations exclude college-specific time trends. Column III lists estimates
for pre-treatment trends in outcomes using Equation B.1. Observations for each outcome vary as
only institutions with no more than two years of a missing dependent variable are included in each
estimation, and as an example, observations for tuition are listed. Robust standard errors, clustered
by institution, are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix C
Not Whether, but Where? Pell
Grants and College Choices
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Table C.1: Summary statistics by college-going status and bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Bandwidth-restricted sample
College-going? No (20.3%) Yes (79.7%) No (19.5%) Yes (80.5%)
Pell eligible 0.721 0.437 0.644 0.583
(0.449) (0.496) (0.479) (0.493)
Potential Pell award (thousands) 3.079 1.660 1.414 1.225
(2.175) (2.100) (1.280) (1.248)
Mother has a college education 0.246 0.438 0.272 0.388
(0.431) (0.496) (0.445) (0.487)
Father has a college education 0.143 0.357 0.151 0.265
(0.350) (0.479) (0.358) (0.441)
Eligible for TN HOPE 0.066 0.413 0.101 0.409
(0.249) (0.492) (0.302) (0.492)
Eligible for TN ACCESS 0.005 0.01 0.004 0.01
(0.070) (0.102) (0.061) (0.097)
Eligible for TN GAM 0.003 0.045 0.002 0.025
(0.058) (0.207) (0.047) (0.155)
White, non-Hispanic 0.642 0.748 0.733 0.739
(0.479) (0.434) (0.442) (0.439)
Female 0.529 0.561 0.474 0.564
(0.499) (0.496) (0.499) (0.496)
Best ACT Composite Score 18.9 21.2 19.0 20.8
(3.1) (4.3) (3.1) (4.0)
First ACT Composite Score 18.1 20.1 18.3 19.7
(2.9) (4.2) (2.9) (4.0)
Self-reported high school GPA 3.074 3.244 3.074 3.224
(0.451) (0.516) (0.458) (0.520)
Number of ACT attempts 1.8 2.1 1.8 2.1
(0.7) (1.0) (0.7) (1.0)
N (students) 28,470 112,046 6,852 28,340
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Source data describe four cohorts of Tennessee public high school
graduates from the classes of 2006-2009. The bandwidth-restricted subsample includes students
whose expected family contribution falls within $3,000 (nominal) of the Pell threshold.
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Enrolled in a public TN two-year college 0.334 0.374
(0.472) (0.484)
Enrolled in a public TN four-year college 0.461 0.442
(0.498) (0.497)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state two-year college 0.014 0.014
(0.117) (0.119)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state four-year college 0.047 0.038
(0.212) (0.191)
Enrolled in a private four-year college 0.137 0.127
(0.344) (0.333)
Enrolled in a private two-year college 0.007 0.005
(0.082) (0.068)
College quality outcomes
ACT Composite 25th Percentile Score (or SAT equivalent) 19.1 18.8
(2.9) (2.7)
ACT Composite 75th Percentile Score (or SAT equivalent) 24.3 24.0
(3.2) (3.1)
Instructional expenditures per FTE student (thousands) 7.054 6.638
(6.155) (5.812)
Student-to-faculty ratio 16.4 16.7
(5.6) (5.2)
Graduation rate, total cohort 35.0 33.0
(20.1) (19.3)
Published in-state tuition and fees (thousands) 6.501 6.146
(6.080) (5.774)
Published out-of-state tuition and fees (thousands) 14.631 14.129
(4.873) (4.681)
Tuition and fees conditional on student residency (thousands) 6.978 6.521
(6.396) (6.022)
”High research” or ”Very high research” Carnegie class 0.341 0.306
(0.474) (0.461)
N (students) 112,046 28,340
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Source data describe four cohorts of Tennessee public high school
graduates from the classes of 2006-2009. The bandwidth-restricted subsample includes students
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Figure C.1: Pell eligibility (Panel I) and potential grant amounts (Panel II), by distance from EFC
thresholds. Scatter points (dots) represent mean eligibility or grant by distance from Pell eligibility
thresholds, weighted by the number of students in each $100 EFC bin.
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Table C.3: Falsification tests for discontinuities in observables and predicted
outcomes
(1) (2)
Coefficient Robust St. Err.
Student characteristics
Mother has a college education 0.001 (0.012)
Father has a college education -0.016** (0.007)
Eligible for TN HOPE -0.015 (0.014)
Eligible for TN ACCESS -4.5E-04 (0.002)
Eligible for TN GAM 0.002 (0.003)
White, non-Hispanic 0.007 (0.008)
Female 0.004 (0.013)
Best ACT composite score -0.046 (0.086)
First ACT composite score -0.024 (0.095)
Self-reported high school GPA 0.006 (0.009)
Number of ACT attempts -0.006 (0.018)
Predicted college outcomes
Predicted: any college enrollment -0.006 (0.007)
Predicted: two-year in-state public enrollment 0.002 (0.003)
Predicted: four-year in-state enrollment -0.007 (0.006)
Predicted: two-year out-of-state public enrollment 8.0E-05 (2.6E-04)
Predicted: four-year out-of-state public enrollment 2.5E-04 (0.001)
Predicted: private four-year enrollment -0.001 (0.002)
Predicted: private two-year enrollment 1.0E-05 (1.6E-04)
Notes: N = 35,192 students. The table reports estimates of β1 from Equation 3.1,
applied to student observable variables (top panel) or predictions of college enrollment
outcomes (Ŷi, bottom panel) based on regressions of Yi against these same variables.
Robust standard errors, clustered by $100 EFC bin, are in parentheses next to each
coefficient.
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Figure C.2: Regression discontinuity results for any college enrollment. Scatter points (dots) represent
mean college enrollment by distance from Pell eligibility thresholds, weighted by the number of students in
each $100 EFC bin. Lines fit predictions from Equation 3.1. Point estimates for β1 are reported below figure
headings, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Regression discontinuity estimates for choice of college sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female White Black
Students Students Students Students Students
Enrolled in a public TN two-year college 0.001 -0.025 0.022 0.001 0.021
(0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
Enrolled in a public TN four-year college -0.008 0.017 -0.029* -0.005 -0.022
(0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.030)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state two-year college 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.007
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state four-year college 0.003 -0.007 0.011* 0.005 -0.003
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Enrolled in a private four-year college 0.001 0.013 -0.008 -0.007 0.009
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017)
Enrolled in a private two-year college 0.002 0.004* 1.5E-04 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
N (students ) 28,340 12,359 15,981 20,955 6,388
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 from Equation 3.1, applied to mutually exclusive and exhaustive
college sector outcomes. Robust standard errors, clustered by $100 EFC bin, are in parentheses next to each
coefficient.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.3: Regression discontinuity results for choice of college sector. Scatter points (dots) represent
college sector outcomes by distance from Pell eligibility thresholds, weighted by the number of students in
each $100 EFC bin. Lines fit predictions from Equation 3.1. Point estimates for β1 are reported below figure
headings, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Regression discontinuity estimates for quality of college chosen
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female White Black
Students Students Students Students Students
ACT 25th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.114 0.217** 0.031 0.083 0.028
(0.068) (0.103) (0.085) (0.079) (0.206)
ACT 75th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.115 0.314*** -0.043 0.091 0.031
(0.073) (0.113) (0.105) (0.086) (0.211)
Instructional expenditures per FTE student 21.4 118.7 -54.5 69.1 -556.7
(123.9) (182.5) (190.3) (137.8) (466.3)
Student-to-faculty ratio -0.224 -0.355* -0.123 -0.208 -0.109
(0.135) (0.195) (0.153) (0.143) (0.261)
Graduation rate 0.814 1.109 0.575 0.614 -0.102
(0.530) (0.829) (0.617) (0.621) (1.194)
In-state tuition and fees 162.1 246.5 100.2 78.7 -7.2
(135.7) (209.3) (185.1) (126.3) (358.9)
Out-of-state tuition and fees 149.5 260.7 61.5 148.0 -202.4
(134.6) (184.5) (156.6) (129.3) (332.5)
Tuition and fees, dependent on students’ residency 217.3 200.0 234.0 160.6 -54.3
(140.1) (218.0) (207.8) (139.8) (366.2)
”High research” or ”Very high research” Carnegie class 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.010 -0.044
(0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.027)
N (students ) 24,653 10,675 13,978 18,314 5,429
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 from Equation 3.1, applied to quality measures of students’ college choice.
Robust standard errors, clustered by $100 EFC bin, are in parentheses next to each coefficient.



















Figure C.4: N = 35,073 high school graduates. Treatment effect estimates for any college enrollment
below the eligibility threshold. Scatter points (dots) represent mean college enrollment by distance from
Pell eligibility thresholds, weighted by the number of students in each $100 EFC bin. X-markers represent
extrapolated college enrollment as predicted by a regression of outcomes against student observables above
the eligibility threshold. Lines fit predictions from Equation 3.1. Point estimates for treatment effects below
the threshold are reported below the figure heading, with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.5: N = 28,250 college-going students. Treatment effect estimates for college sector below the
eligibility threshold. Scatter points (dots) represent college sector outcomes by distance from Pell eligibility
thresholds, weighted by the number of students in each $100 EFC bin. X-markers represent extrapolated
college enrollment outcomes as predicted by a regression of outcomes against student observables above the
eligibility threshold. Lines fit predictions from Equation 3.1. Point estimates for treatment effects below the
threshold are reported below figure headings, with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.6: N = 28,250 college-going students. Treatment effect estimates for college quality below the
eligibility threshold. Scatter points (dots) represent college quality means by distance from Pell eligibility
thresholds, weighted by the number of students in each $100 EFC bin. X-markers represent extrapolated
quality outcomes as predicted by a regression of quality measures against student observables above the
eligibility threshold. Lines fit predictions from Equation 3.1. Point estimates for treatment effects below the
threshold are reported below figure headings, with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Below I present robustness and specification checks for our main regression discontinuity
analyses of Pell eligibility and college outcomes. Additionally, results for treatment effects
away from the eligibility threshold are presented for subsamples of students as well as results
for our implicit test of the bounded conditional independence assumption.
C.1 Regression Discontinuity Specification Checks
Table C.6 lists β1 estimates for any college enrollment across five different specifications of
Equation 3.1, enumerated A - F. Model A is our baseline specification, where the sample
is limited to students whose EFC falls within $3,000 of the Pell eligibility cut-off, the EFC
running variable is rounded to the nearest $100, and covariates other than EFC functional
forms are excluded. Results in the top row of Table C.6 can also be found in Figure C.2.
Model B adds a rich set of students’ pretreatment observables, summarized in Table C.1, as
well as cohort fixed effects. Model C returns to the specification without controls but narrows
the bandwidth to $1,500. Model D estimates Equation 3.1 under the optimal bandwidth for
each subsample, following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Out of concern that $100 EFC
bins are too narrow and introduce more noise than is necessary, in Model E we aggregate
the running variable to $500 EFC bins and re-estimate Equation 3.1. Lastly, Model F uses
a quadratic rather than a linear function for the gap between i’s EFC and the Pell eligibility
threshold for i’s cohort (EFCic − Ēc). As we show in Table C.6, these modifications to
the baseline specification do not affect our conclusions regarding Pell eligibility and college
enrollment per se. Discontinuities in college-going are generally insignificant, with some
counterintuitively negative point estimates that do not replicate across models A - F.
We do not estimate Equation 3.1 under bandwidths that include the full support of
Pell eligible EFC values, for reasons apparent in Figure C.7. The top panel of the figure
illustrates β1 point estimates and confidence intervals for bandwidths ranging from $500
- $20,000. Treatment effect estimates for college enrollment are significantly positive for
bandwidths of about $5,000 and greater. But the bottom panel of Figure C.7 illustrates why
that is the case. By construction, EFC is bounded by zero, and bandwidths that include
students with zero EFC – who constitute a large share of Pell-eligible students and who
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tend to enroll in college at a significantly lower rate than their peers – overstate the linear
discontinuity estimate at the eligibility threshold. These models let zero-EFC and $100-EFC
students have too much influence over discontinuity estimates at the cut-off.
Tables C.7 - C.9 depict regression discontinuity estimates for college sector and college
quality outcomes, overall and by gender. For college sector outcomes we add one specification
check to models A - F described above: namely, we include students who do not enroll in
college in the estimating equation.1 In Table C.7 we show that null college sorting results for
the sample overall generally hold up to variations of Equation 3.1. Exceptions are found in
Column (5) regarding published tuition and fee discontinuities within the optimal bandwidth,
but we note that these bandwidths (reported in brackets in Column (5)) are quite large and
include zero-EFC students. Larger EFC bins render more precise point estimates in Column
(6) for receiving institutions’ ACT interquartile range, student-to-faculty ratio, graduation
rate, and residency-based tuition. Turning to Tables C.8 and C.9 and comparing Columns
(1) and (6), we see that these alternative EFC aggregations underscore the same subsample
results that our baseline model detects.
Table C.8 lists college choice estimates for males, and we find that the positive treatment
effects on college selectivity (in terms of the ACT interquartile range of males’ selected
colleges) are robust to each alternative, albeit with much less precision under the narrow
bandwidth. Table C.9 repeats the same exercises for the female subsample, and we note
that females’ weakly significant substitution between in-state and out-of-state four-year
institutions is robust across different models.
C.2 Treatment Effects Away from the Eligibility Thresh-
old by Gender and Race
Now turning to treatment effects away from the eligibility threshold, Table C.10 holds results
for our implicit test of the bounded conditional independence assumption that underlies the
analysis of these effects. The table lists point estimates and standard errors for the π
1College quality outcomes are of course undefined for these students, so Column (1) and (2) results for
the nine IPEDS college quality measures are identical.
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parameter in Equation 3.2, i.e., the relationship between college outcomes listed in the left-
hand column of Table C.10 and the running variable EFCic− Ēc for Pell-ineligible students.
With the small but statistically significant exception of out-of-state four-year enrollment, we
find that the running variable is an insignificant component of college choice, conditional on
students’ Xic.
Table C.11 lists treatment effects away from the eligibility threshold for subsamples of
students. Column (1) lists results for all students which are the same as those presented in
Figures C.4, C.5, and C.6, and estimates by gender and race are presented in Columns (2)
through (5). Similar to results for all students, Pell eligibility has no significant treatment
effect on college going below the threshold for these subsamples of students, and likewise, we
find little meaningful impacts on students’ chosen college sector below the Pell cut-off. The
exception is for enrollment in a private four-year college, and this positive treatment effect
below the threshold is concentrated among male and white students. Regression discontinuity
results from Tables C.5 and C.8 indicate that marginal Pell eligibility leads males to sort
into more selective colleges, in terms of the ACT scores of preceding classes. Table C.11
finds no such treatment effect below the threshold, suggesting that males’ sensitivity to Pell
grants is very local with regards to colleges’ ACT intake. In terms of the price of college,
however, students below the Pell cut-off – particularly males and whites – attend colleges
with higher tuition and fees,2 in contrast to null discontinuities at the threshold for all four
subgroups (Table C.5).
Perhaps the most intriguing results in Table C.11 are those when the estimating sample
is restricted to white students (Column (4)). White students below the threshold are more
apt to enroll in private four-year institutions (by 1.3 percentage points, or 10 percent of
the mean), and they attend institutions with higher ACT scores (by 0.5 - 0.7 percent of
the mean), higher graduation rates (by 2.5 percent of the mean), and higher tuition and
fees on the order of 15 - 16 cents per dollar of Pell aid. Given high returns to college
quality documented elsewhere, it is conceivable that whites’ behavioral changes due to Pell
eligibility will yield modest returns over a career. The fact that these findings do not extend
2Unreported regression kink estimates similarly find a change in the slope of out-of-state tuition with
respect to white students’ EFC of 17 cents per dollar of Pell.
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to under-represented minorities is concerning, as is the broader argument that much less
costly interventions have proven to be more effective in changing student behavior.
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Table C.6: Regression discontinuity specification checks for any college
enrollment, by gender and race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female White Black
Students Students Students Students Students
A. Baseline estimates -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016* 0.008
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017)
B. With covariates -0.006 0.001 -0.012* -0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011)
C. Narrow bandwidth (1,500) -0.014 -0.007 -0.021 -0.017 -0.007
(0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.023)
D. Optimal bandwidth -0.011 -0.008 -0.018 -0.013 -0.003
(0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020)
[$1,742] [$2,122] [$1,905] [$1,903] [$2,331]
E. $500 EFC bins -0.011 -0.015 -0.008 -0.017* 0.016
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
F. Quadratic -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016* 0.008
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017)
N (thousands) 17.7 - 35.1 8.0 - 16.0 9.7 - 19.2 13.5 - 26.0 3.7 - 8.0
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 from Equation 3.1, applied to the binary incidence
of any college enrollment. Row A displays results from our baseline specification, also
found in Figure C.2. Row B illustrates results when covariates (cohort fixed effects and Xi
variables listed in Table C.1) are included in Equation 3.1. Row C lists results when the
bandwidth around the Pell eligibility threshold is narrowed from $3,000 to $1,500. Row
D lists results under the optimal bandwidth for each outcome and subsample (Imbens and
Kalyanaraman, 2012). Row E lists results when we aggregate the EFC running variable to
$500 bins rather than $100 bins. Row F lists results when a quadratic rather than a linear
function is used for EFCic − Ēc, the gap between i’s EFC and that cohort’s Pell eligibility
threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered by $100 EFC bin, are in parentheses under
each coefficient. Optimal bandwidths are in brackets below standard errors in Row D.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.7: Sensitivity of regression discontinuity results to bandwidth. Panel I: RD treatment effect
estimates and confidence intervals for any college enrollment, by bandwidth. Panel II: Scatter points (dots)
represent mean college enrollment by distance from Pell eligibility thresholds, weighted by the number of
students in each $100 EFC bin. Lines fit predictions from Equation 3.1. Point estimates for treatment effects
below the threshold are reported below figure headings, with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Regression discontinuity specification checks for college sector and college quality, all students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All HS With Narrow Optimal $500
Baseline graduates covariates BW BW EFC bins Quadratic
Enrolled in a public TN two-year college 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.007 -0.002 -0.005 0.001
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
[$2,418]
Enrolled in a public TN four-year college -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.024 -0.011 -0.007 -0.009
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
[$2,491]
Enrolled in a public out-of-state two-year college 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[$6,269]
Enrolled in a public out-of-state four-year college 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
[$3,764]
Enrolled in a private four-year college 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
[$8,683]
Enrolled in a private two-year college 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[$2,823]
ACT 25th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.114 0.114 0.095* 0.076 0.08 0.120* 0.113
(0.068) (0.068) (0.054) (0.094) (0.080) (0.063) (0.068)
[$2,117]
ACT 75th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.115 0.115 0.094 0.102 0.155* 0.127* 0.114
(0.073) (0.073) (0.059) (0.105) (0.087) (0.067) (0.072)
[$2,350]
Instructional expenditures per FTE student 21.4 21.4 -13.8 -64.2 19.6 -15.5 21.2
(123.9) (123.9) (122.7) (152.7) (120.9) (118.0) (123.0)
[$3,244]
Student-to-faculty ratio -0.224 -0.224 -0.155 -0.151 -0.133 -0.255* -0.222
(0.135) (0.135) (0.118) (0.204) (0.193) (0.138) (0.133)
[$1,691]
Graduation rate 0.814 0.814 0.645 0.667 0.796 0.983* 0.808
(0.530) (0.530) (0.432) (0.709) (0.633) (0.507) (0.523)
[$2,181]
In-state tuition and fees 162.1 162.1 143.9 197.2 319.5*** 204.4 166.4
(135.7) (135.7) (123.7) (146.8) (90.0) (138.1) (135.2)
[$32,483]
Out-of-state tuition and fees 149.5 149.5 148.4 117.3 201.2 173.7 150.8
(134.6) (134.6) (99.0) (190.8) (149.9) (130.6) (132.0)
[$2,496]
Tuition and fees, dependent on students’ residency 217.3 217.3 203.5 284.5** 372.6*** 273.0* 221.1
(140.1) (140.1) (131.6) (136.9) (116.3) (142.9) (138.3)
[$8,217]
Carnegie: Very High or High Research 0.007 0.007 0.005 -0.016 0.002 0.009 0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
[$2,569]
N (maximum) 28,340 35,192 28,340 14,324 22,826 28,340 28,340
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 from Equation 3.1, applied to the binary incidence of college sector or measures of college quality. Column (1) displays results from our baseline
specification, also found in Table C.4 and in Table C.5. Column (2) displays results when the estimating sample covers all high school graduates, including those who did not go to college.
Column (3) illustrates results when covariates (cohort fixed effects and Xi variables listed in Table C.1) are included in Equation 3.1. Column (4) lists results when the bandwidth around
the Pell eligibility threshold is narrowed from $3,000 to $1,500. Column (5) lists results under the optimal bandwidth for each outcome and subsample (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012).
Column (6) lists results when we aggregate the EFC running variable to $500 bins rather than $100 bins. Column (7) lists results when a quadratic rather than a linear function is used for
EFCic − Ēc, the gap between i’s EFC and that cohort’s Pell eligibility threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered by $100 EFC bin, are in parentheses under each coefficient. Optimal
bandwidths are in brackets below standard errors in Column (5). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Regression discontinuity specification checks for college sector and college quality, males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All HS With Narrow Optimal $500
Baseline graduates covariates BW BW EFC bins Quadratic
Enrolled in a public TN two-year college -0.025 -0.024 -0.020 -0.038 -0.02 -0.032 -0.025
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
[$2,675]
Enrolled in a public TN four-year college 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.017
(0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
[$3,166]
Enrolled in a public out-of-state two-year college -0.001 -0.001 -1.6E-04 -0.003 0.003 3.7E-04 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
[$18,106]
Enrolled in a public out-of-state four-year college -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
[$2,972]
Enrolled in a private four-year college 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.025* 0.013* 0.012 0.013
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
[$7,143]
Enrolled in a private two-year college 0.004* 0.003* 0.004* 0.002 0.001 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[$4,463]
ACT 25th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.217** 0.217** 0.185* 0.174 0.194* 0.212** 0.219**
(0.103) (0.103) (0.094) (0.138) (0.112) (0.096) (0.102)
[$2,472]
ACT 75th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.284** 0.242 0.293** 0.305*** 0.317***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.107) (0.151) (0.114) (0.106) (0.114)
[$2,773]
Instructional expenditures per FTE student 118.7 118.7 70.5 264.6 44.0 57.6 126.5
(182.5) (182.5) (179.7) (208.0) (172.9) (180.1) (183.3)
[$3,971]
Student-to-faculty ratio -0.355* -0.355* -0.291* -0.436 -0.263 -0.390* -0.357*
(0.195) (0.195) (0.174) (0.302) (0.263) (0.198) (0.191)
[$1,950]
Graduation rate 1.109 1.109 0.847 1.037 1.291 1.278 1.122
(0.829) (0.829) (0.764) (1.178) (1.009) (0.797) (0.809)
[$2,377]
In-state tuition and fees 246.5 246.5 216.3 441.7 341.5** 234.0 255.1
(209.3) (209.3) (201.0) (285.6) (144.7) (207.9) (213.1)
[$9,905]
Out-of-state tuition and fees 260.7 260.7 196.7 333.7 250.0 266.5 263.5
(184.5) (184.5) (162.4) (274.4) (192.5) (179.3) (182.4)
[$2,875]
Tuition and fees, dependent on students’ residency 200.0 200.0 198.1 346.0 388.1** 209.5 208.3
(218.0) (218.0) (209.7) (287.5) (177.7) (221.1) (218.9)
[$4,808]
Carnegie: Very High or High Research 0.009 0.009 0.004 -0.003 0.009 0.011 0.009
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
[$3,065]
N (maximum) 12,359 15,960 12,359 6,249 10,787 12,359 12,359
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 from Equation 3.1, applied to the binary incidence of college sector or measures of college quality. The estimating sample is limited to males. Column
(1) displays results from our baseline specification, also found in Table C.4 and in Table C.5. Column (2) displays results when the estimating sample covers all high school graduates, including
those who did not go to college. Column (3) illustrates results when covariates (cohort fixed effects and Xi variables listed in Table C.1) are included in Equation 3.1. Column (4) lists results
when the bandwidth around the Pell eligibility threshold is narrowed from $3,000 to $1,500. Column (5) lists results under the optimal bandwidth for each outcome and subsample (Imbens
and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Column (6) lists results when we aggregate the EFC running variable to $500 bins rather than $100 bins. Column (7) lists results when a quadratic rather than
a linear function is used for EFCic − Ēc, the gap between i’s EFC and that cohort’s Pell eligibility threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered by $100 EFC bin, are in parentheses under
each coefficient. Optimal bandwidths are in brackets below standard errors in Column (5). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.9: Regression discontinuity specification checks for college sector and college quality, females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All HS With Narrow Optimal $500
Baseline graduates covariates BW BW EFC bins Quadratic
Enrolled in a public TN two-year college 0.022 0.013 0.020 0.043* 0.016 0.017 0.022
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
[$2,744]
Enrolled in a public TN four-year college -0.029* -0.029* -0.025* -0.058** -0.034* -0.029* -0.029*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
[$2,599]
Enrolled in a public out-of-state two-year college 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
[$5,366]
Enrolled in a public out-of-state four-year college 0.011* 0.009* 0.009* 0.017** 0.004 0.012** 0.011*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
[$9,307]
Enrolled in a private four-year college -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.008
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
[$15,413]
Enrolled in a private two-year college 1.5E-04 5.0E-05 0.001 4.9E-04 4.0E-04 4.8E-04 1.6E-04
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[$2,801]
ACT 25th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.031 0.031 0.024 -0.001 0.051 0.048 0.027
(0.085) (0.085) (0.070) (0.112) (0.093) (0.080) (0.086)
[$2,262]
ACT 75th percentile (or SAT equivalent) -0.043 -0.043 -0.055 -0.009 0.028 -0.013 -0.047
(0.105) (0.105) (0.084) (0.151) (0.117) (0.099) (0.107)
[$2,494]
Instructional expenditures per FTE student -54.5 -54.5 -91.8 -322.7 -86.2 -71.7 -62.5
(190.3) (190.3) (185.7) (221.7) (178.1) (191.0) (192.4)
[$3,392]
Student-to-faculty ratio -0.123 -0.123 -0.034 0.071 0.005 -0.15 -0.117
(0.153) (0.153) (0.135) (0.198) (0.187) (0.154) (0.156)
[$1,853]
Graduation rate 0.575 0.575 0.462 0.391 0.927 0.744 0.549
(0.617) (0.617) (0.537) (0.778) (0.640) (0.607) (0.631)
[$2,500]
In-state tuition and fees 100.2 100.2 90.0 6.0 199.5 185.4 100.6
(185.1) (185.1) (184.4) (227.9) (146.1) (193.4) (187.5)
[$11,950]
Out-of-state tuition and fees 61.5 61.5 108.8 -52.1 198.1 100.4 61.3
(156.6) (156.6) (122.9) (194.9) (159.9) (155.4) (156.1)
[$2,731]
Tuition and fees, dependent on students’ residency 234.0 234.0 210.0 239.6 387.2** 326.4 233.7
(207.8) (207.8) (212.9) (264.9) (178.8) (214.0) (211.2)
[$7,182]
Carnegie: Very High or High Research 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.026 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
[$2,763]
N (maximum) 15,981 19,232 15,981 8,075 14,975 15,981 15,981
Notes: The table reports estimates of β1 from Equation 3.1, applied to the binary incidence of college sector or measures of college quality. The estimating sample is limited to females.
Column (1) displays results from our baseline specification, also found in Table C.4 and in Table C.5. Column (2) displays results when the estimating sample covers all high school
graduates, including those who did not go to college. Column (3) illustrates results when covariates (cohort fixed effects and Xi variables listed in Table C.1) are included in Equation
3.1. Column (4) lists results when the bandwidth around the Pell eligibility threshold is narrowed from $3,000 to $1,500. Column (5) lists results under the optimal bandwidth for each
outcome and subsample (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Column (6) lists results when we aggregate the EFC running variable to $500 bins rather than $100 bins. Column (7) lists
results when a quadratic rather than a linear function is used for EFCic − Ēc, the gap between i’s EFC and that cohort’s Pell eligibility threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered by
$100 EFC bin, are in parentheses under each coefficient. Optimal bandwidths are in brackets below standard errors in Column (5). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.10: Conditional independence assumption specification checks
(1) (2)
Coefficient on EFCic − Ēc (St. Err.)
Enrolled in any college -3.2E-04 (0.003)
Enrolled in a public TN two-year college -0.006 (0.005)
Enrolled in a public TN four-year college -0.001 (0.005)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state two-year college 0.001 (0.001)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state four-year college 0.006*** (0.002)
Enrolled in a private four-year college -1.4E-04 (0.004)
Enrolled in a private two-year college 0.001 (0.001)
ACT 25th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.039 (0.027)
ACT 75th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.049 (0.032)
Instructional expenditures per FTE student -86.5 (60.8)
Student-faculty ratio -0.048 (0.056)
Graduation rate 0.181 (0.184)
In-state tuition and fees 2.8 (60.2)
Out-of-state tuition and fees -41.0 (45.3)
Tuition and fees, dependent on students’ residency 67.7 (62.5)
Carnegie: Very High or High Research 0.002 (0.005)
Notes: The table reports estimates of π from Equation 3.2, applied to the binary incidence
of college enrollment, binary college sector outcomes, or college quality measures. Outcomes
Yic for students i, cohort c are regressed against observable characteristics (Xic: real family
adjusted gross income (AGI), the EFC-AGI ratio, mothers’ and fathers’ college education,
race, gender, first ACT composite score, the number of ACT attempts made, a binary
indicator for missing ACT data) and EFCic− Ēc, the gap between i’s EFC and that cohort’s
Pell eligibility threshold. Standard errors are listed in parentheses beside each coefficient.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.11: Treatment effect estimates for outcomes below the eligibility threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female White Black
Students Students Students Students Students
Any college enrollment -0.003 -0.004 0.007 -0.007 0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.018)
Enrolled in a public TN two-year college -0.004 -0.016 -0.004 -0.010 0.003
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.021)
Enrolled in a public TN four-year college -0.002 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.017
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.024)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state two-year college -0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.002 -0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Enrolled in a public out-of-state four-year college -0.005 -0.013** 0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013)
Enrolled in a private four-year college 0.011* 0.019** 0.003 0.013** 0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.016)
Enrolled in a private two-year college 2.3E-04 0.002 -0.002 0.002** -0.011*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007)
ACT 25th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.074 0.107 0.032 0.131*** -0.112
(0.046) (0.071) (0.067) (0.047) (0.143)
ACT 75th percentile (or SAT equivalent) 0.068 0.112 0.024 0.121** -0.057
(0.053) (0.083) (0.078) (0.056) (0.162)
Instructional expenditures per FTE student 228.9 330.9* -116.9 307.0** -347.3
(147.3) (177.5) (156.5) (146.3) (330.3)
Student-to-faculty ratio -0.081 -0.117 0.062 -0.135 0.211
(0.088) (0.124) (0.138) (0.095) (0.292)
Graduation rate 0.537* 0.678 0.488 0.820** -0.553
(0.301) (0.461) (0.463) (0.328) (0.834)
In-state tuition and fees 261.1** 388.6*** 96.6 341.1*** -194.5
(106.8) (149.7) (145.4) (112.7) (287.0)
Out-of-state tuition and fees 299.3*** 334.2*** 318.7*** 347.4*** 242.7
(75.7) (112.2) (114.3) (78.9) (232.6)
Tuition and fees, dependent on students’ residency 213.6* 289.6* 91.4 311.7*** -207.7
(111.6) (160.2) (151.3) (118.2) (299.5)
Carnegie: Very High or High Research -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 0.024
(0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.024)
Notes: N = 35,073 high school graduates for any college enrollment and 28,250 college-going students for other outcomes.
The table reports treatment effect estimates for outcomes below the eligibility threshold and are calculated as described
in Section 3.4.3. Column (1) lists results for all students which are the same as those presented in Figures C.4, C.5, and
C.6. Columns (2) through (5) list results by subgroups of students. The estimating sample for any college enrollment
includes all high school graduates while the estimating sample is restricted to college-going students for outcomes
regarding college sector and college quality. Standard errors are calculated following Kline (2011) and are in parentheses
under each coefficient.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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